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ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts to provide an historicised account o f excuse-making 
stiategies in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literature. This issue is 
considered, broadly, in the light o f the pervasive influence of rhetoric in early 
modem cultui'e at lar ge, and specifically, as an aspect of the rhetorical 
construction of moral ambiguity in Shakespearean drama. Its chief concern is 
with the intractable ambiguity of 'favourable interpretations’ or ‘charitable 
constr uctions’ o f actions or events, the apparent desirability of which seems 
beyond doubt.
Chapter I uses the ‘generosity’ often regarded as Shalcespeare’s own 
trademark as a way into exploring the aims of the thesis. Its central section 
focuses more closely on the ambiguity inherent in a ‘female rhetoric’ of 
mitigation, apology and extenuation. Where these chapters concentrate on 
‘covert’ excuse-making strategies. Chapter V, by contrast, begins with an 
exploration of the ear ly modern tr ansformation (or domestication) o f classical, 
female orators into decent, modest, seventeenth-century women. The thesis 
concludes with an account o f Shakespeare’s suppliant women, a group of 
petitioners who are repeatedly represented ‘between men’. The persistence of 
this pattern, I argue, str esses the extent to which excuse-rnaldng is gendered, and 
might be read, as well, as the playwright’s own attempt to ‘contain’ the radical 
moral ambiguity (radical because as difficult to condone as to condemn) 
generated by such ‘female’ excuse-making.
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The Preface to the Reader
So many Criticks have we in these dales that 
nothing can well passe without an Apologie J
When Samuel Kendrick stood up before his congregation at Eckington, 
on the twelfth of November 1626, he little realised how thankftil he would be to 
step down. All tangible primary evidence of what was said to him during and 
after the sermon has long since vanished. Yet the wealth of prefatoiy material 
attached to its printed form (published a year later) suggests that strong 
objections to the message were raised at the time.
The subject so displeasing to Kendrick’s audience was the enmity of the 
Galatians towards St. Paul, once a fiiend for whom they would have ‘pulled out 
their owne eyes’. Having been censured by him for some eiTor of judgement, 
however, the ‘foolish Galatians’ giew so embittered that the apostle, amazed at 
this sudden volte face, asked, ‘Am I therefore become your enemy, because I tell 
you the truth?For liis own part, Kendiick cannot understand why a relationship 
based on mutual love and respect should not sui^ vive such honesty. Quite baffled, 
he resignedly concedes the existence of a precedent for this unnatuial behavioui’:
But so it fared with Christ himselfe ... A mans enemies shall 
be those of his owne house; Jobs owne wife against him:
Absolon seekes his owne fathers overthrow: Ismael mockes his 
owne brother: what wonder then, if a Ministers owne hearers 
oppose themselves against him?^
In his choice of subject matter, at least, Kendrick is happy. His evocation of the 
Galatians’ hostility to Paul lends a satisfying inevitability to his own first-hand 
experience of the ‘Tell-Troths requital’.
The minister was no doubt pleased with the parallel, but probably realised 
it was not exact. It becomes clear, as the preface continues, that his experience of
* Hemy Morely, The Cleansing o f  the Leper (London, 1604), sig. A2v.
 ^Samuel Kendrick, The Tell-Troths Requital, or Truth's Recompense (London, 1627), pp. 21, 10 
and 20.
 ^Ibid., p. 14.
truth-telling differed from Paul’s, and his listeners’ reactions from those of the 
Galatians, in one important respect. Whereas Paul’s flock cared little ‘with what 
straine of words he stud[ied] to please’ them, whether with ‘plainnesse of speech’ 
or with ‘eloquence’, since it was ‘the matter that occasion[ed their] hatred; the 
telling of the Truth" (20), Kendrick’s own parishioners obviously had ears rather 
for the manner of his delivery than for its substance. As he puts it in his 
dedicatoiy epistle to the ‘Ministers o f the Gospell of the Truth’, ‘if in this 
Pamphlet’:
my phrase shall seeme too clownish, (for such was the 
adversaries comment upon the delivery) pardon it, and say, I 
live among my fellowes, and have not, as yet, learned any 
better eloquence, than (with the home bred Souldier) to call a 
Spade a Spade. Besides, some of you Icnow, that Physick is a 
part of my profession and practice: and therein of strong 
poison, I malce an wholesome medicine: why may not then 
some Balme of Gilead (by a divine confection) be extracted 
out of a harsh plnase; which (simply taken) may breed an 
offence (sig. A3).
The sincerity of Kendiick’s apology for his ‘dull oratory’ (sig. A2v) is 
undermined here by his pride in the manly willingness with which he ‘call[s] a 
spade a spade’. This covert boast notwithstanding, his textual preliminaries are 
not without their concessions to ‘eloquence’. As it appears on the page, 
Kendrick’s alleged preference for plain tmth telling (even at the risk of 
‘breed[ing] an offence’) competes for space with exactly the same conventions of 
deference as appear in the vast majority of early modern prefatory epistles.'^  
Injected into Kendrick’s defence of his own (and Paul’s) truth telling are repeated 
cravings for indulgence from his fellow ministers. ‘Nor is my request without 
reason’, he says, ‘if  you consider the nature of my subject; where nobility entreats 
not onely the courtesie, but commands the debt of youi* acceptance’ (sig. A2v). 
Thus, having preached a sermon to ‘Critickes, whose best learning consists of 
censuring others’, ‘Bastard Curs’ who, ‘when they dare not bite, dare baike’, 
Kendrick offers its printed version to others from whom he expects more
The classic h-eatnient of this subject is J.W. Saunders’s ‘The Stigma of Print: A Note on the 
Social Bases of Tudor Poetry’, Essays in Criticism 1.2 (1951): 139-64. See also Clara Gebeit,
sympathy: his ‘Brethren, whose grave discretion & Christian love have taught 
you to cover an error’ (sig. A3).
But talcing orders was not the only means by which Kendrick’s 
contemporaries learned how to ‘cover an error’. Other methods were learnt at 
school, and with complete impunity, as part of the early modem training in 
rhetoric designed to prepare young men for active civic duty. To provide an 
account of the factors governing eaiiy modem subjects’ mobilisation of such 
exculpatory str ategies, and to examine the nature of the str ategies themselves, ar e 
the principal aims of this thesis. The investigation to follow, however, will 
focus, for the most part, on the impact of this training on negotiations conducted 
in a somewhat less ‘public’ sphere. This emphasis is not quite as wilfully 
perwerse as it sounds. As Thomas Conley has argued:
Even when rhetoric ceased to have direct political relevance, 
the habits of mind, the concern with eloquence and the 
methods of analysis rhetoric provided, continued to saturate the 
literary production of the age. In short, far from being ‘a 
monstrous aberration,’ as the historian Burckhart once 
characterized it, rhetoric is in many ways the key to a proper 
understanding of the culture of the Renaissance.^
Conley’s evocation o f ‘rhetoric’ in this passage corresponds to the first 
definition of the word in the OED. ‘Rhetoric’, this piece of scholarly apparatus 
tells us, is ‘the art of using language so as to persuade or influence others; the 
body of mles to be observed by a speaker or writer in order drat he may express 
Irimself with eloquence’.^  Any Tudor grammar' school-boy would have been 
familiar (perhaps painfully so) with the ‘body of mles’ mentioned here. In the 
Institutio Oratoria, a text whose influence on early modem pedagogy is well 
known,^ Quintilian broke down what he called the ‘system of oratory’ into five
ed., An Anthology o f Elizabethan Dedications and Prefaces, rpt. (New York: Russell & Russell, 
1966).
 ^Thomas Conley, Rhetoric in the European Tradition (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1990), p. 143.
 ^rhetoric la.
’ John O. Ward, for example, has shown that between 1482 and 1599 upwards o f foity editions 
presented texts of the Institutes with amiotations, commentaries, and also (or instead oQ 
castigationes or argumenta. See his ‘Renaissance Commentators on Ciceronian Rhetoric’, in 
James J. Muiphy, ed.. Renaissance Eloquence: Studies in the Theoiy and Practice o f
constituent parts: inventio, dispositîo, elocutio, memoria, andpronunciatio. By 
following the rules o f invention, disposition, elocution, memory and delivery, the 
student learned how to find matter for, how to arrange, how to decorate, how to 
memorise, and finally, how to deliver, an accomplished oration. Used in this 
sense, the word ‘rhetoric’ refers to a discipline, the mastery of which, classical 
and early modern theorists believed, resulted in discourse capable of persuading 
or influencing others— the ‘art’, that is to say, of ‘expressing [oneself] with 
eloquence’.
This is not the sense in which the word ‘rhetoric’ tends to be used today. 
In the section on ‘language’ in his Shakespeare primer, Sean McBvoy claims that 
rhetoric has ‘acquired a generally bad press’: that we ‘use the phrase “just 
rhetoric” to mean bluster empty of reason or logic’.® Chris Park’s account of the 
international debate on pollution, entitled Rain: Rhetoric and Reality, 
identifies rhetoric, quite explicitly, as something very different fi'om truth. Here, 
again, ‘rhetoric’ is discovered at the heart of the political —  acquiring a negative 
moral value through its association with ‘spin’. Writing in 1946, when the term 
was not yet current, George Orwell declared that ‘political speech and writing are 
largely the defence of the indefensible’ happenings ‘which are too brutal for most 
people to face’:
Thus political language has to consist lar gely of euphemism, 
question begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenceless 
villages are bombarded firom the air, the inhabitants driven out 
into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on 
fire with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification ...
People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot hr the 
back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber 
camps: this is called elimination o f unreliable elements. Such 
phraseology is needed if one wants to name things without 
calling up mental pictures o f them.^
I, too, will be concerned with the ‘phraseology’ used to ‘name things 
without calling up mental pictur es o f them’, and with ideas of ‘defence’ more
Renaissance Rhetoric (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1983), 
pp. 158-62, at pp. 158-9.
* Sean McEvoy, Shakespeare: The Basics (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 53.
 ^George Orwell, Politics and the English Language’, in Collected Essays (London: Seeker & 
Warbui-g, 1961), p. 353.
generally, but am chiefly interested in the kinds of excuse which, for various 
reasons, could not be condemned so soundly. This is not to say that they were 
condoned; on the contrary, as I hope to show, the reluctance of early modern 
subjects to ‘call a spade a spade’ was still regarded with suspicion, even when it 
was not motivated by the anticipation of personal profit or preferment.
With this focus in mind, there ar e reasons other than the obvious one for 
beginning with prefaces. The early modern preface is itself an exercise in 
apology, extenuation and mitigation —  a kind of special pleading to the reader to 
overlook deficiencies. Samuel Kendrick’s hope that the men to whom his book 
was dedicated would ‘cover [his] error’ is repeated in the many prefaces which 
imagine such ‘covering’ in terms of physical protection. Professing perturbation 
at the inherent ‘weakness’ o f his text, Fynes Moryson commends the Itinerary 
(1617) to the protection of William, Earl o f Pembroke, fully confident that 
however fragile ‘it shall triumph under the safeguard of that massy shield’. A 
more elaborate but basically identical device reappears in a preface by the 
physician W. Cuningham. In this case it is Sir Robert Dudley before whom the 
‘humble suter’ Cuningham places his textual offering, ardently desirous ‘that it 
may come forth under your noble protection: and be defended as Teucer was 
rmder the shield of mighty Ajax’.^ ®
For an author to crave protection fi'om a patron for a work flawed by his 
own inexperience was a form of self-exculpation used as standar d. Early modem 
prefatory epistles positively overflow with self-effacing admissions o f their 
authors’ literary gaucheries. In his epistle ‘To the Courteous and uncomteous 
Readers’, William Hall shows signs of being afflicted with this disease, one of 
the symptoms of which, appar ently, is the sufferer’s compulsion to flatly deny 
ever having possessed any aptitude for his subject whatsoever. ‘I must confesse 
my Muse is young and tender’, he writes:
And this is all the scuse that I can render.
This is the first time shee did ever write;
Therefore with currish words doe not her bite.
Lest in her budding you doe spoyle her growth.
If that you should doe so I should be loth:
Give her no ill words with good words her nourish.
10 W. Cuningham, The Cosmographical Glasse (London, 1559), sig. A2v.
That shee in time may grow, and bud, and flourish.11
Hall excuses his own text here by implying that for his readers not to do likewise 
would constitute a fundamental rejection of Christian charity. Similarly, when 
Samuel Kendrick explained to his congregation that Christian charity taught 
readers to ‘cover an error’ he was in a sense maldng an excuse for rhetoric itself, 
by redefining its arts in terms of a moral virtue.
These last two words —  ‘moral’ and ‘virtue’ —  do not occur very 
frequently in recent criticism of eariy modern literature. According to Debora 
Shuger, ‘the recent lack of interest in the religious significance o f Shakespearean 
drama stems in part from a suspicion that it possessed no such significance’.^ ^
My own approach to the subject is in part informed by Shuger’s claim that ‘if  it is 
not plausible to read Shakespeare’s plays as Christian allegories, neither is it 
likely that the popular drama of a religiously saturated cultur e could, by a secular 
miracle, have extricated itself from the theocentric orientation informing the 
discourses of politics, gender, social order and h i s t o r y M y  aim in what 
follows is to examine early modern excuse-maldng strategies in the light o f such 
discour'ses, and in particular, to draw attention to the radical ambiguity of excuses 
made by women in this setting.
At the beginning of this preface I suggested that the early modern training 
in rhetoric could have helped young men learm how to ‘cover an error’, and 
certainly, part of that training might have involved learning how to use the 
rhetorical figure (to which we will return in Chapter II) designed to ‘excuse a 
fault, and to make an offence seem less than it is’. The assumption that such 
linguistic strategies would help men malce their way in the world is, o f cour se, 
part o f the reason that they were regar ded with suspicion. At the same time as 
Samuel Kendrick, for example, berates those whose ‘best learning is to censure 
others, his harping on ‘spades’ is clearly underwritten by an assumption about the 
inextricable linlc between rhetoric and insincerity. The language which we might
William Hall, Mortalities Meditation; or, a Description ofSinne (London, 1624), sig. A3r. 
Debora K. Shuger, ‘Subversive Fathers and Suffering Subjects: Shakespeare and Christianity’, 
in Donna B. Hamilton and Richard Strier, eds., Religion, Literature, and Politics in Post- 
Reformation England, 1540-1688 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 46.
Ibid.
now associate with the politician was in the early modem period often associated 
with the flatterer —  whose ‘base mind is well matched with a mercenary tongue’, 
who is ‘a Porter of all good tales, and mends them in the carriage’, and who ‘hath 
salves for every sore, to hide them not to heale them’.^ "^ My aim in this thesis is 
to reassess the moral implications of such strategies when they ar e used for 
apparently less dubious purposes, by figures whose gender would, for the most 
part, have denied them a training in rhetoric, but whose creator, Shakespeare, 
would have received just such a training.
Joseph Hall, Characters ofVertues and Vices, in The Works o f Joseph Hall (London, 1634), 
pp. 173-4.
Chapter I 
Deliberating Shakespeare
Shakespeare has pleased many and pleased long 
because his is the art of humankindness/
In a poll conducted at the end of 1998, listeners to Radio 4’s Today
program voted William Shalcespeai*e their ‘personality of the millennium’. Since 
the ‘Stratford poet’ Irimself was obviously unavailable for comment, The Times 
invited Stanley Wells, vice-chairman o f the Royal Shakespeare Theatre and 
chairman of the Shakespeare Birthplace Trust, to say a few words on his behalf. 
Professor Wells said that the playwright’s enduring appeal transcended social, 
cultural, and linguistic boundaries, because his work was ‘grounded in a 
profound humanity and reflected the things that mattered in everyday life’.^
Appropriated and recast by the article’s author, Wells’s response ends up 
providing the by-line for the entire piece. ‘SHAKESPEARE, whose timeless 
writing, poetic vision and profound humanity is celebrated the world over, has 
been named as the personality of the millennium’, Alexandra Frean exclaimed. 
Frean is obviously par aphrasing the eminent Shalcespearean here, but in the 
process of doing so she has subtly but significantly altered his meaning. She is, 
admittedly, writing a laudatory piece for a non-specialist audience; and to 
criticise her (quite possibly unconscious) slippage from the ‘profound humanity’ 
evident in Shakespeare’s work, to the ‘profound humanity’ of Shakespeare 
himself, is, perhaps, a little churlish. After all, Alexandra Frean is hardly the first 
reader of Shakespeare to have taken for granted an a priori knowledge of his 
character. What the result of Radio 4’s poll tells us is that the impulse to respond 
to Shakespeare’s ‘personality’ did not disappear* with the waning popularity of 
the ‘biographical’ approach to the Shakespearean text, associated most famously
 ^Robert Kimbrough, Shakespeare and the Art o f Humankindness: The Essay Toward Androgyny 
(New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1990), p. 3.
 ^‘Much Ado About Shakespeare’, The Times, 2"^  Januaiy 1999, p. 3.
with Edward Dowden, and later with E.K. Chambers.^  On the contrary, the 
assumption that we as readers of these texts can ‘know’ something of their author 
is, unlike the man himself, alive, well, and ‘celebrated the world over’.
But there are, of course, different ways of ‘Icnowing’. In 1780, the scholar 
and editor George Steevens supplied a deflating corrective to the fashion begun 
by Shalcespeare’s first biographer, Nicholas Rowe, for concocting thrilling stories 
about various formative episodes in the playwright’s life:
As all that is known with any degree of certainty concerning 
Shakspeare, is —  that he was bom at Stratford upon Avon, —  
married and had children there, — went to London, where he 
commenced actor, and wrote poems and plays, — returned to 
Stratford, made his will, died, and was buried, —  I must 
confess my readiness to combat every unformded supposition 
respecting the particular occurrences of his life."^
This implicit rejection of Rowe’s methodology malces Shakespeare sound 
a little like the notoriously short-lived nursery-rhyme hero, Solomon Gr*undy—  
bom on Monday, christened on Tuesday, married on Wednesday, and so on.
From his eighteenth-century perspective, Steevens is convinced that, where 
Shakespeare is concerned, epistemological certainty is a rare commodity indeed.^
 ^According to Samuel Schoenbaum, ‘no biographical pattern imposed on Shakespeare before or 
since has made so profound an impact as Dowden’s. The Dublm professor is the only academic 
critic of Shakespeare whose work would remain uninterruptedly in print for almost a centuiy’. 
Shakespeare's Lives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 496. In his Shakespeare: A Survey 
(London: Macmillan, 1925), E.K. Chambers provided one of the most famous ‘biographical’ 
readings of what were known for years as Shakespeare’s ‘problem plays’, grouping Measure for 
Measure, All's Well That Ends Well, and Troilus and Cressida togethQr as ‘the singularly 
interesting record of a particulai* phase in the poet’s shifting outlook upon humanity’; describing 
them as ‘the utterances o f a disturbed spirit... looking with new misgivings into the ambiguous 
shadows of a world over which a cloud has passed and made a goblin of the sun’ (210). In a 
survey of Shakespearean criticism spanning the years 1900-1964, Irving Ribner considers 
‘psychological’ readmgs like Dowden’s to be ‘of relatively slight importance’, but does concede 
that they spawned other more ‘fruitful’ studies by the likes o f Caroline Spurgeon, who also 
worked from the ‘assumption that Shakespeare the man could be discovered in his plays’. See his 
‘Shakespeare Criticism 1900-1964’, in Edward A. Bloom, ed., Shakespeare 1564-1964: A 
Collection o f Modern Esscys by Various Hands (Rhode Island: Brown University Press, 1964), 
pp. 194-5. As late as 1992, Gany O’Connor opened his William Shakespeare: A Life (Sevenoaks: 
Sceptre, 1992), with the assertion that ‘Shakespeare left his tine biography [elsewhere described 
as a ‘strong presence’] in his plays and poems’ (1).
Edmond Malone, ed.. Supplement to the Edition o f Shakspeare’s Plays Published in 1778 by 
Samuel Johnson and George Steevens, 2 volumes (London, 1780), I, p. 654 (italics in original).
 ^G.B. Harrison puts the birth of this epistemological scepticism somewhat later. According to 
him, it was Sidney Lee’s 1898 Life o f  Shakespeare, where page after page o f ‘confident 
statements were qualified with “ttiere is little room for doubt that,” “it was doubtless,” “it is
10
With the benefit of an additional two centuries of research behind them, his 
twentieth-centmy counterparts might justifiably assume a less sceptical position. 
As Jonathan Bate has argued, we do in fact ‘know a gieat deal more about 
Shakespear e’s life than we do about the lives o f most of his fellow-dramatists 
and fellow-actors’. But, he counters, this knowledge is contained for the most 
part in the form of official documents. From these we learn ‘that Shalcespeare 
invested his income shrewdly and was mildly litigious’.^  They also tell us that in 
May 1597 Shakespeare took legal possession of New Place, the largest house in 
Stratford.^  They cannot prove that he also had a stalce in the ownership of a far 
more elusive property: namely, ‘profound humanity’.
Playing devil’s advocate in her contribution to a volume entitled 
Shakespeare "s Personality, Barbara Freedman summarises the position thus:
Question: “Given an author who has been dead for almost four 
hundred years and who, in over thirty-five plays, never- 
revealed much of his character, what can you tell us about his 
personality?” Answer: “The author reveals the personality of 
the type of person who does not reveal his personality.”®
Freedman’s comment may retroactively question the validity of 
Shakespeare’s posthumous title, but it by no means detracts from its significance. 
If anything, it makes the outcome of the ‘personality of the millennium’ 
competition more worthy of attention than before. My object in lingering so 
doggedly over Shakespeare’s victory at the polls is not to add to the distinguished 
body of critics who have, over the course o f several centuries, lovingly nurtured 
the idea of Shakespeare’s high-mindedness —  defending it, almost unto death, 
from the threatening encroachments of an ‘intolerant coalition of Marxists, rabid
possible”,’ that was responsible for a ‘general feeling that, after all, nothing was really known 
about him’. See Hairison’s Introducing Shakespeare (Haimondsworth: Penguin, 1939), p. 22.
® Jonathan Bate, The Genius o f Shakespeare (London and Basingstoke: Picador, 1997), p. 4.
 ^See Anthony Holden’s William Shakespeare: His Life and Work (London: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1999), p. 155.
® Barbara Freedman, ‘Misrecognizing Shakespeare’, in Norman N. Holland, Sidney Homan and 
Bernard J. Palis, eds., Shakespeare’s Personality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1989), p. 254.
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feminists, godless deconstmctionists, and diseased gays’ Instead I will argue 
that these unashamedly moral judgements tell us something important about the 
unique nature of this writer’s dramatic art.
hnmediate thought must therefore be given to the perplexing question of 
how a playwright who ‘reveals the personality of the type of person who does not 
reveal his personality’ can possibly be voted personality o f the millennium, and, 
moreover, be assumed to have earned that title through an exhibition of 
‘profound humanity’. The verdict reached by Alexandra Frean (and a plethora of 
Radio 4 listeners) makes an anachronistic mockery of Northrop Frye’s claim that 
‘style had its great period in late Victorian times, when the primary connection 
between writing and personality was a fundamental principle of criticism’.
Aware that ‘style’, like other broad conceptual categories, is susceptible to 
misinterpretation, Frye elaborates on his chosen term:
In all literary structur es we are aware of a quality that we may 
call the quality of a verbal personality or a speaking voice —  
something different from direct address, though related to it.
When this quality is felt to be the voice of the author himself, 
we call it style: le style c "est Vhomme is a generally accepted 
axiom.
Frye’s remarks on ‘style’ are important to our- discussion of Shakespeare 
for several reasons. What is obvious at once is that the desire of the playwright’s 
followers to forge a ‘Victorian’ connection between personality and writing has 
long outlasted Queen Victoria’s reign. The second point, and the more crucial, is 
that Frye’s observation seems bound to stop the search for Shalcespeare’s 
personality dead in its tracks. For if  le style c "est I "homme is a generally accepted 
axiom, it is an equally widely accepted commonplace that the ‘voice’ of 
Shalcespeare in Shalcespear ean dr*ama is seldom if  ever to be hear d. Now 
ridiculed, early attempts to imagine him as an erstwhile lawyer, soldier or sailor, 
are, in fact, understandable reactions to Shalcespeare’s own obstinate silence.
 ^Stanley Fish’s car icature o f the elements most lücely to undermine humanist teaching in the 
academy, cited in Rebecca W. Bushnell, A Culture o f Teaching (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1996), p. 3.
Nortinop Frye, Anatomy o f  Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1957), p. 268.
"Ibid.
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This notoriously tight-lipped ‘personality’ is nicely captured in Frye’s account of 
a playwr ight who held ‘no opinions, no values, no philosophy of anything except 
dramatic structure’/^ The figure is familiar* enough, but surely this apparent 
moral neutrality would hardly make him the most ‘decent of dramatists’, as Frye 
calls him elsewhere. In his work, I would argue, we glimpse the critical sleight 
of hand by which Shakespear e’s apparent absence of char acter becomes a 
positive character trait, which is then produced (by early twentieth-century critics 
in particular) as incontrovertible evidence o f his ‘profound humanity’.
Published in 1925, John Dover Wilson’s ‘biography’ of Shakespeare 
provides another example of this process in action. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, it 
also bears traces o f the ‘V ictoria’ tendency to move unconcernedly between 
‘personality’ and ‘writing’ and back. Launching his discussion with a 
contemporary allusion to Shakespeare’s ‘ready and pleasant... wit’, Dover 
Wilson proceeds to deduce, by quoting lines from A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 
that the imagination from whence they spi*ung could only have belonged to ‘one 
of the most delightful companions the world has ever known’. Staying with the 
subject of companions, he then falls to wondering how Shalcespeare managed to 
win ‘powerful’ friends and influence ‘cultivated’ people. The answer he 
eventually returns has to do with the playwright’s ‘own admirable 
circumspection’:
However he might yield himself to the fr enzy of inspiration 
when the mood for composition was on him, he kept his head 
in the practical affairs of life. This was due not to any cold and 
calculated policy of self-interest, such for instance as directed 
Bacon’s steps in similar circumstances, but rather to his large- 
hearted tolerance and universal sympathy, to what Keats called 
that “negative capability” o f his which was the foundation and 
condition of all his ait. He never commits himself deeply to a 
cause or to a point o f view, whatever his affection or 
admiration for those who hold it might be, because Life itself 
in all its infinite variety is far more interesting than any 
opinions, doctrines or points of view about it.^ "^
" A Natural Perspective: The Development o f  Shakespearean Comedy and Romance (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 39.
" J. Dover Wilson, The Essential Shakespeare: A Biographical Adventure (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1935), p. 69.
" Ibid., pp. 75-6.
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Dover Wilson’s reading of Keats in this passage is quite as interesting as 
his reading of Shalcespeare. It is certainly as revealing. Exactly how the 
biographer contrives to make the vast conceptual leap from Shalcespeare’s 
business acumen to his ‘negative capability’ remains a puzzle. More obvious is 
his dogged determination to try it. Along the way he also manages to distinguish 
Shalcespeare’s pursuit of popularity from the ‘cold and calculated policy’ 
directing Francis Bacon’s. The implication is, of cour se, that Shalcespeare 
achieved professional success with the bar e minimum of exertion. Bacon’s 
alleged implementation of a premeditated stratagem serves to confer a certain 
spirit of spontaneity on Shalcespear e, who is loved, unlike the cold-blooded 
scientist, for the kindness and tolerance he showed by nature, hr the context of 
this argument, Keats’s recognition of the ‘limitless possibility of the 
Shakespearian imagination’ is pressed into service as an index of the unlimited 
capacity of his heart.
As his critique moves forward, this once influential critic’s very selective 
exploitation of his source becomes ever more apparent. Keats goes on, in the 
famous ‘negative capability’ letter, to describe Shalcespeare as a poet content to 
rest with ‘half Icnowledge’; as one ‘capable of being in uncertainties. Mysteries, 
doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason’. T h e  spectre of this 
observation hovers in the margins o f Dover Wilson’s account of a man who 
‘never commits himself deeply to a cause or to a point of view’, but Keats 
himself receives no frirther mention. So why doesn’t Dover Wilson supply the 
remainder of the quotation? Surely its allusion to a playwright disinclined to 
‘irritability’ could only add yet another agreeable facet to the ‘delightful 
companion’ o f whom he initially spoke.
One possible reason for its omission might involve Dover Wilson’s 
inability to imagine Shalcespeare doing anything by ‘half measures —  
‘knowing’, especially. It is easy to picture him objecting to Northrop Frye’s 
description of Shakespeare as a man without opinions, values or principles, 
preferring instead to see him following them with modest restraint. Making the
" The quotation is from Nicholas Roe’s John Keats and the Culture o f Dissent (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 233.
16 See Jonathan Bate, ed.. The Romantics on Shakespeare, rpt. (London: Penguin, 1997), p. 198.
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translation from Keats invisible eliminates tlie need to envisage Shakespear e ever- 
having harboured the least ‘uncertainty’ or ‘doubt’. Dover Wilson’s Shakespeare 
Icnows his own mind but is blessed, as well, with a ‘large-hearted tolerance and 
universal sympathy’ capacious enough to accommodate the opinions and values 
of all comers, hr this reading, as in Frye’s, Shalcespeare’s apparent lack of 
personal opinion is re-inscribed as a feature of his anti-dogmatic approach to life.
Given Dover Wilson’s enthusiastic appropriation of Keats, it is surprising 
to find that a quintessentially ‘Romantic’ attitude to Shalcespeare is in fact more 
prominent in the work of Northrop Frye. Dover Wilson is, at any rate, less 
willing than he to accept ‘the element of “mystery” ... in Shalcespeare [that] is 
one of the gifts o f the Romantic Movement to Shakespeare criticism, and one for 
which’, T.S. Eliot believed, ‘we have reason to be g ra te fu lU n l ik e  that of the 
shadowy, ephemeral playwright presented by Frye (and clearly influenced by 
several Romantic readings), the palpable vitality of Dover Wilson’s Shakespeare 
is never in d o u b t . I t  is hard to imagine this Shakespeare being ‘everywhere and 
nowhere’. On the contrary, he is discovered at the heart of a bustling community, 
given fr iends and dr inking partners, and even menaced by hypothetical 
toothaches, all of which emphasise his active participation in ‘the practical affairs 
of life’.
This representation of Shalcespeare as a writer immersed in the reality of 
the quotidian lent support to his role as an unr ivalled creator of individual 
characters. From the mid-eighteenth century onwards, his genius was identified 
as being for a vivid particularity of description, rather than for the general. Dover 
Wilson gives this idea a liberal humanist twist by relating it to Shakespeare’s 
interest in ‘Life’, with a quite literal capital ‘L’ —  a concern which led him to 
reject any single, paltry, point o f view, and to see all things from every 
conceivable angle.
Possibly the most ironic thing about Dover Wilson’s account is that 
Shakespeare’s refusal to ‘commit himself deeply to a cause or to a point of view’
" T.S. Eliot, ‘From Dryden to Coleridge’, in Harley Granville-Baiker and G.B. Hairison, eds., A 
Companion to Shakespeare Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934), p. 298.
Frye’s account o f Shakespeare as someone who held ‘no opinions, no values, no philosophy of 
anything . . .’, is cleai'ly influenced by, for example, Hazlitt’s recognition that he ‘seemed scarcely
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is lauded as exemplary behaviour in the same breath as opprobrium is heaped 
upon the ‘cold and calculated policy’ favoured by Francis Bacon. Whereas the 
humanist critic does his utmost to separate poet from essayist, later criticism 
found increasing reason to stress the link between them. Largely indifferent to 
the issue of moral excellence, this strand of criticism focused on how a shar ed 
intellectual climate, inherited by Bacon as well as by Shakespeare, actively 
fostered an unwillingness to consider any question from one side only.
Implicitly, these readings offered an historical explanation for Shakespeare’s 
ability to remain in uncertainty and doubt, ‘without any initable reaching after- 
fact & reason’. The chief concern o f such critical narratives, however, was 
neither with ‘large-hearted tolerance’ nor ‘universal sympathy’, but with the 
rhetorical construction of moral ambiguity.
Historicist work in this field began in ear-nest in the last quar-ter of the 
twentieth century with Joel Altman’s groundbreaking study The Tudor Play of 
Mind. Altman proposes that the moral ambiguity evident in drama written as 
early as the end of the fifteenth century is a product of the early moder-n humanist 
training in logic, dialectic, and rhetoric, which cultivated minds well schooled in 
the habit o f arguing in utramque partem —  on both sides o f the question. 
‘Arguing both sides of the question was frequently employed as a method of 
political inquir-y and (not infrequently) o f political hedging; it appears as a mode 
of theological speculation and even of scientific investigation’.^  ^ The men who 
later under*took such inquiries began to acquire the intellectual tools with which 
to do so at an ear-ly age. Most if  not all were graduates of the Tudor gr ammar 
school system, taught according to methods akin to those set down in the statutes 
of the cathedral school at Durham in the 1590s.^  ^ Having progressed fi-om
to have an individual existence of his own’ (in Bate, ed., Romantics, p. 166); and by Keats’s 
decision that he had ‘no identity’ (ibid., p. 199).
Joel Altman, The Tudor Play o f Mind: Rhetorical Inquiry and the Development o f Elizabethan 
Drama (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 32.
For an account o f the impact on Shakespeare o f a grammar school education see Hardin Craig’s 
‘Shakespeare and the Trivium’, in Edward Bloom, ed., Shakespeare 1564-1964: A Collection o f  
Modern Essays by Various Hands (Rhode Island: Brown University Press, 1964). Drawing on 
T.W. Baldwin’s monumental William Shakespere’s Small Latine andLesse Greeke, Craig 
defends Shalcespear e’s want of a university education, arguing that the grammar school is perhaps 
o f ‘more value to civilization than the university, since education in grammar schools, if  can led 
far enough, might be said to be culturally adequate’ (169). Craig’s discussion focuses on 
‘grammar’ as the fiist of the ‘trivial’ subjects which constituted the curriculum of the grammar 
school, the two others being rhetoric and logic. Grammar is presented as ‘the gateway to all
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making his own ‘epistle’ to maldng a ‘theame’, the student was considered 
advanced enough to
have redd unto him the bookes o f Cicero ad Heremium [5 /c], 
wherein the schoolemaister shall teach the schollers to frame 
and make an oration according to the precepts o f Rhetorick ... 
thus: the schoolemaister shall propound a theame or argument 
which shall have two parties, and two schollers shall be 
appointed, the one shall take the first part, the other the second 
... and upon Saturday ... shall shew their orations?^
Far fr om being learned one day and forgotten the next, the profound 
impact o f this intensive formal training on the ear ly modern mindset can be 
traced through a diverse range of texts. The permeation of the ‘eristic turn of 
mind’ into even the most apparently imlikely areas of intellectual life is made 
manifest in Erasmus’s Diattiba de Libero Arbitrio, a debate on ‘free will’ which 
is itself governed by the method of the Ciceronian controversia?^ Humanists 
like Erasmus, who employed and developed the skills and tools of ancient 
orators, ‘dealt with the world of common experience in terms of the probable, the 
likely, and the verisimilar’.^  ^ Opinions were offered simply as satisprobabile, or 
‘sufficiently probable’ — the presence of watertight ‘proofs’ considered neither a 
necessary nor a desirable feature of inquiries in which the ‘formal systematic 
search for abstract truth’ played little part.^ "^
Other investigations of the historical basis for this epistemological 
relativism have been undertaken by Lee Jacobus and Victoria Kahn. Kahn 
suggests that ‘Quattrocento dialogues, treatises on free will, paradoxical encomia, 
and essays’ all attest to the humanist cognisance of the contr ary interpretations 
capable o f being elicited from their own texts.^  ^ Where Kahn treats the subject
learning’, and the 1750 echoes of Latin literature in Shakespeare’s plays as evidence of what ‘the 
grammai* school taught or inspired him to do on his own’ (174).
Cited in T.W. Baldwin, William Shakespere's Small Latine and Lesse Greeke, 2 volumes 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1944-50), I, p. 412.
^  On Erasmus’s ‘dialogue’ with Luther see Thomas M. Conley, Rhetoric in the European 
Tradition (Chicago and London; University o f Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 122-4.
See Barbara J. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A Study of  
the Relationships Between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 7.
Ibid.
Rhetoric, Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1985), p. 23.
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of early modem ‘academic skepticism’ more generally. Jacobus applies it to 
Shakespearean drama in particular. His reading focuses on the impact on 
Shakespeare of thinkers such as Francis Bacon and Michel de Montaigne, both of 
whom, he claims, were influenced by the special brand of scepticism associated 
with the fouith-centmy B.C. philosopher, Pyrrho. Preserved to us in the writings 
of Diogenes Laertius (hence ‘the cynic’) Pyrrho’s central contention was that ‘for 
every position or argument, an equally strong contrary may be proposed’ 
Translating a verse from Homer in his essay ‘On the uncertainty of our 
judgement’, Montaigne likewise maintained that ‘there is every possibility of 
speaking for and against anything’ A similarly self-deprecating reflection on 
‘How our mind tangles itself up’ led him to conclude that ‘there is nothing 
certain except that nothing is certain’.^ ®
Like that adopted by earlier proponents of the humanist dialogue form, 
Montaigne’s approach to ‘inquiry’ thereby encouraged the advancement of 
arguments which might be clearly inconsistent, but which, if  shown to be equally 
plausible, must then be allowed to coexist. ‘To condemn [a thing] as impossible 
is to be rashly presumptuous’, he argued;^  ^his own determination to ‘remain in 
suspense’ thus stressing his affinity with humanists such as Erasmus, whose 
arguments pro and contra were motivated by a comparable desire to see final 
judgement on ethical questions indefinitely deferred.
Bacon produced numerous essays, too, of course, and whilst his 
‘Aphorisms’ also “‘invite men to inquire further’” ‘by suggesting hypotheses and 
raising doubts’, the Englishman’s scepticism actually achieves its fullest 
expression elsewhere.^ ® Indeed, PyrTho’s theory that ‘every saying has its 
corTesponding opposite’ exerts a more obvious influence on the content and 
structure of Bacon’s Colours o f Good and Evil— a set o f commonplace 
generalisations to be used in deliberative discourse. As a contemporary of
See Lee A. Jacobus, Shakespeare and the Dialectic o f Certainty (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1992), p. 5.
‘On the uncertainty of oui judgement’, in Michel de Montaigne: The Complete Essays, tons, 
and ed. M.A. Screech (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 314.
‘How our mind tangles itself up’, in Screech, ed., p. 693.
^  ‘That it is madness to judge the true and the false from our own capacities’, in Screech, ed., p. 
202.
On the ‘Aphorisms’, see William J. Bouwsma, The Waning o f the Renaissance 1550-1640 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 192-4, at p. 193.
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Bacon’s explained it, ‘the Deliberative Idnde of Negotiation ... differeth from the 
Judicial, as having reference to publike matters more than to private businesses; 
and consisteth either in perswading men to that which we thinke the better; or 
disswading them from that which we esteeme to be the worse’ Bacon’s 
commitment to this project is apparent from the outset; his table o f ‘colour s’ 
identified as a tool with the help of which men may learn ‘what is good and what 
is evil, and of good, what is the greater, and of evil what is the less’.^  ^ Each 
colour takes the form of a precept that is ‘sufficiently broad in application to be 
used in almost any context in which it is required to show that one course of 
action is preferable to another’:
The colour is supported by illustrations, supporting 
comparisons, quotations and examples. Each colour is 
countered by an elenchus [refutation], which contradicts the 
original colour (but is equally a widely accepted 
commonplace), and supports its opposition by a comparable 
collection of counter-illustrations.^^
Although Bacon claims that the ‘reprehension of these colours’ is 
necessary for the formation of a ‘true and safe judgement’, the ensuing series of 
carefully balanced examples suggests the exact reverse. Each plausible precept is 
immediately undermined (or at least problematised) by an equally plausible 
counter-illustration. By copiously reproducing such examples, the author 
compels his reader to accept the coexistence of more than one popular* ‘truth’. 
Driven by the intellectually curious humanist tradition, then, the compiler of the 
Colours ensur es that habits of thought ar e questioned before they are 
unthinkingly endorsed. The table provides a physically realised indication of 
indeterminacy through which its reader is challenged to deny the actuality of 
multiple perspectives on almost any issue he cares to raise.
In this way. Bacon confers on his own epistemological uncertainty an 
intellectual credibility that is denied to other, less cerebral, manifestations of
Daniel Tnvil, The Dove and the Serpent (London, 1613), pp. 64-5.
O f the Colours o f Good and Evil, in Brian Vickers, ed., Francis Bacon (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 97.
Lisa Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art o f Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1974), pp. 220-21.
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scepticism in the period. Consider Daniel Tuvil’s derisory treatment of ‘old 
men’, who, ‘having by reason of their yeares, and long experience discovered, 
that whatsoever is under the Sunne is vanitie and liable to chaunce’:
will not utter their opinion positively in anything, but 
undervalue every thing more than is requisite or convenient.
Their discoui'se is alwayes limited with doubts, and 
suppositions and enterlaced with Per adventures. It may bees, 
or other such like tearmes of Moderation', so whatsoever they 
propound, they adhere to nothing. They are for the most part 
left-handed (that is to say) malicious, and apt to conster all 
things in the worst sense. Their hardnes of beliefe doth furnish 
them with matter of suspition; and the laiowledge they have of 
worldly policie, doth authorize their incredulity.^ "^
TuviTs comment is notable primarily for its hostility to senescent 
scepticism.^ ^ Here the man who suspends judgement (and ‘will not utter [his] 
opinion in anything’) is branded a suspicious, hard-hearted cynic. In this context, 
scepticism which ‘adhere[s] to nothing’ is envisaged as a crippling agent of 
limitation.
This wizened and penurious ambivalence is in stark contr ast to the 
‘skeptical openness’ wliich twentieüi-century critics like Norman Rabkin found 
in Shakespeare. Published just over a decade before Altman’s study, Rabkin’s 
Shakespeare and the Common Understanding looks from a humanist perspective 
at a phenomenon that his successor would later relate to the specific cultural 
conditions in which it occurred.
What Altman would call the ‘eristic turn of mind’ appears in Rabkin’s 
text as the ‘dialectical dramaturgy’ he considers to be ‘the most notable constant 
in Shakespeare’s work’.^  ^ The experience of Hamlet is a case in point:
Tuvil, The Dove and the Serpent, p. 54 (italics in original).
A similar view is expressed less overtly in Horace’s assertion that ‘Many ills encompass an old 
man, whether because he seeks gain, and then miserably holds aloof from his store and fears to 
use it, or because, in all that he does, he lacks fire and courage, is dilatoiy and slow to form 
hopes’. See tlie Ars Poetica, in Horace: Satires, Epistles, Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton 
Fafrclough (London: Heinemann, 1926), 170-75. This dilatory scepticism is given a more 
sympathetic treatment by Juan Luis Vives in Anima Senis, where we are told that ‘wisdom, self- 
control, dignity, moderation, stability and steadfastness of spirit in the pursuit of virtue’ are all 
qualities in which old men ‘smpass others’. In Early Writings, trans. and eds. C. Matheeussen, C. 
Fantazzi and E. George (Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill, 1987), p. 99.
Shakespeare and the Common Understanding (New York: Free Press, 1967), p . 11.
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The play presents an ideal, that o f reason, in such a way that 
we must recognise its absolute claim on oui* moral allegiance, 
and then entirely subverts that ideal by demonstrating that its 
polai* opposite is the only possible basis for action its 
protagonist is morally committed to perform.^ ^
Rabkin’s Shalcespeare, who ‘presents a universe in which we must decide at 
every moment which way to choose, yet which tells us simultaneously that no 
choice is possible’, is but an ahistorical version of Joel Altman’s mentally 
dexti'ous Tudor subject, whose training in rhetoric enables him to 
‘simultaneously entertain two opposing points of view’^  ^—  ‘to make one side of 
a debatable question seem as plausible as possible and then turn aiound and make 
the other side o f the question seem just as plausible’ Insofar as he borrows a 
term from modem physics (‘complementarity’) to describe the Shakespearean 
vision, Rabkin, in his turn, offers a more ‘theoretical’ interpretation of Benedetto 
Croce’s Shalcespeare, in whom ‘positive determinations and negative ones 
maintain equal strength .,. [and] tangle and clash with one another without 
becoming tmly reconciled in a better hai*mony’. Shalcespeare, according to 
Croce,
does not stand apart from these opposing emotions, fr om 
attraction and repugnance, fr om love and hate, from hope and 
despair, from joy and pain; but he stands apart fr om the 
unilaterality of each of these. He gathers them all unto 
himself, and not in order to endure them all and to shed tears of 
blood over them, but to form a single world out of them: the
Ibid., p. 6. Graham Bradshaw’s Shakespeare’s Scepticism (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1987), 
provides a similarly ‘aliistorical’ account of the ‘clash between concepts of “honom*”’ and a ‘more 
comprehensive collision between incompatible views of Natur e and value’ in Hamlet (10). 
Although he does ‘develop a distinction between terminal or dogmatic scepticism and ... radical 
scepticism’, Bradshaw admits to having made ‘little attempt to set Shakespeare’s thought in the 
context o f Renaissance ideas’ (x-xi).
Rabkin, Common Understanding, p. 7; Altman, Tudor Play o f Mind, p. 32. See also Jonathan 
Bate’s discussion of William Empson’s Seven Types o f Ambiguity in Chapter 10 of The Genius O f 
Shakespeare (London: Picador, 1997), pp. 302-16 and passim. In this fascinating analysis of 
Empson’s application of an ‘imcertainty principle’ to Shakespeare, Bate charts the development 
of Empsonian ‘Ambiguity’ —  a concept he believes was influenced by the ‘new physics’ being 
practised at Cambridge in the 1920s. Ambiguity o f the seventh type (often found in Shakespeare) 
involves a rejection of ‘either/or’ in favom* of ‘both/and’ interpretations. Bate calls Empson 
‘Modernism’s Einstein among literary critics’ and his theory o f ‘both/and’ the ‘twentieth century’s 
most powerful contribution to the rmderstanding of Shakespeare’ (316).
Donald Lemen Clark, Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1957), p. 212.
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Shalcespearean world, which is the world of these unresolved
40opposites.
Tracing the clironological trajectoiy from Croce to Rabkin to Altman 
shows how commonplace assumptions about Shalcespeai*e that aie, essentially, 
humanist in persuasion, might be rewardingly historicised. The crucial point to 
be drawn from Rabkin’s reading (for an argument involving Shakespeare’s 
‘profound humanity’ at least) is his insistence on the ‘skeptical openness’ 
apparent in Shakespeai'e. In the final analysis, he argues, Hamlet does not 
present a world in which nothing is valid. It is not as if  neither of the play’s 
opposing ‘sets of values is based on reality— the cynical response; for better or 
for worse, both of them ai*e’."^  ^ In this respect, Rabkin’s Shalcespeare seems to 
work fr om ideological assumptions similai* to those underpinning what Victoria 
Kahn calls ‘Quattrocento’ humanism. This academic scepticism is distinguished 
by Kahn from its later development into Pyrrhonism, in which the process of 
argumentation leading to the hallowed ‘suspension of judgement’ threatens to 
demolish any gi’ounds for belief."^  ^ For the Quattiocento humanists, by contrast, 
contradiction was a ‘liberating rather than [a] demoralizing’ force."^ ^
Kahn’s distinction between ‘demoralizing’ and ‘liberating’ scepticism 
seems to me important. Rabkin’s Shalcespear e is obviously possessed of the 
latter; indeed, the whole idea of Shalcespeare’s ‘skeptical openness’ is cleaiiy 
informed (at some level) by Rabkin’s more intuitive perception of the 
playwright’s optimistic generosity of spirit. It is Shalcespeare’s way to offer more 
rather than fewer alternatives than his audience can manage. His scepticism, 
Rabkin implies, is char acterised by a belief in everything as opposed to nothing. 
Described in these terms, sceptical ‘openness’ resounds with all the ‘buoyancy
Benedetto Croce, ‘Shakespeare’s Poetic Sentiment’, m Benedetto Croce: Essays on Literature 
and Liter aty Criticism, trans. M.E. Moss (Albany; State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 
109.
Rabkin, Common Understanding, p. 9.
The likelihood of this happening was clearly recognised, though not necessarily condemned, by 
the Dutch neo-stoic Justus Lipsius, who, whilst admiring the ancient sceptics in his Manductio ad 
Stoicam Philosophiam (1604), also wished that they had not been ‘can ied away by their zeal for 
debating things’. On Lipsius, and the ideological affinities he shared with Montaigne, see Richard 
Tuck, ‘Scepticism and Toleration in the Seventeenth Century’, in Susan Mendus, ed., Justifying 
Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), pp. 21-35, at p. 23.
Kahn, Rhetoric, p. 27.
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and hopefulness’, the ‘extraordinaiy faith and energy’ that literary historians 
often identify as the hallmark of humanism itself."^ "^
My approach to the implications of this scepticism will be both historical 
and ahistorical. Rather than simply rehear sing the idea that Shakespeare’s 
humanist education equipped him with the ability to ar gue on both sides of the 
question, and can therefore be held responsible for the ambiguity char acteristic o f 
his drama, I also want to suggest that the deliberative declamation, so familiar to 
graduates of the Tudor grammar school system, provides a useful model for 
reading other, post-Tudor, critics, reading Shakespeare."^  ^ My object in 
undertaking this apparently anachronistic project is to stress the centr ality of the 
role played by rhetoric hr the construction o f ethically loaded, potentially 
contradictory interpretations of actions or events. In order to lay the foundations 
for a historicised exploration of this ambiguity later in the thesis, this chapter will 
function as a kind of meta-deliberative declamation, the ‘theame or argument’ of 
which involves Shalcespeare’s ‘profound humanity’. Its aim is to examine (in the 
words of Francis Bacon) the ‘labours’ o f various ‘persuaders’ to make this 
profound humanity ‘appear* good or* evil, and that in the higher or lower 
degree’
And the first step in this project is to bring some precision to the meaning 
of the term ‘profound humanity’. Would Shakespeare’s possession of this 
quality have been recognised in Iris own day? Henry Chettle declared in 1592 
that he Irimself had ‘seen his demeanor no less civil than he excellent in the 
quality [i.e. theatrical work] he professes’; and in 1604 Anthony Scoloker 
refened to him as ‘friendly Shalcespeare’."^  ^ But can ‘friendliness’ really be taken
The descriptions appear in Basil Willey, The English Moralists (London: Methuen, 1965), p. 
100, and Arthui'F, Kinney, Humanist Poetics: Thought, Rhetoric, and Fiction in Sixteenth- 
Century England (Amherst: University o f Massachusetts Press, 1986), p. 5.
In ‘The Moving Pattern of Shakespeare’s Thought’, in G.L Duthie’s collection of Papers 
Mainly Shakespearean (Edinbmgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1964), James Sutherland 
suggests that Shakespeare’s readiness to ‘avail himself o f any natural opening for a display of 
forensic eloquence’, even at an early stage in his career, ‘may be in paif accounted for by the 
education in rhetoric that he, in common with other Elizabethan boys, had received at school, and 
to the keen interest in rhetoric that is so marked a feature of the age’ (11). Sutherland gives eight 
examples (only two of which do not appear in the significantly ‘public’ context of the histories or 
the Roman plays) of Shakespeare’s sustained ‘interest in putting a case’ (14).
Bacon, Colours o f Good and Evil, p. 97.
The references to Chettle and Scoloker appear in Roland Mushat Frye’s Shakespeare: The Art 
o f the Dramatist, rev. ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 20. ‘Quality’ was a
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as a synonym for ‘profound humanity’? In his Book Named the Governor, under 
a section headed ‘The three principal parts of humanity’, Thomas Elyot wrote 
that:
The natur e and condition of man, wherein he is less than God 
Almighty, and excelling notwithstanding all other creatures in 
earth, is called humanity; which is a general name to those 
virtues in whom seemeth to be a mutual concord and love in 
the nature of man. And although there be many of the said 
virtues, yet be there thr ee principal by whom humanity is 
chiefly compact: benevolence, beneficence, and liberality, 
which malceth up the said principal virtue called benignity or 
gentleness."^^
The effort to return Shalcespeare’s ‘profound humanity’ to its historical context 
happily yields immediate results— bringing us into contact with what is surely 
the most common of all coimnonplaces relating to the playwright. Ben Jonson’s 
notorious allusion to ‘gentle Shalcespeare’ does indeed suggest that his 
possession of the ‘principal virtue’ of which ‘humanity’ consists is no mere 
bar dolatious invention of the twentieth century.
Evidence of Shalcespeare’s monopoly on ‘benevolence’ — which, as 
Elyot explains, ‘if it do extend to a whole country ... is properly called charity’
—  is also assumed to abound. ‘Most perceptible’ in Shakespeare, from the early 
twentieth-century perspective of David Masson, was ‘a magnanimity and moral 
elevation that are almost religious’.J .I .M . Stewart thought he wrote ‘as one 
good-hearted for the good-hearted’, and called him a ‘thoroughly wholesome 
person’, m whose plays ‘the air is clean, the soil sweet, and the plenty ... 
distinguishably God’s’. ‘Too much has been made of “gentle” Shalcespeare’, 
decided Hazleton Spencer in 1940, when what really marks him out is a 
‘passionate admiration for the human spirit’ and a ‘deep pity for the lot of man’.^ ^
standard teim for the acting profession, as in Hamlet’s question about the boy players: ‘Will they 
pui'sue the quality no longer than they can sing?’ (2.2,344-5).
Sir Thomas Elyot, The Book Named the Governor, ed. S.E. Lehmberg (London; J.M. Dent & 
Sons. 1975), pp. 120-21.
David Masson, Shakespeare Personally (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1914), p. 142.
J.I.M. Stewart, ‘Shakespeare’s Men and their Morals’, in John Ganett, ed.. More Talking of  
Shakespeare (London: Longman, 1959), p. 127.
Hazelton Spencer, The Art and Life o f William Shakespeare (New York: Hai court, Brace and 
Company, 1940), p. 46.
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Spencer’s ‘essentialist’ reading o f Shakespeare’s ‘admiration for the 
human spirit’ dovetails neatly with Thomas Elyot’s evocation of the ‘humanity’ 
resident in those whose commitment is to ‘mutual concord and love in the nature 
of man’. Any one of these laudatory observations, indeed, may be mustered in 
support of the case for seeing ‘charity’ as the virtue to which Shalcespear e was by 
natur e most inclined. J.I.M. Stewart’s description of the comucopian 
Shakespearean worlds in which the ‘plenty’ is ‘distinguishably God’s’, is also a 
description of the special natur e o f Chr istian charity, which, alone among the 
virtues, ‘admitteth no excess’.L ik e w ise , it is not difficult to find in Hemy 
Chettle’s recollection of Shalcespeare’s ‘civil demeanor’, a reference to the 
‘charity’ St. Paul described as ‘not puffed up’; which 'Doeth not behave it selfe 
unseemly ... is not easily provoked, thinlceth no evill’.^ ^
Magnanimity, compassion, a predilection to ‘think no evil’ — these 
qualities slot together easily (and are perhaps most recognisable) as component 
parts of Christian charity. Yet none o f them are exclusively ‘Christian’ virtues. 
Nor have they only ever been advocated or prized in specifically ‘Christian’ 
contexts. We come upon the decidedly un-Christian Aristotle, for instance, in 
Book I of the Rhetoric, recommending to his students a similar need to ‘par don 
human wealcnesses’; to look
not to the action itself, but to the moral purpose; not to the part, 
but to the whole; not to what a man is now, but to what he has 
been, always or generally; to remember good rather than ill 
treatment, and benefits received rather than those conferred.
Injuries, he insists, should be patiently bome.^ "^  This sounds very much like a 
description of Christian charity, which ‘suffereth long, and is kinde’ (1.Cor. 13:4).
52 ‘So in all other excellencies’, wrote Francis Bacon in The Advancement o f  Learning, ‘though 
they advance nature, yet they are subject to excess; only charity admitteth no excess’ (in Vickers, 
ed., Francis Bacon, p. 263). For a discussion o f Bacon’s praise of char ity, which associates his 
own philosophy with an ‘extremity’ o f goodness far beyond the golden ‘mediocrity’ privileged hr 
Aristotelian ethics, see Joshua Scodel, ‘“Mediocrities” and “Extremities”: Francis Bacon and the 
Aristotelian Mean’, in David Quint, Margaret W. Ferguson, G.W. Pigman III and Wayne A. 
Rebhom, eds.. Creative Imitation: New Esscys on Renaissance Literature in Honor o f Thomas M. 
Greene, Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies (Binghamton, New York: 1992).
^ King James Bible (1611), The First Epistle o f Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians, XIII: 4-5 
(italics mine).
Aristotle, The ‘A rt’ o f Rhetoric, trans. John Henry Freese (London: Heinemann, 1926), 1.13.17- 
18.
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But the principles Aristotle outlines here, ably assisted by the rhetorical figure 
correctio, do not pertain to charitable, but rather to equitable, conduct. Brought 
to bear in a legal context, they are principles adapted to dealing with individual 
cases that cannot be judged according to the inevitably rigorous precision of the 
law.^  ^ Equity (Gr. epieikeia, Lat. aequitas), as the ancient rhetoricians 
understood it, was a ‘mitigating coiTective to the generality and consequent 
rigidity inherent in the law. Designed, in contrast to legal statute, as a flexible 
measure, equity could talce into account the infinite pai ticularity of human events 
by investigating the agents’ intentions and thus could accommodate each 
individual case’.^ ^
As well as par doning human weaknesses, then, equity was concerned with 
the interpretation of the spirit rather than the letter of the law. Its strength as a 
legal concept, as W. Gordon Zeevald noted, derives from the fact that it makes 
sense both in the sphere of Aristotelian ethics, and in the Chr istian context of 
‘doing unto others what you would have them do to you’.^  ^ Although early 
modem interpretations of equity borrow from each of these contexts, they usually 
emphasise its value as a conduit for the delivery of ‘merciful’ judgements.
Where the pagan philosopher Aristotle spoke of the ‘sweet reasonableness’ of 
equity, Christopher St. Germain referred in 1531 to the ‘sweetness o f [its]
Aristotle’s use of the rhetorical figure correctio—  ‘making straight’, setting right’: the 
correction o f a word or phrase used previously— is especially significant in the light of his 
description of it, in The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham, ipt. (London: Heinemann, 
1975), as a tool for correcting or righting the ‘generality’ of laws. ‘Equity’, he writes, ‘though 
just, is not legal justice, but a rectification o f legal justice. The reason for this is that law is 
always a general statement, yet there are cases which it is not possible to cover in a general 
statement... When therefore tlie law lays down a general rule, and thereafter a case aiises which 
is the exception to the rule, it is then right, where the lawgiver’s pronouncement because of its 
absoluteness is defective and erroneous, to rectify the defect by deciding as the lawgiver would 
himself decide if he were present on the occasion, and would have enacted if he had been 
cognizant of the case in question ... This is the essential nature of the equitable: it is a 
rectification of the law where law is defective because of its generality’ (5.10.3-5).
Kathy Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition: Chapters in the Ancient Legacy and 
its Humanist Reception (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 2.
The Temper o f Shakespeare’s Thought (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974), 
p. 143. Given his emphasis on the ‘spirit’ as opposed to the ‘letter’ of the law, Zeevald’s claims 
lead naturally into a discussion of the coincidence of Chi istianity and equity as played out in the 
conducive contexts of Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure (pp. 159-84), and The Merchant o f  
Venice (pp. 149-59). On Shakespeare’s personal acquaintance with equity, as it functioned in the 
‘remedial’ environment in the Court of Chancery, see W. Nicholas Knight, ‘Equity, “The 
Merchant of Venice” and William Lambarde’, Shakespeare Swvey 27 (1974): 93-104. A rather 
less biographical account appears in E.F.J. Tucker, ‘The Letter of the Law in The Merchant of  
Venice', Shakespeare Survey 29 (1976): 93-101.
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mercy’.S im ila r ly , ^Aequum & bonunf is described in William Fulbecke’s 
classification of laws as that ‘which doth mildly interprété, amend, and modifie 
the hard and rigorous speaches and ansures of the other Laws’. ‘Justice is rightly 
administered’, he claims, ‘when hatred is away and conscience is present, when 
rigor is tempered with mercy
Fulbecke’s account shows the ease with which the New Testament 
principles of charity and mercy could be made to meet and inform the practical 
application of the law. Other early modem wr iters completed the same 
assimilative process but in reverse. Around half-way through A Preparative to 
Contentation, for example, John Carpenter introduces the legal concept of equity 
in order to add weight to his specifically Christian discourse. An ‘extreme’ kind 
o f ‘justice and discipline’, that ‘savour[s] little or nothing of Equitie\ is thus held 
responsible for the decay of many kingdoms, and for the trouble tliat afflicts the 
church.^ ® Because we are bound, both by charity and by equity, to ‘bend to the 
best in everie deliberation’, religious and legal doctrine appear in Carpenter’s text 
as inextricably entwined. Little if  any distinction is made between the equity 
whose purpose is to ‘mildly interprète, amend, and modifie’ the harshness of 
unfeeling law, and the Christian charity which
wilt not admit that either those which slide of ignourance, 
infirmitie or feare, shoulde bee made publique examples of 
disgrace: or that whatsoever is eyther sayd, written, or wrought 
... shoulde be wrested and urged with hard censures and like 
constmctions: but rather, that the multitude of sinnes should be 
charitably covered, and all things talcen in the better sence, and 
favourably constmed.^ ^
With these words Carpenter bids the Preparative goodbye, entrusting it willingly 
to the keeping and the ‘right charitable constructions’ of his dedicatee.
The name of the guardian of these pages is ‘Theophilus’ (literally ‘the 
Jfriend of God’), but this could quite easily be a pseudonym for Shakespeare, the
Christopher St. Germain, A Dialogue Betwixt a Doctor o f Divinity and a Student in the Laws of 
England (London, 1531), n.p.
A Direction or Preparative to the Study o f  the Law (London, 1620), cited in Zeevald, Temper, 
p. 144.
John Carpenter, A Preparative to Contentation (London, 1597), p. 89 (italics in original).
Ibid., ‘The Epistle Dedicatory’.
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‘bending author’ offered up for approval by the Chorus at the end of Henry 
In addition to serving as a metaphorical bow, a humble expression of his 
gratitude to the paying public, Shakespeare’s verbal self-poifrait reflects 
suggestively on his own ability to ‘bend to the best in everie deliberation’. His 
propensity to do so did not go unnoticed among his contemporaries, one of 
whom, in pailicular, was also unable to let it pass without reproof. This much is 
apparent from Ben Jonson’s infamous reaction to Heminge and Condell’s 
remarks (in the ‘Epistle to the Reader’ o f the First Folio) on the undefiled nature 
of Shakespeare’s scripts. ‘I remember\ says Jonson, ‘the Players have often 
mentioned it as an honour to Shakespeare, that in his writing, (whatsoever he 
penn’d) hee never blotted out line. My answer hath beene. Would he had blotted 
a thousand’.T h e  account proceeds with a more personal reflection on 
Shakespear e: ‘Hee was (indeed) honest’, Jonson admits, ‘and of an open, and free 
nature’:
had an excellent Phantsie; brave notions, and gentle 
expressions: wherein hee flow’d with that facility, that 
sometime it was necessary he should be stop’d: Sufflaminandus 
erat; as Augustus said of Haterius ... Many times hee fell into 
those things, could not escape laughter: As when hee said in 
the person of Caesar, one speaking to him; Caesar thou dost 
me wrong. Hee replyed: Caesar did never wrong, but with just 
cause: and such like; which were ridiculous. But hee 
redeemed his vices, with his vertues. There was ever more in 
him to be praysed, than to be pardoned.^ '^
This recollection is generally construed as a sour criticism of 
Shakespeare’s careless workmanship. Irritated by Iris prolific output, Jonson 
reinterprets Shalcespeare’s habit of ‘never blot[ting] out line’ as a sloppy 
unwillingness to return to the scene of Iris stylistic felonies, and turns 
Shakespeare himself into a comedy character who resists all efforts to shut him 
up. The man fr om Str atford is o f course renowned for his literary fecundity. 
Teriy Eagleton, for instance, has suggested that ‘even those who know very little 
about Shalcespeare might be vaguely aware that his plays ...are written with an
William Shakespeare, Henry V, ed. T.W. Craik, ipt. (London: Routledge, 1995), Epilogue, 1.2. 
Ben Jonson, Timber: or, Discoveries, in C.H. Herford and Percy and Evelyn Simpson, eds..
Ben Jonson, 11 volumes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925-52), VIII, p. 583. 
""ibid., p. 584.
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extraordinary eloquence, one metaphor breeding another in an apparently 
unstaunchable flow of what modern theorists might call “textual productivity’” .^  ^
Given his materialist commitment to demystification, it seems unlikely that 
Eagleton intended to liken Shakespeare to the ‘figurative’ or ‘metaphoricall’ God 
presented in John Donne’s ‘Expostulation 19’, in whose works t^ypes & figures 
overspread all; and figures flowed into figures, and powred themselves out into 
farther figures\^^ In suggesting that ‘Shakespeare’s own fiiends recognized that 
his pen often ran away with him’, M.M. Mahood expresses a similar* sentiment, 
in language colloquial enough to bring the playwright crashing back to earth.^  ^
Taking their cue fiom Jonson, however, remarks like these are seldom 
concerned with issues of quantity alone. As Neil Rhodes has argued, ‘Jonson’s 
account of Shakespeare linlcs certain moral qualities of sincerity and firanloiess 
with the literary qualities of fer*tile imagination and stylistic copiousness’.^  ^ It is 
this cormection that appears in embi*yonic form in John Dover Wilson’s portrait 
of Shakespeare, whose firenzied attacks o f creativity ar e evoked in close 
proximity to the warmth generated by his spontaneity and generous spirit of joie 
de vivre. The same thought apparently occurred much earlier to John Webster, 
who made mention, in the preface to The White Devil, of Shalcespeare’s ‘right 
happy and copious industry’
To return to Jonson, though, and his alleged attack on the ‘slovenliness’ 
which M.M. Mahood suggested ‘cause[s] Shalcespeareans most embarrassment’.
Terry Eagleton, William Shakespeare (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 1.
John Donne, ‘Expostulation 19’, in Anthony Raspa, ed.. Devotions Upon Etnergent Occasions 
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 99-100.
‘Unblotted Lines: Shakespeare at Work’, in Kenneth Muir, ed.. Interpretations o f  Shakespeare: 
British Academy Lectures (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 69. The 1972 British Academy 
lecture on Shakespeare.
® See the ‘Coda’; ‘Freedom of Speech in Shakespeare’, in Neil Rhodes, The Power o f Eloquence 
and English Renaissance Literature Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), at p. 196
(italics mine). Along similar lines, the long central chapter on Shakespeare in William Flesch’s 
Generosity and the Limits o f Authority: Shakespeare, Herbert, Milton (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1992), offers a sustained tr eatment o f the idea that language intensifies 
in inverse proportion to the (material) resources o f its speakers. Though Lear*, Antony, and 
Richard III all suffer an end to tlieir prosperity, each attempts to continue ‘giving’ —  a generosity 
which can now only be expressed through the gr andiosity of their language. On Jonson’s own 
ideal of artistic freedom o f expression, ‘which he identified with the norm of Greek and Roman 
theatre’, see Janet Clare, ‘Jonson’s “Comical Satires” and the Art of Corrrtly Compliment’, in 
Julie Sanders, Kate Chedgzoy and Susan Wiseman, eds., Refashioning Ben Jonson: Gender, 
Politics and the Jonsonian Canon (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998).
In F.L. Lucas, ed., The Complete Works o f  John Webster, 4 volirmes (London: Chatto and 
Windus, 1966), I, p. 108.
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Offered in the introduction to her 1972 birthday lecture, this observation is 
followed by the inevitable reference to Jonson’s criticism of ‘such lines as 
“Caesar did never wrong, but with just cause” —  which, if Shakespear e wrote it 
at all, was blotted into better sense before ever Julius Caesar was printed’. More 
willing than her critical forbears to appreciate this ‘facility’, Mahood proposes 
that ‘Shalcespeare’s headlong method o f composition has wider consequences for 
his ait than the odd solecism or syntactical tangle’. She proceeds to argue that his 
‘cheerful ad-libbing’ provides ‘evidence, not so much of Shalcespeare’s absent- 
mindedness, as of the presence of an exploring and adventurous mind’.^ ^
This account offers another way of reading Jonson’s criticism without 
questioning the nature of the criticism itself. That Jonson’s chief objection was 
to Shakespear e’s habit of writing sentences sans sense is still taken for granted. 
The assumption is a common one, but it ignores the significance of Jonson’s 
descriptive terminology, and indeed, of the example he chooses to cite. Jonson 
suggests that the stylistic fr eedom or lar gess which effortlessly produced an 
abundance of (specifically) ‘gentle’ expressions can be read as a moral quality 
—  a generosity of spirit, he implies, that is revealed in this rather clumsy attempt 
to excuse Caesar. Shakespeare’s voracious writerly activity, moreover, is heavily 
underlined by both Jonson and Webster, who might therefore be assumed to 
pronounce him free from ‘the disease of weake unbusred people, who being not 
furnished with abilitie for other employment,.. delight to be doing what is moste 
easie, to censure others’. Writing in 1633, Samuel Torshell, the diagnoser of this 
insidious social sickness, goes on to lament the sad lack of ‘mercie in our 
Reports’; that ‘we care not how we wound the reputations and teare the credits of 
men not offending. There is but little charitie’, he adds, ‘where there is an 
aptnesse to enterfaine all loose and scandalous reports, and to scatter them as 
busily as we greedily entertaind them’,^ ^
TorshelTs prognostication of the ill effects arising fi-om idleness sheds 
new light on Shalcespeare’s peculiarly ‘gentle’ industry. The virtue of 
‘gentleness’, as Thomas Elyot explained, is comprised of several parts, one of 
which is benevolence or ‘charity’ — the only virtue that ‘admitteth no excess’.
Mahood, ‘Unblotted Lines’, pp. 69, 76 and 70.
Samuel Torshell, The Saints Humiliation (London, 1633), p. 49.
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As someone remembered, specifically, for never being ‘unbusied’, Shalcespeare 
also seems to be miraculously immune to the disease which afflicts such people. 
Jonson’s description of him as a prolific producer o f ‘gentle’ expressions 
implicitly credits Shakespeare with ‘mercie’ and ‘charitie’ in lawful 
superabundance. This reflection on the playwright’s capacity for forgiveness is 
tellingly consolidated with an acknowledgement of his adherence to the spirit of 
equity. If he is witness to an accusation of wiong-doing on the part of another, 
Jonson suggests, Shakespeare’s immediate reaction is to ‘think no evilT — to 
protect the reputation of the defendant by ar guing the justness of his individual 
‘cause’. Instinctively siding with the beleaguered party, Shakespeare ‘mitigates 
and mollifies the hard and rigorous speaches and ansures’ directed at the accused. 
In other words, Shalcespeare’s copy is ‘fair’ in more ways than one.
As is invariably the case when he spealcs of Shakespeare, Jonson’s 
attitude to him is hard to infer. His equally notorious eulogy, ‘To the memory of 
my beloved, the Author Master William Shakespeare’, nonetheless prompted a 
confident accusation of animosity from John Dryden, to whom the tribute 
appeared ‘insolent, sparing and invidious’ Such epithets do not seem so 
appropriate here. The Shakespeare who inhabits this memoir, I would aigue, is 
presented instead as a compulsive, vaguely absurd dealer in extenuation —  as 
one by whom even the most objectionable behaviour is ‘favourably construed’. 
The comment reveals as much about Jonson as Shakespeare, of course. As 
anecdotal evidence, its real value lies in Jonson’s rather uncharitable suggestion 
that his friend’s defence of Caesai* is worthy of ridicule. Whether intentionally or 
not, Jonson’s reconstruction of events sets up an opposition, wherein he and 
certain lilce-minded contemporaries unite in mocking poor Shakespeare’s 
sympathetic tolerance of risibly untenable positions.
In this respect, Shakespeare seems to stand at a remove from the cynical 
Jonson, and the uimamed others whose laughter joined his own. Even so, it 
would be wrong to imagine sympathy of this kind as uniquely ‘Shakespearean’.
A similar principle is perceptible in the work of one other writer in particular —
On Dryden and various other critics who have ‘questionfed] the presence of substantive content 
in [Jonson’s] praise’, see Barbara L. DeStefano, ‘Ben Jonson’s Eulogy on Shakespeare: Native 
Maker and the Triumph o f English’, Studies in Philology 90 (1993): 231-45.
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a writer William Empson described, significantly in this context, as a ‘double 
ironist’, whose technique as an author (A) is to show ‘both B and C that he 
understands both their positions’/^ While Shakespeare’s religious convictions 
continue to excite critical controversy,^ "  ^this second writer’s tolerant optimism 
can be linked more directly to his belief in the tenets o f a pailicular strain of 
Chiistianity. The writer in question is Henry Fielding; an ethics of ‘benevolence’ 
and ‘good nature’ preached by the early modern latitudinarian tradition, the 
background against which he must be read.^ ^
What can be learned from a comparison between Shalcespeare’s apparent 
willingness to talce things ‘in the better sence’ and a similai* tendency in Fielding? 
After all, the novelist was writing a century and a half later and within a rather 
different religious context. Not Shalcespeaie but Fielding admitted the impact 
upon him of Issac Barrow, the seventeenth-century Anglican divine, whose 
teachings emphasised ‘a kind of universality in the matter of [the good man’s] 
beneficence’.^ ® Not Shakespeare but Fielding openly endorsed a specifically 
latitudinarian view of charity, in which the extension of ‘a “general kindness” to 
all men because they ar e men’ held equal sway with the donation of financial 
gifts designed to relieve the suffering of the parish poor.^  ^ Most importantly, if  
R.S. Crane is correct in seeing latitudinarianism as a product o f the Restoration,
William Empson, ‘Tom Jones', in Hai’old Bloom, ed., Hemy Fielding (New York, New Haven 
and Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 1987), p. 18.
For a survey of recent scholarship, and an analysis of the impact on Shalcespeare studies of 
‘revisionist versions of Protestant consensus’, see Donna B. Hamilton, ‘Shakespeare and 
Religion’, in W.R. Elton and John M. Mucciolo, eds.. The Shakespeare International Yearbook 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 187-202.
R.S. Crane, ‘Suggestions Toward a Genealogy o f the “Man of Feeling’”, English Literary 
History 1.3 (1934): 205-30, at p. 207. Crane’s article provides a particularly well-sourced 
account of eighteenth-century latitudinarianism, which he suggests is a product o f the combined 
influence exerted by numerous Anglican divines on the ethical and psychological thought of the 
period 1660-1725. A thorough discussion o f Fielding’s relation to this tradition is given by 
Martin C. Battestin, in The Moral Basis o f Fielding’s Art: A Study o f Joseph Andrews ’ 
(Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1959), especially Chapters 1-3.
Battestin, Moral Basis, p. 18.
Crane, ‘ Suggestions’, p. 211. See also Christopher Hill, Society and Puritanism in Pre- 
Revolutionary England ^ London: Seeker & Warburg, 1964), especially Chapter 7, ‘The Poor and 
the Parish’; and Domra T. Andrew, Philanthropy and Police: London Charity in the Eighteenth 
Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). Hill discusses the rapidly changing 
attitudes to charity, and its decline, in the first half of the seventeenth century, from a vhlue 
‘holier than hope or even faith’ to ‘a crust of bread handed to the poor man at the gate’ (220). 
Conversely, Andrews’s concern is with the mid-eighteenth-century outpoming of charitable 
assistance; with charity in its more tangible and practical forms: ‘the “Inclination to promote 
Publike Good’” as opposed to simple ‘benevolence’ (5). Hemy Fielding’s active support of The 
Fomrdlirrg Hospital and The Lying-In Hospital are discussed briefly in Chapters 2 and 3.
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the articles of this paificular religious doctrine were being disseminated far too 
late to have influenced the thinking of Shalcespeare at all.
This notwithstanding, admirers of this ‘kindest’ of playwrights have often 
spoken as though his work provides evidence of an enduiing belief in this very 
faith.^  ^ Indeed, a sample from Crane’s list of eighteentli-century latitudinarian 
buzzwords —  ‘humanity’, ‘good nature’, ‘universal benevolence’ —  reveals the 
extent to which this is so.^  ^ The recuixence o f these terms in criticism of 
Shakespeare suggests that, if  latitudinarian charity had not eventually come to 
exist, then Shalcespeaieans would have had to invent it. If for no other reason 
than this, a brief exploration of ‘charity’ as handled by Fielding, is surely worth 
undertaking.
In the middle o f Book II o f Tom Jones, Captain Blifil, brother-in-law to 
Squire Allworthy (the eponymous hero’s adoptive father) engages that man in a 
discussion on this veiy topic. Armed with ‘great learning’, Blifil proceeds to 
‘prove’ to the philanthropic Allworthy ‘that the word charity, in Scripture, 
nowhere means beneficence or generosity’ :
‘The Christian religion’, he said, ‘was instituted for much 
nobler purposes, than to enforce a lesson which many heathen 
philosophers had taught us long before, and which, though it 
might, perhaps, be called a moral virtue, savouied but little of 
that sublime Christian-like disposition, that vast elevation of 
thought, in purity approaching to angelic perfection to be 
attained, expressed, and felt only by grace. Those (he said) 
come nearer to the Scripture meaning, who understood by it 
candour, or the forming of a benevolent opinion of our 
brethren, and passing a favourable judgment on their actions; a 
virtue much higher, and more extensive in its nature, than a 
pitiful distribution of alms, which, though we would never so 
much prejudice, or even ruin our families, could never reach 
many; whereas charity, in the other and truer sense, might be 
extended to all mankind.’ ®^
Blifil is not lying. His ‘proof really does derive from the eulogy to charity 
delivered to the Corinthians by St. Paul. ‘Though I bestowe all my goodes to 
feed the poor’, the apostle tells them, ‘and though I give my body to bee burned,
See the epigraph from Robert Kimbrough at the head of this chapter.
Crane, ‘Suggestions’, p. 211.
Hemy Fielding, Tom Jones, ed, R.P.C. Mutter, rpt. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), p. 73.
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and have not charitie, it profiteth me nothing’/^ But the devil can cite scripture, 
as the ‘Reader’ exercising his ‘Judgment’ in this matter is presumed by Fielding 
to understand/^ Paul maintains that benevolent opinions and favouiable 
judgements must accompany alms-giving; Blifil says they should replace it. And 
by attempting to persuade Allworthy to abandon his habit of supporting 
foundlings like Tom, Blifil certainly intends to ‘profit’ himself in no small 
measuie. ‘Prejudicially’ and deliberately paving the way of his own family to 
bankmptcy is, in Blifil’s view, the least haimful consequence of such generosity. 
Worse by far is the moral culpability that must attach to a benefactor if it 
transpires, later, that the object of his open-handed bounty is actually unworthy of 
that favoui*. Such “‘examples must gr eatly lessen the inward satisfaction, which 
a good man would otherwise find in generosity’”, he declares:
‘ ... nay, may even make him timorous in bestowing, lest he 
should be guilty o f supporting vice, and encouraging the 
wicked; a crime of a very black dye, and for which it will by no 
means be a sufficient excuse, that we have not actually 
intended such an encouragement; unless we have used the 
utmost caution in chusing the objects of our beneficence.’^^
‘Supporting vice’, ‘encouraging the wicked’, committing crimes of ‘a 
very black dye’ —  surely these are not faults of which the altruistic Allworthy is 
guilty? Perhaps not. Fielding, at any rate, obviously considers his reader wise 
enough to detect the self-interested bias of Blifil’s account. The judicious reader 
is also expected to recall the alacrity with which the Captain spreads damning 
reports about his neighbours; in short, that the concept of ‘forming a benevolent 
opinion of our brethren, and passing a favouiable judgment on their actions’ is, to 
Blifil, completely alien. In response to Allworthy’s favourable interpretation of
icing James Bible (1611), The First Epistle o f Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians, XIII: 3.
Tim Parks refers to this verse in an emdite essay on the subject of ‘chaiity’ in which he recalls 
being puzzled by it as a child, until someone explained to him that ‘charity meant “love” not 
charity as we now use the word’. See his Adultery and Other Diversions (London: Vintage, 
1999), pp. 98-9.
^  Fielding presents the chapter as ‘Containing much Matter to exercise the Judgment and 
Reflection of the Reader’. On the novel’s interest in the problems of assessing evidence and 
passing judgements, and the connection o f this to Fielding’s own position as a magistrate, as well 
as to the activity o f ‘criticism’ in general, see Matilda Snow, ‘The Judgment of Evidence m Tom 
Jones', South Atlantic Review 48.2 (1983): 21-36.
Fielding, Tom Jones, p. 73.
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alms-giving, Blifil proposes an alternative view of charity that he personally 
laiows nothing about. But this is not the end of Blifil’s contribution to the 
dialogue. And the prediction he offers with regard to the possible outcome of 
such charity cannot be so easily dismissed. That this worse-case scenario might 
actually happen is certainly feasible; that it might is enough, and cannot, of 
course, be proved. Almost imperceptibly, Blifil shifts his ground as he continues 
spealdng, supplementing his use of the present tense with a few strategically 
placed examples of the future conditional. His pessimistic forecast need only be 
satis prohabile, which it evidently is, for Allworthy, though renowned for his 
slowness to ‘believe anything to [another’s] disadvantage’,^ "^ dispatches an 
employee to check up on the moral conduct o f one particular object of his 
beneficence.
So what exactly is happening here? At one level we are simply 
eavesdr opping on part of a conversation between two men, one of whom is an 
eloquent parasite with a sharp eye for the main chance. Another way of reading 
the exchange is as a debate, whose ‘theame or argument’ is ‘should a man show 
charity?’, and to which is brought, by one of its disputants, a ‘great learning’ that 
consists primarily of an ability to ar gue convincingly on the negative 
(undoubtedly more difficult) side of this question. Once made, BlifrTs 
uncharitable construction of charity cannot be unmade, and is left hanging, 
pregnantly persuasive, in the air. What is proven by his argument is that the 
virtue of charity— which involves giving the most favourable interpretation 
available to any act or event— is itself capable of being construed in a better or a 
worse sense.
Published in the middle of the eighteenth century, Tom Jones plays out a 
dilemma upon the horns of which certain Shalcespeareans of the period found 
themselves stuck. Influenced by the eighteenth-century latitudinarian tradition. 
Fielding was an advocate of what Martin Battestin approvingly described as 
‘liberal’ or ‘complacent’ moralism.®® This moral tolerance is the animating 
principle behind the character of Squire Allworthy, in whom we find traits not 
dissimilar* to the ones Fielding’s contemporar*y, Samuel Johnson, foimd in
84 Ibid., p. 75.
Battestin, Moral Basis, pp. 13 and 15.
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Shakespeare —  tr aits which make him concerned rather to please than to instruct; 
most comfortable when giving the benefit o f the doubt; apt to find a bright side 
upon which to look/® In a lecture delivered to the British Academy, Michel 
Grivelet defined this impulse as a form o f ‘open-minded generosity’/^ 
‘Shalcespeare, though not unaware o f the dangers of hestial degradation’, he 
noted, commenting on the questionable conduct of some of Shakespeare’s 
earliest creations, is ‘capable of smiling upon the vagaries of man, less prepared 
to be systematically censorious of them’/^ On the three hundredth anniversary of 
the dramatist’s death, J.F.A. Pyre presented this capacity as evidence of his 
subject’s profound humanity. ‘Whilst others approach Shakespeare in 
shrewdness of observation and analysis’, he argued, there are none who are so 
‘intimate and kindly ... Many escape his humour, and some his sublimity; there 
are few who do not yield their worship to his divine tenderness’.*^
Here Pyre speaks in the awftrl tones more suited to religious reverence of 
the ‘kindly’ ‘tenderness’ to which Samuel Johnson had given a far more sinister 
twist. Willing to concede Shakespeare’s several excellencies, Johnson is more 
depressed by the dangerous implications of his ‘open-minded’ tolerance. He is 
convinced, in fact, that contact with Shakespeare too often results in his readers’ 
own powers of ‘observation’ being in some way disabled or impaired. Blinded 
by the dancing reflections produced by decades of critical acclaim, ‘We fix our 
eyes upon his graces, and turn them fi*om his deformities, and endure in him what 
we should in another loathe or despise’.^ ®
Gone firom this chilling description is Ben Jonson’s amusingly
Predictably enough, Johnson was no fan of Fielding’s, and sometimes grew almost violent in 
his condemnation of Tom Jones. ‘“I am shocked to hear you quote from so vicious a book,” he 
once scolded Hannah More, who said that this was “the only occasion o f Johnson’s being really 
angry with her”. “I am sorry to hear you have read if. a confession which no modest lady should 
ever make. I scarcely know a more coiTupt work.’” Cited in Christopher Hibbert, The Personal 
History o f Samuel Johnson (London: Pimlico, 1998), p. 322 n.9.
‘A Poifrait of the Artist as Proteus’, in Kenneth Muir, ed.. Interpretations o f Shakespeare: 
British Academy Shakespeare Lectures (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 44. From the lectme 
of 1975.
Ibid., p. 43.
J.F.A. Pyre, ‘Shakespeare’s Pathos’, in Shakespeare Studies; by Members o f  the University o f  
Wisconsin to Commemorate the Three-Hundredth Anniversaiy o f the Death of William 
Shakespeare, April 23, 1616 (Madison: University o f Wisconsin, 1916), p. 77.
Samuel Johnson, Preface, in R. W. Desai, ed., Johnson on Shakespeare, 2"^  edn. (London: 
Sangam Books, 1997), p. 120.
36
sympathetic Shalcespeare, an ambiguous figure enough, but one in whom there 
was ‘ever more ... to be praysed, than to be pardoned’. Suddenly, a man whose 
‘faults [are] sufficient to obscure and overwhelm any other merit’ appears in his 
stead. He it is who ‘sacrifices virtue to convenience, and is so much more careful 
to please than to instruct, that he seems to write without any moral purpose’; he 
who makes ‘no just distribution o f good or evil, nor is always careful to show in 
the virtuous a disapprobation of the wicked’; he who ‘carries his persons 
indifferently through right and wrong, and at the close dismisses them without 
further care, and leaves their examples to operate by chance’. Shalcespeare has 
other faults; liis plots are baggy and his comic characters boorish. But it is to 
such defects as Johnson mentions first that he believes ‘may be imputed most of 
the evil in books or in men’.®^
‘Evil’ is a word seldom applied to William Shalcespeare, and its 
appearance here might well remind us of Blifil’s satisprobabile account of the 
potentially deleterious effects of charity. Johnson’s criticism o f Shakespeare’s 
failure to malce a ‘just distribution of good or evil’ is a resonant echo of Blifil’s 
objection to the reckless lack of caution Allworthy shows in ‘chusing the objects 
of [his] beneficence’. Like Blifil, Johnson regards such indiscriminate generosity 
as tantamount to ‘encouraging the wicked’.
Reading Ben Jonson’s account of Shakespeare in Timber alongside 
Samuel Johnson’s in the Preface thus produces a radically unstable image of the 
playwright which pulls in diametiically opposed directions. Each Jo(h)nson, first 
Ben then Samuel, presents an different interpretation of the same subject: 
Shakespeare’s penchant for extenuation. We may therefore imagine them as 
opponents in a deliberative declamation; the ‘two schollers’ appointed to argue 
pro and contra Shakespeare’s charitable compulsion to smile indulgently on 
human failings. ‘In deliberatives’, we recall, according to Francis Bacon, ‘the 
point is, what is good and what is evil, and of good what is greater, and of evil 
what is the less’.®^ Presenting the case for Shalcespeare, Ben shows ‘of evil what 
is the less, and of good what is the greater’ (‘redeemed Iris vices, with his 
vertues’). Samuel, presenting the case against him, shows ‘of evil what is the
Ibid., p. 105.
Bacon, O f the Colours o f Good and Evil, p. 97.
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greater, and of good what is the less’ (‘faults ... sufficient to ... ovei'whelm ... 
merit’).
In the context of this ‘virtual’ deliberative, both ‘persuaders’ labour to 
win support for their case by appealing to their readers’ emotions. Referring in a 
benignly mocking, almost condescending tone, to Shakespeare’s curious but 
basically harmless behaviour, Ben Jorrson encourages the formation o f ‘calm and 
gentle’ emotions {ethos), thereby coaxing his readers into ‘a feeling of goodwill’. 
The eighteenth-century persuader’s methods are very different. Aggressively 
stacking Shakespeare’s defects one on top of another, then using the emotive 
word ‘evil’ to cap this list, Johnson stirs up the more hostile, violent emotions 
(pathos), associated with ‘anger, dislike, [and] fear*’.®^ And as if  this elenchus 
were not convincing enough, Samuel seems intent on overturning Ben’s claim 
that there was ‘ever more in [Shakespeare] to be praysed, than to be pardoned’. 
Where Ben seizes the opportunity afforded by deliberative discoruse to highlight 
Shakespeare’s ‘virtue’, Samuel argues, on the contrary, that such praise is often 
‘given by custom and veneration’ and is therefore not deserved at all.®"^
He was not the first to have said so. Some half dozen years earlier, Oliver 
Goldsmith launched his career in literature withÆ  Enquiry into the Present 
State o f Polite Learning in Europe. Devoted to an investigation ‘Of the Stage’, 
its twelfth chapter reveals the budding dramatist’s hostility toward various 
(expediently anonymous) theatr e managers, who pander to public taste by 
rejecting new plays in favour of ‘old pieces’. Must we be forever condemned to 
witnessing the ‘absurdities’ of Shalcespear e, he asks, and, clearly conscious of the 
irreverence of such a question, continues:
Let the reader suspend his censure; I admir e the beauties of this 
great father of our stage as much as they deserve but could 
wish, for the honour of our cormtry, and for his honour too, 
that many of his scenes were forgotten. A man blind of one 
eye should always be painted in profile. Let the spectator who 
assists at any of these new revived pieces only ask himself 
whether he would approve such a performance if written by a 
modem poet; if he would not, then his applause proceeds
^ Quintilian, Imtitutio Oratoria, trans. H.E. Butler, 4 volumes (London: Heinemann, 1920-21), 
II, 6.2.9; 6.2.6-7.
Johnson, Preface, p. 120.
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merely from the sound of a name and an empty veneration for 
antiquity/^
Unlike his yet-to-be recognised contemporary, however, Johnson had no 
axe to grind with timorous theatre managers. Thus free fr om the personal 
venality of Goldsmith’s, his own interest in the powerful influence of ‘custom 
and veneration’ is one of the most important aspects of his critique. The way 
Johnson saw it, Shakespeare failed to ‘show in the virtuous a disapprobation of 
the wicked’ because he was too busy giving such wicked offenders the benefit of 
the doubt. And what is worse, his readers proceed to compound this ‘evil’ by 
themselves excusing what could just as easily be seen (and Johnson does see) as 
a serious moral failing. The fault that they would loathe in another, they tolerate 
or even applaud in Shakespeare. Why? Simply because he is Shakespeare, and 
his every stroke has already been sanctioned by the weight of ‘custom and 
veneration’. ‘If we endured without praising’, Johnson continues:
respect for the father of our drama might excuse us; but I have 
seen, in the book of some modern critic, a collection of 
anomalies which show that he has connpted language by every 
mode of depravation, but which his admirer has accumulated 
as a monument o f honour.®®
If Johnson’s palpable yearning to dismantle this ‘monument of honour*’ 
sounds strangely familiar, then that is because it has been more recently 
articulated (though couched in different terms) by cultur al materialist critics 
working primarily in Britain from the middle of the 1980s. On the face of it, 
Johnson’s eighteenth-century editorial project has little in common with cultural 
materialism’s ‘decanonization of Shakespeare as a cultural token’ Surely the 
doctor’s attitude to his subject is well removed from the reaction of ‘radical’
Oliver Goldsmith, An Enquiry into the Present State o f Polite Learning in Europe (London, 
1759), p. 169
^  Johnson, Preface, p. 120.
Don E. Wayne, ‘Power, Politics, and the Shakespearean Text: Recent Criticism in England and 
the United States’, in Jean E. Howard and Marion F. O’Connor, eds., Shakespeare Reproduced: 
The Text in History and Ideology (New York and London: Methuen, 1987), p. 51.
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critics to ‘“Shalcespeai'c”: the cultural construction, the ideological force, the 
myth’?®*
Or is it?
Johnson’s withering allusion to the preposterously bardolatrous findings 
which formed the bulk of the ‘modem critic’ John Upton’s Critical Observations 
on Shakespeare (1746) suggests that he was already acutely aware of the 
ideological importance o f ‘Shakespeare’ — where that word is ‘less the name of 
a specific historical figure, than a sign that has come to designate a vaguely 
defined, but fiercely defended, set of characteristics that fimction as the 
touchstone of value for what we commonly call the “English literary tradition’”.®® 
As if reluctant even to countenance such muddle-headed asininity, Johnson rather 
surprisingly leaves the specific details o f his objection to Upton’s project vague.
It is not clear* whether Upton is taken to task for his inability to recognise ‘bad’ 
Shakespeare, or even to believe in its existence, or for* using Shakespeare as an 
advertisement to promote what Johnson therefore feels doubly driven to renounce 
as ‘bad’. Less ambiguously conveyed is the editor’s troubled realisation that 
‘evil’, or* at least ‘corruption’ and ‘depravation’, could be at best effectively 
extenuated, and at worst fashioned into a ‘monument of honour’, by a simple 
demonstration of its connection to ‘Shakespeare’: the ‘touchstone of value’, the 
long-established arbiter o f all that is good and noble.
hi the same way that Johnson spoke of the per*nicious ability of ‘custom 
and veneration’ to make virtues out of vices, cultural materialists dwell on the 
process by which a ‘dominant ideology’ naturalises its own unjust, and frequently 
violent, oppressive and inhumane behaviour. This goes on, they say, both within 
and outside the boundaries of the Shakespearean text. So it is that the Venetian 
state presented in Othello ‘claims a monopoly of legitimate violence’, where ‘the 
exercise of that violence is justified thr ough stories about the barbarity of those
^ Graham Holderness, Cultural Shakespeare: Esscys in the Shakespeare Myth (Hatfield: 
University of Hertfordshire Press, 2001), p. 5.
James H. Kavanagh, ‘Shakespeai-e In Ideology’, in John Drakakis, ed., Alternative 
Shakespeares (London and New York: Methuen, 1985), p. 144. Terry Eagleton, in his 
‘Afteiword’ to The Shakespeare Myth, ed. Graham Holderness (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1988), suggests similarly that ‘All o f the wiiters in this book are alert to the fact 
that Shakespeai-e is today less an author than an apparatus —  that his name ... is merely 
metonymic of an entire politico-cultural formation, and thus more akin to “Disney” or 
“Rockefeller” than to “Jane Smith’” (204).
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who aie constituted as its demonised others’/®® So it is that the Right 
Honourable Nigel Lawson, Chancellor o f the Exchequer in Margaret Thatcher’s 
eai'ly 1980s government, invoked Shakespeare in support of Conservative fiscal 
policy; justifying veiy i/whonourable cuts to the health service and a reduction in 
taxation on the rich by quoting directly from Ulysses’s speech on degree/®* 
Polemical attacks on this abuse of Shakespeare aie frequently (and often 
coiTectly) read as timely responses to contemporary political events. Yet it seems 
deal' from his iconoclastic attitude to Upton’s ‘monument of honour’ that 
Johnson knew in the eighteenth century what Graham Holderness is proud to 
announce as the disco veiy o f ‘radical’ criticism at the beginning of the twenty- 
first. That fai' from maldng us ‘wise, and good, and free’, ‘“Shalcespeare” can... 
operate to delude, to coiTupt and to enslave’.*®^
Samuel Johnson is not ordinaiily noted for his radical or dissident 
readings o f ‘Shakespeai'e’ or the Shalcespearean text, but he did have experience 
in speaking successfully on behalf o f ‘the opposition’. Indeed, he positively 
revelled in being given occasion to do so. Glancing back, later on in life, at the 
adventures of his youth, Johnson remembered how he ‘used always to choose the 
wrong side o f a debate, because most ingenious things (that is to say, most new 
things) could be advanced upon it’.*®* Contraiy by natuie, Johnson’s desire to 
ai'gue on the ‘wiong side’ of the Shakespeare question might therefore be seen as 
a solo effort to end what Francis Bacon called ‘the reign or tyranny of custom’,*®"* 
by kicking down the monument built in Shalcespeare’s honour, and grinding the 
rose-coloured glasses of ‘custom and veneration’ to dust beneath his famously 
gigantic foot. Although in many ways profoundly conservative, Johnson’s own 
clear-headed scepticism with regard to myth-making and sentimentality means
Alan Sinfield, Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics o f Dissident Reading (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 34.
See Mai'got Heinemann’s now classic essay ‘How Brecht Read Shakespeare’, in Jonathan 
Dollimore and Alan Sinfield, eds.. Political Shakespeare (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1985).
Holderness, Cultural Shakespeare, p. 5. Various dubious Tory appropriations o f Shakespeare 
are discussed by Richard Wilson, in ‘NATO’s Phaimacy: Shakespeare by Prescription’, in John J. 
Joughin, ed., Shakespeare and National Culture (Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 1997).
Cited in Hibbert, Personal History, p. 16.
Francis Bacon, ‘Of Custom and Education’, in John Pitcher, ed., Francis Bacon: The Essays 
(London: Penguin, 1985), p. 179.
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that he shares some common ground with more radical iconoclasts. His 
‘alternative’ interpretation of Shakespeai’e’s sympathetic or generous tolerance, 
especially, anticipates the ‘new’ ideas advanced on this topic in the 1970s —  not 
only by practitioners of political literary criticism, but by radical, politically 
oriented dramatists such as Edwai’d Bond.*®*
The comparison is strange enough to require explanation. To ai’gue 
convincingly that Bond’s radical take on Shakespeare was influenced by him, 
rather than by social and political theories inherited from Mai’x, would surely 
have taxed the ingenuity of Johnson himself, however experienced an antagonist 
he was. Be that as it may, Bond’s ‘concern with the inter-relation of past, present 
and future’ —  sparked by his reading o f twentieth-century materialists or not—  
was a subject to which Johnson had already given serious thought.*®® As we have 
seen, Johnson was quite as aware as Bond that the ‘past often works as a myth on 
the present’.*®^ And although neither knew the same ‘present’, both understood 
the influence upon it that ‘Shalcespeare’ had. In Johnson’s case, this 
consciousness takes the foim of an attack on Upton’s reverential partial­
sightedness with respect to the Bard. In the case of Bond, it finds imaginative 
expression in the demystifrcatory stiategies set to work in plays such as Lear and 
Bingo. If Bond demonstrates in the eaiiier play ‘the imperative need to avoid 
comfortable acquiescence in Shakespeare’s conclusions’,*®* he shows in the latter 
an analogous need to resist the comfortable conclusions reached by the 
establishment on ‘Shalcespeare’ himself. By attempting to ‘look beyond the myth 
of the “sweet swan of Avon” retiring to the bosom of his family at the end of his
In his 1987 investigation of the ‘new directions in Shakespeare studies’, Walter Cohen admits 
that his adoption o f 1980 as a point o f departure may appear arbitraiy, ‘and would seem still more 
so if [its] bibliography also included articles, many o f which date from the 1970s’, but goes on to 
contend that, in England, ‘where leftist cultural criticism developed earlier [than m the United 
States], 1980 nonetheless represented a significant point of demarcation, with an intensified 
radical response to the recent victoiy of Thatcher, the extension of tins work to Renaissance 
literatme, and the publication of an important Marxist study of Middleton’. See his ‘Political 
Criticism of Shakespeare’, in Jean E. Howard and Marion F. O’Connor, eds., Shakespeare 
Reproduced: The Text in History and Ideology (New York and London: Methuen, 1987). 
Although avowedly Marxist, Bond’s ‘critical’ response to Shalcespeaie obviously falls outside 
Cohen’s remit.
On Bond’s indebtedness to Mai-x and others, see David Hirst’s introductoiy remarks (‘Points 
oî'D&çdx\mé’) m. Edward Bond (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 4ff.
Letter from Bond to Tony Coult, dated 28* July 1977. Cited in Malcolm Hay and Philip 
Roberts, Bond: A Study o f his Plcys (London: Eyre Methuen, 1980), p. 179.
Ibid., p. 180.
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cai’eer’/®® Bond signals his independence from those who ‘fix [their] eyes upon 
[Shakespeare’s] graces, and turn them from his defonnities, and endure in him 
what [they] should in another loathe or despise’/*®
Utterly devoid of sentiment, then, this sober re-presentation of 
Shakespeare’s final sojourn in Stratford challenges the (often equally ‘creative’) 
readings offered by the ‘sweet swan’s’ less sceptical admirers. Among these may 
be counted John Masefield, who, writing only a decade before the first 
performance of Bingo, takes a typically benign view of Shalcespeare’s filial 
attachments. ‘Of the home, we know nothing’, he admits, ‘except that place and 
inmates were dear to him; he held by them and returned to them’.*** It is exactly 
this Icind of conclusion that Bond seems determined to upset. In the absence of 
evidence to the contrary (and sometimes in the face of it) Masefield automatically 
assumes that Shalcespeare ‘the man’ showed kindness and compassion to all 
those whose lives he touched. Such conclusions aie based on a preconceived 
belief in what Hazleton Spencer saw as Shakespeare’s ‘passionate admiration for 
the human spirit’ and his ‘deep pity for the lot of man’. And sure enough, 
Masefield’s account of this happy family sounds entirely plausible when 
Shakespeai'e is himself presented as a ‘genius’, who ‘by some stai'tling mercy 
could perceive, and in undying words set down the eternal marvel o f man’s life 
that is so splendid, so passionate and so short’.**^
A deep-seated desire to re-describe this ‘startling mercy’ — figured 
variously as ‘charity’, ‘generosity’, and so on— to underline its status as a 
paradoxically nefarious myth, appears in Bond’s work as well as in Johnson’s. 
Out of apparently incommensurable projects emerges an homologous 
understanding of the role and responsibility of the writer in society. The 
eighteenth-century critic delivers his verdict on this subject in a characteristically 
brusque fashion. Shakespeare’s habitual sacrifice of virtue to convenience is 
indefensible, according to Johnson, even if allowance is made for the barbar ity of 
Shakespeare’s age. No matter when or where he depletes his reservoir of ink, ‘it
Hirst, Edward Bond, p. 38.
Johnson, Preface, p. 120.
John Masefield, William Shakespeare, quatercentenary edn. (London: Mercury Books, 1964), 
p. 3.
Ibid., p. X.
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is always a writer’s duty to malce the world better, and justice is a virtue 
independent of time or place’ A remarkably similar vision of the writer’s
‘duty’ propels the action, or more properly the lack thereof, in Bingo. Here the 
question ‘Was anything done?’ is repeatedly asked of Shakespeai'e, the play’s 
protagonist, who is unable to say honestly that anything was.
Both critics, then, are demonstrably conscious of an abdication of 
responsibility on the part of Shakespeare. For Johnson, he fails to deal 
adequately with his things o f darkness, whose reproachable conduct is eventually 
casually dismissed. Bond is likewise troubled by the ‘convenience’ of 
Shakespeare’s denouements. Content to admhe the dramatist’s ‘intellectual 
strength and passionate beauty’, his quietist ‘solutions and, in paiticular, “the 
reconciliation that he created on the stage’” are rejected by the radical playwright 
as ‘totally dishonest’.^ In ^ m g o , ‘Shakespeare’ assumes physical dimensions, 
and the implications of his complacent dismissal of people and problems are 
unflinchingly played out. The ability Keats found in Shakespeare to ‘make all 
disagreeables evaporate’ may have struck Edward Bond with its ‘beauty’, but 
neither he nor Johnson would have vouched for its ‘truth’.
One way of approaching Bond’s alternative interpretation of 
‘Shalcespeare’ is to liken it to other political readings given in the specific field of 
(British) English literary criticism. Bond’s fighting talk would certainly soimd an 
appropriate note on a field Don Wayne has noticed ‘periodically takes on the 
appearance of a battleground on which a struggle is waged for control of the 
representational power of texts that are understood to be the nation’s cultural 
patrimony —  for better or worse! ’ It is not difficult to imagine Bond 
embroiled in such a dispute, flanked on either side by materialists, all firing 
alternative versions of ‘Shakespeare’ at their idealist foe. To do so is easy, but, 
with scarcely any more effort, his radical reading of Shakespeare might be re­
inscribed within a much earlier, classical tradition. Bond’s oppositional strategy
Johnson, Preface, p. 105.
Cited in Christopher Innes, ‘The Political Spectrum of Edward Bond: From Rationalism to 
Rhapsody’, in John Russell Brown, ed., Modern British Dramatists: New Perspectives 
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Keats, in Bate, ed.. Romantics, p. 198.
Wayne, ‘Power, Politics, and die Shakespearean Text’, p. 52.
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has at least as much in common with what Samuel Johnson identified as the 
argument advanced on the ‘wrong side’ of the question. And indeed, it is not in 
Mai’x or even Althusser, but rather in Cicero, that we find a blueprint for what 
Bond is doing.
Entering at Chapter thirty-eight o f the De Partitione Oratoria, we 
interrupt the two Ciceros, junior and senior, towards the end of a pedagogical 
exercise designed to untangle the labyiinthine complexities of legal cases. Cicero 
the younger requests a more detailed account of how to proceed in cases ‘when 
the dispute turns on something in a written document’ ‘The rules as to a 
disputed meaning aie common to the two opponents’, his father answers:
Each will maintain that the interpretation on which he himself 
will base his case is worthy of the intelligence of the writer; 
and each will maintain that the meaning that his opponents will 
say is to be derived from an ambiguous phiase in the document 
is either absurd or useless or unfair or disgraceful.^
Cicero’s advice to his son emphasises perfectly the extent to which 
‘interpretation is by and large adversarial, an antagonistic affair’.^ O n e  need 
only remove the two Ciceros fiom the specific arena of their hypothetical court of 
law, and substitute for their ‘written documents’ the plays of Shalcespeare, to 
appreciate the essential communality between this classical process of 
ai'gumentation and the contentious materialist agenda. Uninterested here in 
Shakespeare’s ‘intelligence’. Bond aims to expose and reject the idealist vision of 
generous Shalcespeai'e as an ‘absurd’ interpretation of the written documents 
available —  an inteipretation that is both ‘unfair’ and ‘disgraceful’.
Seeing idealist and iconoclast as opponents in a meta-deliberative 
declamation on the subject o f ‘generous Shalcespeare’ allows us to draw another 
illuminating parallel. If the Partitione acknowledges the existence of contested 
meanings, the pseudo-Ciceronian Rhetorica Ad Herennium provides needful 
instructions on how to treat them. This advice is given in Book HI of the
Cicero, De Partitione Oratoria, in De Oratore Book III, De Fato, Paradoxa Stoicorum, De 
Partitione Oratoria, ti'ans. H. Rackham, 2 volumes (London: Heinemann, 1948), II, 38.132.
Ibid.
Kathy Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition: Chapters in the Ancient Legacy and 
its Humanist Reception (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 2.
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Ad Herennium, where the topics of deliberative speech ar e also divided. Chapter 
three focuses more specifically on the technique most likely to successfully 
undermine the case for praising an action that appears to embody an indubitable 
vhtue. In order to gain a hearing for this underdog case, the Ad Herennium 
recommends that the speaker try to show that the actions his opponent considers 
honourable and praiseworthy actually deserve to be seen in a completely different 
moral light. Tf it is at all possible’, the speaker should ‘show that what [his] 
opponent calls justice is cowardice, and sloth and peiwerse generosity’; ‘what [his 
opponent] declares to be temperance [he] shall declare to be inaction and lax 
indifference’.^ ®^ Just as if  the defenders of Shakespeare’s generosity were his 
opponents, and he their plucky adversary. Bond proceeds in Bingo to show 
exactly that.
The play opens in 1615-16; the scene is an empty garden in 
War wickshire. Shakespeare enters, sits down on a bench, and begins to read 
some papers. An old man beside him trims the hedge. Apart from him, the 
retired playwright is alone. Before long he is approached by a wandering 
woman, who peers over the gate and holds out her hand. Assured she would 
prefer money over food, Shalcespeare rrnis back inside to root out his purse; with 
this ‘glib gesture of charity’ his open-handed liberality is e s t ab l i shed . A little 
later we discover Shakespeare deep in contemplation— agonising over the sins 
of his past. This time he is accompanied by an elderly female employee (the 
gardener’s wife) who quemlously comforts him with her own impression of his 
good-heartedness: ‘No, no. Yo’yont named for cruelty. They say yo’m a 
generous man. Yo’ looked arter me an’ father. Give us one a your houses t’ live 
in ’.'""
Responding to the only kind of charity she knows —  the kind that puts 
money in her purse —  the old woman rehear ses an assumption about 
Shakespeare that Bond presumably wants us to realise is both hollow and 
unfounded. Bond’s inclusion of the conversation between Shalcespeare and the
Rhetorica Ad Herennium, trans. Haiiy Caplan, rpt. (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), 3.3.6.
Hay and Roberts, Bond, p. 184.
Bond, Bingo, 1.3.
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old woman is crucial to his project. It comes shortly after the playwright is 
accused by his daughter, Judith, o f ignoring the people he lives with— of 
sneering at their opinions, and of failing even to register the fact that his wife lies 
ill in bed (1.2).
These indictments are writ large on the backgr ound of a political dispute 
over land. Very early in the play, William Combe, one of Stratford’s large 
landowners, pays Master Shalcespear e a visit —  the purpose of which is to ensure 
that Shakespeare (as one of the town’s biggest rent holders) will not oppose his 
plan to ‘get rid o f  short lease tenants, stalce out new fields, and enclose them 
behind hedges and ditches. Combe promises to guarantee Shalcespeare against 
financial loss in return for an understanding: that he will not ‘support the town or 
the tenants’ (1.1). Far fiom opposing them actively, however, Shakespeare is 
advised to ‘ignore them’, to be non-committal, and to stay in his garden. By 
doing so he avoids passing judgement on the matter, defers his decision ad 
infinitum, and finally, like Hamlet, ‘let[s] be’. In a controversy over fences, in 
other words, Shakespeare can frequently be found astride one. The phrase 
‘Nothing’s decided’ echoes dully throughout the play.
This policy o f non-intervention also operates outside the realm of 
business and finance. Soon after Shakespeare has supplied the young woman 
with food, money, and the promise of a job, she is caught with her skirt up in the 
bushes, gainfully employed with the gardener (himself an erstwhile recipient of 
Shakespeare’s liberality). Judith is emuged by this impudence but Shakespeare 
does not care. His daughter’s instinctive reaction is to situate this ‘irresponsible’ 
inertia in the realm of ethics: to let be, in this case, she implies, makes him 
‘morally as guilty as they are’ (1.2).
By turning ‘Shalcespeare’ into the protagonist of Bingo, Edward Bond 
radically undermines some of earlier criticism’s most ingr ained, cherished, and 
tacitly held assumptions. Presented in unfamiliar surTOundings, as an influential 
Stratford burgher and a disenchanted husband and father. Bond’s world-weary 
Shakespeare is manifestly not a nice person. Instead of embodying ‘the most
For a ‘non-fictional’ account o f the conti oversy over the Welcombe enclosures see Samuel 
Schoenbaum, William Shakespeare: Records and Images (London: Scolar Press, 1981), pp. 72- 
92.
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impetuous tide of warm-blooded humanity that ever beat thr ough the heart of 
man’/^ '^  he admits to despising his daughter —  not even with a passion, but with 
a malignant, ‘cold and formal hatred’ Most ruthlessly demolished by Bond is 
the commonplace elision of the two different meanings of the word ‘generosity’; 
the obfuscatory semantic slippage which led mid-twentieth-century critics like 
Hazleton Spencer to ponder, whimsically, whether Shakespeare, ‘like John 
Webster’, was ‘generous to his brother poets in thought and utterance? ... Did his 
hand fly to his pocket, or could he steel his heart, when misery in Shoreditch rags 
told a hard-luck story and held out a shaking claw?’^^®
Spencer’s final touch, the addition o f the quivering talon, is, perhaps, a 
little excessive for even the most sentimental o f tastes. But the point is that such 
questions could never be asked by someone even vaguely uneasy about receiving 
the wrong answer. In this reading, Shakespeare’s ‘uncommonly sweet nature’ 
acts as a guarantor for his financial munificence. The resulting image of 
‘Shakespeare the benefactor’ is then automatically fed back into the already fixed 
one of ‘Shalcespeare the merciful’. The two concepts reinforce each other; and 
the end product is a composite picture of an incontrovertibly ‘generous’ man. 
Bond’s representation of a Shalcespeare whose financial generosity is offset by 
his total lack of ‘profound humanity’ breaks open this carefully constructed 
heimeneutic circle. Bingo begs the question of whether the generosity regarded 
for centuries as Shakespeare’s trademark (appearing here as his neutrality over 
the enclosures and his reluctance to punish ‘sinners’) might not be read instead as 
a species o f what the author of the Rhetorica Ad Herennium called ‘lax 
indifference’. Bond’s Shakespeare does less than he should, and far less than he 
can.
Dover Wilson, The Essential Shakespeare, p. 10. 
Bond, Bingo, 2.5.
126 Spencer, Art and Life, p. 3. Katherine Duncan-Jones makes certain not to him* this distinction 
in her own recently published biography, Ungentle Shakespeare: Scenes from his Life (London: 
The Arden Shakespeare, 2001), In the preface to this text Duncan-Jones emphatically denies ‘that 
any Elizabethans, even Shakespeare, were what might now be called “nice” —  liberal, 
unprejudiced, unselfish’ (x). And, indeed, she proceeds to find evidence of Shakespeare’s 
reluctance to ‘divert much, if any, o f his considerable wealth towards chaiitable, neighbourly or 
altruistic ends’ (xi). The appearance of this disclaimer eaiiy on in the study leaves the way clear 
for her to find, in Shakespeare’s plays, ‘a widespread endorsement of devotion, charity and 
kindness, and an equally widespread condemnation of impiety, selfishness and gi eed’ (196).
Spencer, Art and Life, p. 46.
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What is at stalce here has as much to do with nomenclature as ethics. 
Bingo is important to this argument because it lays bare the representational 
strategies by which generations o f critics sought to explain, or attempted to 
neutralise, the ambiguities they discovered in Shalcespearean drama itself. Tt 
may almost be said to be the rule’, argued J.I.M. Stewart, that when 
Shalcespeai'e’s characters ‘come hard up against a moral problem proper —  a 
moral dilemma or hard choice— the dramatist finds some means to let them off. 
The issue is suspended, dissolved or dodged; some theatricality, some trick of 
distraction is brought in. Even in Measure for Measure, the play most commonly 
cited in arguments here, the dramatist is thoroughly evasive in the end’.^ ®^
Thus, Bond’s portrayal o f a Shalcespeare who, as his daughter Judith 
complains, ‘shields’ tiansgressors, and whose reaction to the moral dilemma of 
the enclosures is to ‘Wait and see’, emerges in Stewart’s analysis as a dramatist 
well-schooled in the art of letting people off—  of suspending, dodging or 
dissolving ethical conundrums.
Throughout this chapter I have attempted to convey some sense of how 
very different modes of critical inquiiy might lead to the drawing o f very similar 
conclusions. Stewart’s account surely calls for the re-entiy of Norman Rablcin’s 
Shakespeare, who is possessed of ‘skeptical openness’, though here in an entirely 
positive sense which emphasises his generous tolerance towards different points 
of view. This makes him the antithesis of the old men whose refusal ‘to utter 
their opinion in anything’ might be understood as what Stephen Toulmin called 
‘destructive nay-saying’. In an account of humanism which embraces the work 
of Erasmus, Montaigne and Shakespeare, Toulmin suggests that the writings of 
these men display
J.I.M. Stewart, ‘Shakespeare’s Men and their Morals’, in John Gairett, ed.. More Talking of 
Shakespeare {LonAom Longman, 1959), pp. 125-6.
George K. Hunter has also suggested that many of Shakespeare’s plays (Love‘s Labours Lost 
and^ Midsummer Night's Dream among them) ‘end with epilogues or throwaway final lines that 
transcend by evading the points at issue’. Hunter’s essay is more subtly nuanced in other respects, 
however, and links this ‘tianscendence’ to the ‘ethical polyphony’ encouraged by the humanist 
dialogue form and by the early modern habit o f arguing in utramque partem, as explored by Joel 
Altman in The Tudor Play o f Mind. For Hunter’s comments on Altman, and for a discussion of 
die related tecliniques of orator and playwi ight, see his ‘Rhetoric and Renaissance Drama’, in 
Peter Mack, ed., Renaissance Rhetoric (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 112 and 
passim.
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the urbane open-mindedness and skeptical tolerance that were 
novel features o f this new lay culture. Their ways of thinking 
were not subject to the demands o f pastoral or ecclesiastical 
duty: they regarded human affairs in a clear-eyed, non- 
judgmental light that led to honest practical doubt about the 
value of ‘theory’ for human experience.
Out of this intellectual climate is bom Shakespeare’s contention that ‘Caesar- did 
never wrong but with just cause’ —  a claim that seems to ar ise naturally from the 
humanist culture whose optimism was based, according to Arthur Kinney, on the 
belief that ‘all things could be mended’.
This humanist belief in amelioration points to the fundamental affinity 
between a rhetorical openness which encouraged receptivity to different points of 
view and the more specifically moral qualities of tolerance, generosity, and what 
Thomas Lovell Beddoes was to call, simply, ‘kindness’. In his ‘Lines Written 
from Switzerland’ Beddoes laments the passing of an age of poetic ‘Tmth’, 
chronicled by ‘kind Shakespeare, our- recording angel’, whose ‘kindest’ 
imaginings are rejected in favour of alter-native forms of literature —  the ‘sermon 
and the scandalous paper’ preferred by those whose ‘velvet day-bed’ is always 
‘novel strewn’.
The playwright’s refiisal to sermonise is of course renowned. ‘He deals 
with morals always; but as a moralist, never’, claimed Stewar-t. ‘No man had less 
desire than Shalcespeare to point the moral, and none a deeper desire to paint it’, 
ar gued Edgar Fripp.^ ^^  Exploiting an image of Shalcespeare to which we will 
return, Fripp’s point/paint pun explicitly allies the dramatist’s painterly 
proficiency with his anti-didactic leanings. The fact that we ‘are not merely 
taught by him, but are taught without knowing i t \  is, in Fripp’s opinion, a ‘point’ 
in Shakespeare’s favour.
Not so in the opinion of Samuel Johnson, as we have already seen. Nor 
in the opinion of a contemporary of his, the blue-stocking Elizabeth Griffiths,
Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda o f Modernity (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1990), p. 25.
Kinney, Humanist Poetics, p. 36.
‘Lines Written in Switzerland’, in Judith Higgens, ed., Thomas Lovell Beddoes: Selected 
Poems (Manchester: Carcenet Press, 1976), pp. 48-50.
Edgar I. Fripp, Shakespeare: Man and Artist, rpt., 2 volumes (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1964), I, p. 70.
Ibid., (italics in original).
50
who would clearly have swapped any amount of sophisticated painting for just a 
few monochromatic examples. This much is apparent from Mrs Griffiths’s 
description of her authorial task as an effort to place Shalcespeare’s ‘Ethic merits 
in a more conspicuous point of view’.^ ^^  Abundance, not dearth, has hampered 
her progress. The real difficulty, she admits, has been what to choose, and 
sometimes, how to separate the moral from the matter, amidst such a ‘profusion 
of sweets, and variety o f colours’. M r s  Griffiths may have borrowed the idea 
of Shakespeare’s ‘garden’ from Samuel Johnson, but her intention is clearly to 
perfbim what another Jonson, again Ben, saw as every spealcer’s duty: to present 
Iris subject so that ‘his hearer may talce knowledge of his discipline with some 
delight’; to extract his examples from the ‘rough and brakey seats, where they lay 
hid and overgrown with thorns, to a pure, open and floweiy light, where they may 
talce the eye and be talcen by the hand’.^ ^^
As the author of The Morality o f Shakespeare’s Drama Illustrated, Mrs 
Griffiths obviously assumes the role of chief illustrator (modelled on Late Latin 
illustrator ‘one who enlightens’). Treating the canon as a kind of commonplace 
book, Mrs Griffiths deals primarily in ‘invention’ —  ‘the power’ that Cicero 
claimed ‘investigates hidden secrets’ and by searching Shalcespeare’s ‘places’ 
she engages in the process of dis-covering, or bringing to light, the ‘moral’ 
specimens which had, until then, lain unseen.
This is an ambitious project and Mrs Griffiths fares badly. By the time 
she reaches The Comedy o f Errors, the lady is resolved to ‘take no fuither notice 
of the want o f a moral fable in the rest o f these plays’, having already been
Elizabeth Griffiths, The Morality o f Shakespeare’s Drama Illustrated (New York: Augustus 
M. Kelley, 1971), p. ix.
"^Ibid.
Ben Jonson, ‘Reading, Speaking and Writing Well’, in Ralph S. Walker, ed., Ben Jonson’s 
Timber or Discoveries (Syiacuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1953), pp. 47-8.
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, trans. J.E. King (London: Heinemann, 1927), 1.25.61.
In his discussion of Agricola’s use of rhetorical ‘places’, Walter Ong shows how the Latin term 
silva (woods, brush, forest), and its Greek cognate, influenced the notion o f ‘loci’ through the 
Renaissance tradition. ‘Rhetoricians tend to think of the “matter” of discourse in teims o f a 
woods [j/c], to be dealt with by a process o f “sorting out” or “cutting out” or “arranging”’. The 
relation of the ‘woods’ to the places o f ‘invention’ is made manifest, as Ong points out, in the title 
of Jonson’s own commonplace book, Timber, or Discoveries upon Men and Matter as They Have 
Flowed Out o f His Daily Readings. See Walter J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay o f  
Dialogue: From the Art o f Discourse to the Art o f Reason (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1958), pp. 116-21, at pp. 118-19.
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disappointed by this same deficiency in her first four attempts/"^ ® Fatigued but 
not broken, Mrs Griffiths boldly presses on, and, in spite of early indications, 
obviously does find matter enough to keep herself amused. For it is not until 
page 468 that she pauses, briefly, to give an account of ‘moral writers’ in general. 
Of the two classes of philosophy into which such a writer can fall, she claims, 
‘Our author represents it more impartially, neither inclining to one side or the 
other’. As an explanation of Shakespeai-e’s slippeiy moral system, though, the 
playwright’s ‘unparticipating aloofiiess’ (so crucial to later writers such as 
Coleridge) leaves Mrs Griffiths cold.^ '^  ^ A few pages later finds her couching the 
problem in different terms: ‘ Shalcespeare’s faults arise fiom richness not fiom 
poverty’, she announces. ‘They exceed, not fall short; his monsters never want a 
head, but have sometimes two’.^ "^^
This aspect of Shakespearean drama poses a problem for Mrs Griffiths 
that is remarkably similar to the one her near -contemporary Hemy Fielding 
encouraged the readers of Tom Jones to consider. Faults that ‘arise from 
richness’ and a penchant for ‘excess’ —  are not these the very same ‘failings’ 
that Captain Blifil told Squire Allworthy were concomitant to supporting the 
vicious and the wicked, and consequently, to condoning crimes of a ‘very black 
dye’?
Writing in the last quarter o f the eighteenth century, Mrs Griffiths is 
already relying heavily on the economic lexicon to which many of her successors 
would also turn, and which Edwar d Bond so intransigently exposed. The 
Shakespeare manufactured by liberal humanist critics such as E.E. Stoll, whose 
‘vices, like his virtues, are those of exuberance’, and whose ‘artistic virtues are 
positive, opulent, redundant, not negative or corrective, frugal or austere’, is 
incipient in Mrs Griffiths’s account o f a playwright whose ‘generosity’ knows no
Griffiths, Morality, p. 56.
On Coleridge see Jonathan Bate, Shakespeare and the English Romantic Imagination (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 20. Writing at the end o f the nineteenth century J.R. Seeley said that 
‘From Shakespeare, no doubt, the world may learn, and has learnt, much; yet he professed so little 
to be a teacher, that he has often been represented as almost without personal opinions, as a mere 
undisturbed minor, in which all Nature reflects herself. Cited in C.E. Hughes’s compilation, The 
Praise o f Shakespeare: An English Anthology (London: Methuen, 1904), p. 272.
Griffiths, Morality, p. 487.
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bounds. Just as Allworthy (all-worthy but not at all discerning) could be
accused of having exercised little ‘caution’ in choosing the ‘objects’ o f his 
‘beneficence’, so too has Shakespeare (generous, literally, to a fault) been unable 
to resist giving even the most monsti ous of his creations an enthe exti a head.
Hindsight should allow us to feel sympathy for this hai’d-working literaiy 
lady, herself confused by the ‘profirsion of sweets, and variety o f colours’ she has 
encountered in Shakespeare. If her assessment of the playwright anticipates that 
of Stoll (who is apparently more sui*e o f his moral footing) it also looks forwar d 
to the Shakespeare discovered by Norman Rabkin, whose approach to the 
construction of moral ambiguity involves his provision o f too many alternatives, 
as opposed to too few.
The connection between Shakespeare and generosity is long established. 
Indeed, the OED finds two separ ate meanings of the word generous to be of 
Shakespearean c o i n a g e . O n e  of my objectives in this chapter has been to 
sur vey the range of early modern contexts in which ‘generosity’ was either 
advocated or prized. Though these contexts are many, it would be wrong to 
suppose that ‘generosity’ in its broadest sense was universally valued or even 
condoned, Thomas Elyot, with whose definition of ‘humanity’ we began this 
chapter, understood the ease with which the associated virtues of benevolence, 
beneficence and liberality could be made to leak into one another; that ‘inasmuch 
as liberality wholly resteth in the giving o f money, it sometime coloureth a 
vice’.^ "^  ^ In a letter to his son, Denzil Holies evinces a similar uneasiness about 
the potentially dangerous consequences o f generosity, advising him to ‘let [his] 
hospitality be moderate, according to the measure of [his] revenues’, and noting, 
enigmatically, in the manner of Polonius, that ‘many consume themselves with 
secret vices and their hospitality must bear the blame’.
This recognition of the questionable virtue of generosity exists alongside 
the exhortations to charitable or equitable conduct directed at early modern
Elmer Edgar Stoll, Art and Artifice in Shakespeare: A Study in Dramatic Conti'ast and 
Illusion, rpt. (London: Methuen, 1963), p. 50.
generous l.a. Of noble lineage; high born; 2.a. Of actions, character, etc.: Appropriate or 
natui al to one of noble birth. Both references are to Love's Labours Lost (1588).
Elyot, Governor, p. 131.
Holies is cited in Hill, Society and Puritanism, p. 227.
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subjects from a variety of quarters. On the face of it, the distinction between 
financial and moral generosity is easily made: while the value of the first may be 
questioned, the value of the second surely cannot. Taking Shalcespeare’s own 
legendary ‘generosity’ as an example, I have attempted to show that it can be 
questioned; it is and was. In the case of Shakespeare, part of this perceived 
ambiguity must be related to the specific exigencies of time and place. Johnson’s 
mistrust of Shakespeare’s tendency to smile benignly upon human failings may 
be explained, in part, as one aspect o f a more general intolerance to anti-didactic 
writing, associated especially, perhaps, with a peculiar ly eighteenth-century 
understanding of the function of literature.
But by reading Johnson alongside Bond, I hope I have shown that this 
ambiguity cannot be dismissed entirely as a fimction of historical change. One of 
the central contentions o f this thesis is that the practice o f ‘forming a benevolent 
opinion of oiu' brethren’, or interpreting their actions in the ‘better sence’, was 
regarded with equal if not greater suspicion by commentators in the early modem 
period. Towards the end of Act I of Twelfth Night, Shakespear e’s own Olivia 
provides the sullen, anti-social Malvolio with an emphatic definition of this kind 
of generosity; the kind with which much of this argument will be concerned. ‘To 
be generous, guiltless, and of free disposition’, she reminds him, ‘is to take those 
things for bird-bolts that you deem cannon-bullets’.^ ^^  My aim in what follows is 
to demonstrate the intractable ambiguity inherent in such ‘charitable 
constructions’ — the appar ent desirability of which seems beyond doubt. I will 
continue, as I have here, to stress the centrality of the role played by rhetoric in 
the formation and interpretation of these favomuble or unfavourable judgements. 
What happens when ‘generous’ or ‘mild’ interpretations of actions are used (to 
adapt the words of Thomas Elyot) to ‘colour a vice’, is a subject to which we will 
return in Chapter II.
William Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, eds. J.M. Lothian and T. W. Craik, rpt. (Walton-on- 
Thames: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1997), 1.5.90-93.
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Chapter II 
Wanton Pictures
Yet canst thou, 
(Great Master though thou be) tell how 
To paint a veitue?^
Lately resurrected from his dusty medieval grave, the celebrated poet
Gower begins the third Act of Shakespeare’s Pericles by exhorting the assembled 
company to concentrate on the matter about to unfold. Having left the 
eponymous hero and his new bride Thaisa ascending the stairs to bed, the 
audience is asked to jump forward in time to a point at which the product of their 
royal union, a daughter named Marina, has already been delivered. In the manner 
of Cleopatra, who fills the ‘gap of time / [Her] Antony is away’ by inventing 
stories about him,^  the audience oiPericles is told to ‘Be attent, / And time that 
is so briefly spent / With youi- fine fancies quaintly eche’.^  The theatrical 
experience thus described is a wholly interactive affair. For the play to succeed, 
each individual audience member must use his ‘fancy’ to ‘supplement’ or 
‘augment’ the events being staged before him."^  A similar comtesy is expected 
fr om the audience of Henry V, witnesses whose ‘thoughts’ are needed first to 
‘deck our kings’, and who are later urged to ‘Still be kind, / And eke out our 
performance with your mind’ Only imagination can atone for the fact that plays 
last hours, not months or years; without it, a stage incapable of receiving a ‘fleet 
majesticaT will always seem baie.
Of paramount importance in the theatre, the ability to call upon one’s 
fancy to fill in the blanlcs is no less necessary in other, non-dramatic, contexts.
 ^Thomas Carew, ‘To the Pamter’, in Rhodes Dunlop, ed.. The Poems o f Thomas Carew: With his 
Masque Coelum Britamicum, rpt. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), p. 106.
 ^William Shakespeare, Antony and Cleopatf'a, ed. John Wilders (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1995), 1.5.5-6.
 ^William Shakespeare, Pericles, ed. F.D. Hoeniger, rpt. (Walton-on-Thames: Thomas Nelson & 
Sons, 1997), 3.0.11-13.
 ^Hoeniger glosses eche\ supplement, augment; an old spelling o f ‘eke’. C.T. Onions’s 
Shakespeare Glossary, 2"^  edn. (Oxford: Clai'endon Press, 1919), gives eche] ‘to eke out’ and 
eke] ‘to increase, add to’; ‘to supplement’ (pp. 66-7).
 ^William Shakespeare, King Henry V, ed. T.W. Craik (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 
‘Prologue’, 1.28 and 3.0.34-5.
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As a process wherein the imagination is used to supplement tangible facts, 
‘eching’ also plays a significant part in biographical writing. Pausing a third of 
the way thiough her pseudo-biogiaphy o f Orlando, who is, for a time at least, a 
rough contemporary of Shalcespeare, Virginia Woolf malces a mock apologia for 
her botched attempts to ‘piece out a meagre summary’ of her subject’s life. As a 
biographer struggling with scanty or illegible documentary evidence, Woolf finds 
it incumbent upon her ‘to speculate, to surmise, and even to use the 
imagination’.^
A figure far- more famous than Orlando, William Shalcespeare has forced 
a similar response from even the most painstalcing of resear chers. Mindful, 
perhaps, of the poet’s posthumous proscriptions against tampering with his 
physical remains, William Neilson and Ashley Thorndike present their 
biographical endeavour as an effort ‘to clothe the nalced skeleton of the 
documented facts’.^  Equally willing to ‘eke out’ so fragmentary a life as 
Shakespeare’s, Katherine Duncan-Jones admits to having ‘risk[ed] conjecture, in 
the hope of putting some spectral, or speculative, flesh on those well guar ded 
bones’.^  A common and closely related variation on this metaphor imagines the 
biogr apher/critic as a painter. So it is that John Dover Wilson launches his 
‘Biographical Adventure’ with a statement of his intention to ‘begin by sketching 
[the] backgr ound first, not neglecting the central figure entirely, but showing it in 
outline only and leaving the details of posture, costume, face and expression to be 
filled in later’.®
Signalling his plan to ‘draw’ then ‘clothe’, the intrepid Dover Wilson 
splits the biographical project into two clear* stages. Vohmtary confessions like 
his help explain how Shakespeare’s life, so much of which is ‘shrouded in 
mystery’, has little by little been ‘dressed up with myth’.^ ® As if  naturally
Vii-ginia Woolf, Orlando: A Biography, ed. Brenda Lyons (London: Penguin, 1993), p. 84. 
’ William Allan Neilson and Ashley Horace Thorndike, The Facts About Shakespeare (New 
York: Macmillan, 1923), p. 46.
® Katherine Duncan-Jones, Ungentle Shakespeare: Scenes from his Life (London: The Arden 
Shakespeare, 2001), p. x.
 ^John Dover Wilson, The Essential Shakespeare: A Biographical Adventure (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1935), p. 14.
Jonathan Bate, The Genius o f Shakespeare (London and Basingstoke: Picador, 1997), p. 5.
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repulsed by the prospect of ‘eching’, literary explorers such as Park Honan have 
beaten a rather different path to the treasure that is ‘Shalcespeare’. In his own 
recent investigation, Honan covertly but firmly reverses the popular parallel by 
referring to the biographer’s task as an effort ‘to collect what is known about the 
playwright, to synthesize it, and in a sense to clean the bones o f the “Shakespeare 
documents” or to separate facts from myths and e r r o r s I n  Honan’s project 
supplementation gives way to refinement. Here the onus is not on augmenting 
but on paring down and stripping away.^  ^ This rationale seems to reject by 
association (as scholarly bad practice) what Antony Burgess called ‘the right of 
every Shakespearean who has ever lived to paint his own portrait of the man’.^  ^
Embedded in these various accounts of sketching, painting, dressing and 
fleshing are connotations of filling in, padding out, and even (when we allow for 
‘conjecture’) malcing it up.^ "^  Appearing on the very first page of his biography, 
Honan’s implicit self-exoneration is important because it functions, ironically, to 
dissolve the affinity between his own working practice and the working practice 
favoured by the very object of his study. No proponents of Samuel 
Schoenbaum’s understanding of biography as, ‘by and large, a prosaic 
endeavor’,o th e r  Shakespeareans (less bashful about their own creative artistry)
" Park Honan, Shakespeare: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. ix.
In this respect his methodology has much in common with the ‘new’ approach to biography 
initiated at the beginning of the twentieth centuiy by writers such as Lytton Strachey, who, in the 
preface to Eminent Victorians (London: Chatto & Windus, 1918), declared that ‘it is not [the 
biographer’s] business to be complimentary; it is his business to lay bare the facts o f the case as 
he understands them ... To quote the words of a Master— “Je n’impose rien; je ne propose rien; 
j ’expose’” (ix).
Antony Burgess, Shakespeare (London: Vintage, 1996), p. 6. The cuiious but intiiguing locus 
classicus o f the adding flesh/coloming in païallel may perhaps be discovered in Aristotle’s 
Generation o f  Animals, tians. A.L. Peck (London: Heinemann, 1943). Speaking of the embryonic 
fonnation of blooded creatures, Aristotle tells us that in ‘the early stages the parts are all traced in 
outline; later on they get theii* various colours and softnesses and hardnesses, for all the world as 
if  a painter were at work on them, the painter being Natur e. Painters, as we know, fust of all 
sketch in the figure of the animal in outline, and after that go on to apply the colours’ (2.6.20-25).
Intraducing himself as a ‘student artist’, Frank Harris vehemently refhtes the implication that 
his own portrait of Shakespeare is in any way fictitious. As if to distance himself from 
Cromwell’s biographer, Carlyle, who was ‘too romantic an artist, too persuaded in his hero- 
worship to discover for us [his subject’s] faults and failings’, Hams assures us that, in his text, 
Shakespeare will be presented, ‘sweet gentleness’, ‘giant vices’ and all, ‘as he really was’. The 
Man Shakespeare and his Tragic Life Story (London: Frank Palmer, 1909), pp. xv-xvii.
S. Schoenbaum, ‘Looking for Shakespeare’, in Philip H. Highfill, Jr., ed., Shakespeare’s Craft: 
Eight Lectures (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), p. 172.
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have often painted a picture of a poet and playwiight who is himself renowned 
for painting pictuies.
Their ability to do so is predicated on an idea with a very long histoiy. 
The concept itself is generally thought to derive ft om two classical soui ces: 
Horace’s reference in the Ars Poetica to utpicturapoesis —  ‘A poem is like a 
picture’, and the saying attributed by Plutarch to Simonides that ‘painting [is] 
inarticulate poetry and poetry articulate painting’/^ Or, in the words of Matthew 
Coignet, that a ‘Painting is a dumme Poesie, and a Poesie a speaking painting: & 
the actions which the Painters set out with visible colour's and figures the Poets 
recken with wordes, as though they had in deede beene perfburmed’/^
The culture that produced Matthew Coignet also produced Michel de 
Montaigne, who claimed in his essay ‘On Experience’ that ‘all things are 
connected by some similarity’/^ A culture founded upon such a premise was 
unlikely to challenge the classical assumption that there ‘is no ait which is not 
either the mother or the relative of another’/® On the contrary, it embraced the 
correspondence with a warmth often verging on the fiery. Between the fifteenth 
and the eighteenth century, in other words, ‘attitudes to literature and painting 
were deeply informed by the belief in an essential commonality between the 
arts’. ‘Poesy ... is an art of imitation’, wrote Philip Sidney, ‘for so Aristotle
Horace, Ars Poetica, in Horace: Satires, Epistles, Ars Poetica, b ans. H. Rushton Fairclough 
(London: Heinemann, 1926), 361; Plutai'ch, On the Fame o f the Athenians, in Plutarch‘s 
Moralia, trans. Frank Cole Babbitt, 14 volumes (London: Heinemann, 1936), IV, 347. See also 
the description in the Rhetorica A d Herennium, trans. Harry Caplan, rpt. (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1999), o f the figure commutatio: ‘when 
two discrepant thoughts are so expressed by transposition that the latter follows from the former 
although contradictory to i f  (4.28.39). The phrase ‘A Poem ought to be a painting that speaks; a 
painting ought to be a silent poem’ is given in illustration of this figur e.
Matthew Coignet, Politique Discourses on Trueth and Lying, trans. E. Hoby (London, 1586), in 
G. Gregory Smith, ed., Elizabethan Critical Essays, 2 volirmes (Oxford: Clar endon Press, 1904),
I, p. 342.
The Complete Essays, trans. and ed. M.A. Screech (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 1213. On the 
early modem passion for building complicated systems of correspondence see Neil Rhodes, 
‘Articulate Networks: the Self, the Book and the World’, in Neil Rliodes and Jonathan Sawday, 
eds., The Renaissance Computer: Knowledge Technology in the First Age o f Print (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2000).
Tertullian, De Idololatria, trans. J.H. Wasziuk and J.C.M. Van Winden (Leiden and New York: 
E.J. Brill, 1987), 8.3.
Alison Thome, Vision and Rhetoric in Shakespeare: Looking Through Language (Basingstoke 
and London: Macmillan, 2000), p. xii.
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termeth it in his word mimesis, that is to say, a representing, counterfeiting, or 
figuring forth— to spealc metaphorically, a speaking picture’/^
In Chapter I, I attempted to lend some historical significance to the idea of 
Shakespeare’s ‘profound humanity’. This Chapter will follow a similar pattern, 
though here I wish to return to Edgar Fiipp’s claim that ‘no man had less desire 
than Shalcespeare to point the moral, and none a deeper desire to paint it’.
If we aie happy to grant the OED authority, Shalcespeai'e’s interest in 
‘painting’ might be better described as ‘seminal’ than ‘pronounced’ or even 
‘intense’. Nobody before Shakespeare, according to this piece o f scholarly 
appaiatus, had used the word ‘pictuie’ to signify ‘a graphic description, wi'itten or 
spoken, capable of suggesting a mental image, or of imparting a notion of the 
object described’ Whether the attribution to Shalcespeare is conect, however, 
is o f less interest than the context in which the word is said to occur. Best 
Icnown, perhaps, for the strain its verbal athleticism places on the ear, Love’s 
Labours Lost is also replete with allusions to the ‘eye’ or ‘eyes’ —  words used 
more frequently here than anywhere in Shakespeare save A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream?^ It is in the park sun ounding NavaiTe’s seat of masculine learning and 
abstention that this alleged first citing (or sighting) of the word ‘picture’ appears.
Unlike Oberon’s forest, Navarre’s academy is not haunted by 
mischievous spirits scattering magic dust. Thus in many ways very different, the 
forest and the academy are each home to inhabitants whose visual perception is 
shown to be in some way confused or flawed. Called upon at the beginning of 
act five to present her lover’s ‘favour ’, Rosaline produces verses by Berowne: ‘I
Sir Philip Sidney, An Apology for Poetry, ed. Geoffrey Shepherd, rpt. (London: Thomas Nelson 
& Sons, 1967), p. 101. The idea that classical theories of imitation might encoui age the drawing 
of parallels between the arts is suggested by Kathy Eden, in Poetic and Legal Fiction in the 
Aristotelian Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). Eden argues that Aristotle 
departed in the Poetics from Platonic tradition by redefining imitation and elevating it to a first 
principle of artistic production. ‘Regarded in a technical sense as the artist’s tool, equivalent to 
the hammer with which a carpenter constructs his “object,” mimesis selves as an instrument in 
fictional construction where the object is human action’ (69). See also R. McKeon, ‘Literary 
Criticism and the Concept of Imitation in Antiquity’, Modern Philology 34 (1936): 1-35. 
pictuie 4.a.y?g.
The fact that Love's Labours Lost is teeming with references to the eyes is pointed out by Frank 
Kemode in Shakespeare’s Language, (London: Allen Lane, 2000), p. 59.
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am compaied to twenty thousand fairs’, she announces, ‘O, he has drawn my 
picture in his letter!’. ‘Anything like?’, asks the Princess, with impeccable comic 
timing. ‘Much in the letters’, replies the raven-headed beauty; ‘nothing in the 
praise’ However genuine or well-intentioned, then, this courtly missive is 
notable only for its signal failure to convey any accurate information about its 
subject at all. Berowne’s ‘picture’ is as fai* from ‘speaking’ as the brooch given 
to the Princess by the King of Navan-e. Shakespeare’s use in this play of the 
word ‘pictuie’ to denote a ‘graphic description ... capable o f suggesting a mental 
image’ is actually a kind of anti-example —  evoked as if on purpose to stress the 
limitation of the idea.
Verging on the derisive, if  not on the spitefiil, the ladies’ reaction to 
Berowne’s declaration of affection emphasises the gulf separating this smitten 
amateur from the ‘best Historian’ o f yore, who, according to Francis Junius, 
could ‘adorne his Nanution with such forcible figures and lively colours of 
Rhetorike, as to make it like unto a Pictuie’.B e r o w n e  has failed miserably to 
reach the goal held in common by artist and writer, namely, to ‘make the reader a 
spectator’
Responses to Shakespeare’s own creation of pictorial vividness are 
invariably more positive than that occasioned by the defective daubings of his 
hapless courtier Berowne. ‘Never was a world so vivid, so pictorially distinct, as 
that of Shakespeaie’s plays’, enthused David Masson in 1914. ‘You see 
everything that can be seen— individual objects, glitteringly clear in form and 
colour; expanses, landscapes, cities, streets, sea shores, the sea itself:
William Shakespeare, Love’s Labours Lost, ed. H.R. Woudhuysen (Walton-on-Thames: 
Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1998), 5.2.37-40.
Francisons Junius, The Painting o f the Ancients, eds. Keith Aldiich and Philipp and Raina Fehl 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford: University o f California Press, 1991), p. 49. Edited 
according to the text of Junius’s own 1638 ti anslation o f Plutarch.
Plutarch, On the Fame o f the Athenians, 347. In the preface to his translation of Du Fresnoy’s 
De Arte Graphica (1695), John Dryden gave a similar account of the specific connection between 
the aitist and the writer, going on to praise Thomas Otway’s expertise in this area: ‘To express the 
Passions which are seated in the Heart by outward Signs, is one great Precept of the Painters, and 
veiy difficult to perfonn’, he noted. ‘In Poetry, the same Passions and Motions of tlie Mind are to 
be express’d; and in this consists the principal Difficulty, as well as the Excellency of that A r t ... 
we call it the Gift of oui* Apollo: not to be obtained by Pains or Study, if  we are not born to it’.
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Sound, too, is incessant in this world, from the puiiing of 
brooks and the whispering of leaves, and the singing of small 
birds, to the thunderous noise and uproar; it is frill, as well, of 
odours and tastes; and all can be struck or touched/^
Masson’s ebullient appreciation of Shakespeare’s living worlds is of a 
piece with Sir Joshua Reynolds’s description of Shakespeare as a ‘faithful and 
accurate painter of natme’/^ Together they evoke an idea of the playwright to 
which critics have often returned. Like the idea of generous Shalcespeare 
(examined in the previous chapter) this concept has proven amazingly durable. 
Shakespeare’s special aptitude for pencil drawn characters was noted by the first 
generation German Romantic writer Ludwig Tieck in 1794, and again, without 
substantial variation, by T.J.B. Spencer almost two hundred years later.^ ® Taking 
the analogy a stage fuither, eighteenth-century commentators William Warburton 
and Lord Lyttleton recognised both the verisimilitude captuied in Shalcespeare’s 
‘just and lively paintings’, and their astounding breadth of range.^ ®
This final pair o f observations must, o f course, be read in terms of the 
historical context from whence they came; a period during which the production 
of actual Shakespearean painting was at its most intense. James Baiiy’s graphic 
realisation of Lear and Cordelia, Hogarth’s of char acters fr om The Tempest,
See J.C. Ghosh’s edition of The Works o f  Thomas Otway: Plays, Poems, and Love-Letters, 2 
volumes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), I, p. 17.
David Masson, Shakespeare Personally (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1914), pp. 134-5.
Sir Joshua Reynolds, Discourses on Art, ed. Robert R. Wark, rpt. (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1988), Discourse VIII, p. 148.
In his commentary on As You Like It, Tieck notes that ‘Jaques is probably intended to be a 
comic version of what Hamlet is in the tragedy; the character is finely drawn, only the poet has 
quite missed the comic, if  that was his intention’. See ‘Ludwig Tieck on Shakespeare and 
Jonson’, in D.H. Craig, ed., Ben Jonson: The Critical Heritage 1599-1798 (London: Routledge, 
1990), p. 577; and T.J.B. Spencer’s ‘Shakespeaie’s Careless Art’, in Milton Crane, ed., 
Shakespeare’s Art: Seven Essays (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 
116.
In the intr oduction to his 1747 edition o f the Works, Warburton notes ‘the amazing sagacity 
with which [Shakespeare] investigates every hidden spring and wheel of human action’, and ‘his 
happy manner of communicating this knowledge, in the just and lively paintings which he has 
given us o f all our passions, appetites and pur suits’. See Beverley Warner, ed.. Famous 
Introductions to Shakespeare's Plays: By the Notable Editors o f the Eighteenth Century (New 
York: Burt Franklin, 1968), p. 105. In 1765, Lord Lyttleton declared that Shakespeare ‘painted 
all characters, from kings down to peasants, with equal hnth and equal force’. Lyttleton’s
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Benjamin West’s of the distracted Ophelia, and many others like them, all meant 
that eighteenth-century Shakespeareans were surrounded by opportunities to 
become literal witnesses to the dramatist’s spectacular art/^  However, the 
passion for ‘reading’ scenes from Shakespearean drama as painterly artefacts was 
no exclusively Augustan fixation. It is still apparent, much later, in Jane 
Donawerth’s analysis of the gi ipped wrists, the wrinkled brows and the rolling 
eyes of the citizens described by Hubert at the end of King John. ‘The pictur e 
presented is vivid’, she remarks, ‘recalling the color, structure, and grotesquerie 
in paintings by Brueghel and Cranach’. In the English countryside cluttered by 
inhabitants mad with grief at the death of Arthur', ‘focused details pile up in a 
busy, almost frenzied scene o f intensity and sorTow’.^ ^
As is evident fr om these few examples alone, all maimer of wr iters have 
eulogised over Shalcespeare’s speaking paintings —  none more so, perhaps, than 
those working in the Romantic period. The critiques produced at this time 
acquired a new theoretical bent, as figures such as Char les Lamb, William Hazlitt 
and Samuel Taylor Coleridge grappled with the problem of expressing the 
peculiarly affective power of Shalcespeare’s language. Transporting us back with 
him to Elizabethan England, Coleridge asks that we ‘contrast the stage of the 
ancients with that of the time of Shakespear, and we shall be struck with his 
genius; with them it had the trappings of a royal and religious ceremony; with 
him, it was a naked room, a blanket for a curtain; but with his vivid appeals to the 
imagination [he] figuied it out a “field for monaichs’” .^ ^
remarks are reprinted in C.E. Hughes’s compilation, The Praise o f Shakespeare: An English 
Anthology (London: Methuen, 1904), p. 292,
T.S.R. Boase’s ‘Illustrations of Shakespeare’s Plays in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries’, Journal o f the Warburg & Courtauld Institutes 10 (1947): 83-108, provides a detailed 
account of the illustrations appearing in various editions of the works, beginning with Rowe’s in 
1709, and also discusses the pieces commissioned for Boydell’s Shakespeare Gallery, opened in 
1789. Boase associates the massive increase in production of Shakespearean painting with the 
meteoric rise to fame of the actor David Garrick in the early 1740s. See also Ronald Paulson, 
Book and Painting: Shakespeare, Milton and the Bible. Literary Texts and the Emergence o f  
English Painting, (Knoxville: University o f Tennessee Press, 1982). Bariy and West are 
discussed in chapter 1; chapter 2 is devoted to Hogarth.
Jane Donawerth, Shakespeare and the Sixteenth-Century Study o f Language (Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 168.
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ‘Lectures on the Characteristics of Shakespear’, in Jonathan Bate, 
ed.. The Romantics on Shakespeare, rpt. (London: Penguin, 1997), p. 129. Coleridge’s
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This whimsical reflection on the paucity of objects in the Elizabethan 
playhouse raises an important point. Shalcespeare wrote for the theatre, the 
language of which ‘is the sum of its gestuies, both verbal, physical and 
metaphoric; as Owen Feltham noted in 1628, “The Stage feeds both the eare and 
the eye’” .^ "^ As a dramatist, Shalcespeare could hardly fail to give his audience 
something to look at. Indeed, if  any one o f his company resembled the ‘Excellent 
Actor’ anatomised in the Overbuiian characters, he was himself ‘an exquisite 
painter’ Given the fact that Shakespeare wrote speaking parts for real, visible 
people, is it not mere irrational bardolatiy to commend these vivid images for 
their ability to ‘speak’? Possibly, but by no means entirely, for the idea of 
Shalcespear e as a designer o f powerfully articulate pictures was also endorsed by
assumptions about the bareness of the Elizabethan stage are reasonable, given Shakespeare’s 
embarrassed reference to the ‘four or five most vile and ragged foils’ employed to signify 
Agincourt in Hemy V (4.0.50). Nevertheless, the previously popular and highly romanticised 
notion advanced by, for example, William J. Lawrence, in The Physical Conditions o f the 
Elizabethan Public Playhouse (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Haivai d University Press, 1927), of a 
completely empty ‘platform jutting out into an open chcus, with the sun casting its beam over the 
groundlings’ (1), does need to be modified in accordance with the recent findings of theatre 
historians. While Bemai d Beckerman has estimated that, of all the scenes Shakespeare wrote for 
the Globe, 80% could have been performed on a bare stage platform, Henslowe’s 1598 inventory 
of his stock— including i. Hell Mought, i. bedsteade, i, payer of stayers, a raynbowe, i. b ee of 
gowlden apelles, miscellaneous altars, and so on— introduces intiiguing possibilities. On 
Beckerman and Henslowe see Andr ew G uit, The Shakespearean Stage, 1574-1642, 3^  ^edn. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 187-93.
Molly Smith, The Darker World Within: Evil in the Tragedies o f Shakespeare and his 
Successors (London: Associated University Presses, 1991), p. 36.
Sir Thomas Overbury, The Overburian Characters, To Which is Added A Wife, ed. W.J. Paylor, 
Percy Reprints 13 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1936), p. 77. Paylor makes a persuasive case for 
attributing ‘The Excellent Actor’ (one of the 32 ‘Characters’ added in the text’s 6“‘ impression) to 
John Webster (xvii-xix). For an eloquent discussion of the parallels between theatre and painting, 
read in the light of Leonardo’s praise of the latter’s superior achievements and applied to 
Shakespeare, see John Dixon Hunt, ‘Shakespeare and the Paragone: A Reading of Timon of  
Athens’, in Werner Habicht, D.J. Palmer and Roger Pringle, eds., Images o f  Shakespeare: 
Proceedings o f the Third Congress o f the International Shakespeare Association, 1986 (London 
and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1988). Dixon Hunt argues persuasively that the two 
arts are intrinsically connected: both theatr e and painting being concerned, ultimately, with the 
communication o f inward states via outward gestures. See also Leonard Barkan, ‘Making 
Pictures Speak: Renaissance Art, Elizabethan Literature, Modern Scholarship’, Renaissance 
Quarterly 48 (1995): 326-51. Drawing on work by Lucy Gent, who emphasises the remarkably 
low level of visual ‘literacy’ in Elizabethan England, Barkan argues that ‘the theater is England’s 
lively pictorial cultur e, the answer, the compensation, the supplément in the face o f all the 
painting, sculpture, and art theory that was so famously alive in the Europeans civilizations that 
Elizabethans dreamed about’ (388, italics in original).
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those Romantic writers who preferred to engage with him in the study, not from a 
seat facing a stage/^
Of such persons the nineteenth century yielded no shortage. From their 
accounts it would seem that a fusty blanlcet and a tattered cuitain, the less 
conspicuous the better, provided stage decoration enough— any superfluous 
addition to which would culpably detract from the main business of the work’s 
language. The ‘elaborate and anxious provision of scenery, which the luxury of 
[his] age’ demanded was anathema to Charles Lamb, who believed it destroyed 
altogether the ‘illusion which it [was] introduced to aid’.^  ^ Shalcespearean 
drama, according to this critic, contained few subjects capable of being enhanced 
by theatrical representation. A work like The Tempest, in fact, was positively 
mined by the addition of ‘real’ supernatural creatures, prancing and capering 
about. ‘It is one thing to read of an enchanter, and to believe the wondi’ous tale 
while we are reading it’, giumbled Lamb:
but to have a conjurer brought before us in his conjuring-gown, 
with his spirits about him, which none but himself and some 
hundred of favoured spectators before the curtain are supposed 
to see, involves such a quantity of the hateful incredible, that 
all our reverence for the author cannot hinder us from 
perceiving such gioss attempts on the senses to be in the 
highest degree childish and inefficient.^*
The officious presence of a real Prospero can only impede the process by which 
the Shakespeaiean submits to a willing suspension of disbelief. In his 
contemplation of this playwright’s drama, at least, Lamb might well have 
seconded the argument proposed by Paulo Saipi, in the History o f the Council o f  
Trent, that ‘a thing conceived does not necessarily exist’.*®
On the theories behind the Romantic turn from tlie stage see Alan Richardson, A Mental 
Theater: Poetic Drama and Consciousness in the Romantic Age (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1988), Chapter 1 and passim.
Charles Lamb, ‘On the Tragedies of Shakespeare, considered with reference to then fitness for 
stage representation’, in Bate, ed.. Romantics, p. 126.
Ibid., (italics in original).
Cited in William J. Bouwsma, The Waning o f the Renaissance 1550-1640 (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 42.
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Less initated than Chaiies Lamb by the implausible appearance and 
disappearance of nymphs and reapers, other early Shakespeareans focused on the 
dramatist’s written tieatment of events existing in the realm of the probable. 
Reflecting in An Essay o f Dramatic Poesy on the perennial problem of staging 
convincing death scenes, John Dryden explained how the ‘words of a good 
writer, which describe it lively, will malce a deeper impression of belief in us than 
all the actor can persuade us to, when he seems to fall dead before us; as a poet in 
the description of a beautiful gar den, or a meadow, will please oui' imagination 
more than the place itself can please oui' sight’."*® Shakespeare, according to 
Dryden, was one such ‘good writer’. ‘All the images of Nature were still present 
to him’, remarked the younger poet, ‘and he drew them, not laboriously, but 
luckily; when he describes anything, you more than see it, you feel it too’."**
What Dryden praised as a description vivid enough to be felt would have 
been identified by a rhetorician as an example of enargeia or evidentia.^^ And it 
was this figure that both ancient and early modern theorists believed held the key 
to persuasion."** Quintilian, for instance, described enargeia as a ‘vivid 
illustration’ which ‘thrusts itself upon our notice’, and went on to extol it as ‘the 
highest o f all oratorical gifts’."*"* More impoi'tantly for our immediate purposes, 
Quintilian’s emphasis on the impact of vivid description on listeners was adapted 
by Erasmus, in the sixteenth century, to cover the written as opposed to the
John Dryden, An Essay o f Dramatic Poesy, in W.P. Ker, ed., Essays o f John Dryden, 2 
volumes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), I, p. 63.
Ibid., pp. 79-80.
These were the temis used most frequently in the eai'ly modern period, though others were also 
cmrent. In A Treatise o f the Figures o f Grarnmer and Rhetorike (London, 1555), Richard Sherry 
groups a number of figmes, mcXxAiXigprosopopoeia (‘when any man is described’), ethopoeia (an 
‘expressyon of mylde maners and affections’), and topogr'aphia (‘the discription of a place’), 
under the general heading Demonstratio: ‘when we so plainly and copiously expresse a thing, a 
person, & an affection, maners, speach, and circustance [sic], that the reader, semeth to see it 
before his eies, as though it wer livelye paynted in a table’ (http://collections.chadwyck.co.uk).
Cicero compares the ‘ornament’ he calls ‘brilliance’ to others such as ‘brevity’, and concludes 
that ‘brilliance is worth considerably more than the clearness above mentioned. The one helps us 
to understand what is said, but the other makes us feel that we actually see it before our eyes’.
See De Partitione Oratoria, in De Oratore Bk III, Fato, Paradoxa Stoicorum, De Partitione 
Oratoria, tians. H. Rackham, 2 volumes (London: Heinemann, 1948), II, 6.20-21.
Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, tians. H.E. Butler, 4 volumes (London: Heinemann, 1920-21), 
III, 8.3.61; 71.
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Spoken word. The fifth method of ‘emichment’ or ‘amplification’ described in 
De Copia is translated as evidentia or ‘vividness’:
We employ this whenever, for the sake of amplifying or 
decorating oui' passage ... instead of setting out the subject in 
bai'e simplicity, we fill in the colours and set it up like a picture 
to look at, so that we seem to have painted the scene rather 
than described it, and the reader seems to have seen rather than 
read. We shall be able to do this satisfactorily if we first 
mentally review the whole nature o f the subject and everything 
connected with it, its very appearance in fact. Then we should 
give it substance with appropriate words and figuies of speech, 
to malœ it as vivid and clear to the reader as possible/*
Erasmus’s description of the rhetorical figure evidentia is notable for the 
convenient summary it seems to provide of all that Romantic writers like William 
Hazlitt found best in Shakespeare. As Hazlitt saw it, the playwright’s ability to 
depict ‘miraculous tr uth[s] of nature’ did not depend on ‘a combination and a 
foi'm’ of words, but proved instead that ‘all the persons concerned must have 
been present in the poet’s imagination, as at a kind o f rehearsal', and whatever 
would have passed through their minds on the occasion, and have been observed 
by others, passed through his, and is made known to the reader’."*® For Hazlitt, it 
is Shakespeare’s capacity to mentally ‘rehearse’ the ‘whole nature of [his] 
subject’ that enables his reader to feel that they ‘have seen rather than read’. ‘In 
reading this author’, he says:
you do not merely learn what his characters say, —  you see 
their persons. By something expressed or understood, you are 
at no loss to decypher their peculiar' physiognomy, the meaning 
of a look, the grouping, the bye-play, as we might see it on a 
stage. A word, an epithet paints a whole scene, or throws us 
back whole year s in the history o f the person represented."*^
Erasmus, De Copia, in Literary and Educational Writings 2, ‘De Copia/De Ratione Studii, 
ti'ans. Betty I. Knott, in Craig R. Thompson, ed., Collected Works o f Erasmus, 86 volumes 
(Toronto, Buffalo and London; University of Toronto Press, 1974-93), XXIV, p. 577 (italics 
mine).
William Hazlitt, ‘On Shakspeare and Milton’, in Bate, ed., Romantics, p. 183 (italics mine). 
Ibid., p. 182.
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Quintilian’s account of the ‘vivid illustration’ which ‘thrusts itself upon our 
notice’ is miiTored in Hazlitt’s scheme by the striking Shalcespearean word- 
painting that ‘throws us back’/* According to George Chapman, the power 
unleashed by ^Energia, or clearness of representation’, depends upon a writer’s 
ability to give to his subject ‘lustre, shadow, and heightening’, which, in poetry 
as in painting, add ‘motion, spirit, and life’/® ‘Each object and circumstance 
exists in [Shakespeare’s] mind, as it would have existed in reality’, wrote Hazlitt, 
as if by way of uncanny confirmation. ‘In the world of his imagination, every 
thing has a life’.*®
These Romantic reflections on the special natuie of Shakespeare’s artistry 
bear' a striking resemblance to the accounts given by rhetoricians of the affective 
power of evidentia. In the light of this coiTespondence, the reasons for 
Shakespeare’s popularity among the Romantics are not far to seek. Lamb’s 
suspicion of the ‘gross attempts on the senses’ made by theatrical representation 
reflects the continued effort of Romantic writers to escape the tyranny of the eye. 
A poet who possessed the ‘faculty o f bringing every object in natur e, whether 
present or absent, before the mind’s eye’ was, for this reason, to be privileged 
above all otliers.** ‘A noble scene! don’t I see it with my own eyes?’, exclaimed
The physical aspect of language is briefly explored by John Poulaicos and Steve Whitson, who 
observe that ‘To say that piece of rhetoric had impact on its audience is to say that it hit, shuck 
the bodies of its listeners with enough force to make them otherwise (a striking phrase is sh iking 
not in itself but because it shikes someone)’. See their ‘Rhetoric Denuded and Redressed: Figs 
and Figures’, Quarterly Journal o f Speech 81 (1995): 378-85, at p. 381.
George Chapman, Ovid's Banquet o f Sense, in Algernon Charles Swinburne, ed.. The Works o f  
George Chapman: Poems and Minor Translations (London: Chatto and Windus, 1875), p. 21, 
‘The Epistle to Master Matthew Royden’.
Hazlitt, in Bate, ed., Romantics, p. 184. On Shakespeare’s perception of the imagination as the 
source of enargeiac speech see S.K. Heninger, Jr., ‘A World of Figures: Enargeiac Speech in 
Shakespeare’, in John W. Mahon and Thomas A. Pendelton, eds., ‘Fanned and Winnowed 
Opinions': Shakespearean Essays Presented to Harold Jenkins (London and New York:
Methuen, 1987). On the influence of Aristotle on the eai'ly modem and Romantic connection of 
the two, see Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric o f  Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1969), pp. 78-84.
Hazlitt, in Bate, ed., Romantics, p. 183 (italics mine). On Hazlitt’s aversion to theatrical 
representation see the first section of David Marshall’s ‘Exchanging Visions: Reading A 
Midsummer Night's Dream’, English Literary History 49 (1982): 543-75. The phrase ‘the mind’s 
eye’, as S.K. Heninger, Jr. points out, has its provenance in the classical rhetorical tradition. The 
locus classicus of mentis oculi, he suggests, is in Cicero, De Oratore, 3.163. See Heninger,
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Coleridge, too overcome with wonder, almost, to finish his reading of Romeo and 
Juliet?^ Such reactions are typical of this ‘observer’, but whether revered, as it 
was by he and Hazlitt, or resisted, as it was by the more delicately constitutioned 
Hugh Blair, Shalcespeare’s virtuoso ability to ‘fill in the colours’ o f his subjects 
—  to set them up ‘like a picture to look at’ —  is always taken as read.
Critics discussing writers other than Shalcespeare have also sought 
assistance from the rhetoric of ut pictura poesis, of course, both within the poet’s 
own time and for many years after. ‘By the third decade of the seventeenth 
centuiy in England, the comparison of the painter to the poet had become 
commonplace’.** In his 1633 ‘Elegy upon the Death of the Dean of Paul’s, Dr. 
John Donne’, Thomas Carew, for example, paid homage to a poet whose 
rejection of ‘servile imitation / Hast redeemed, and opened us a mine / Of rich 
and pregnant fancy, drawn a line / Of masculine expression’.*"* Commenting on 
the difficulty of untangling individual authorship in the Beaumont and Fletcher 
collaboration, Jasper Maine wondered
... whether one did contrive, the other write.
Or one framed the plot, the other did indite;
Whether one found the matter, th’other dresse,
Or the one disposed what the other did expresse;
... So evenly drawne out, so gently spun.
That Art with Natme nere did smoother run.**
Approaching the subject from a slightly different angle, Hemy Chettle’s 
Englandes Mourning Garment reproaches a number of early seventeenth-century 
poets for their silence on the occasion o f Elizabeth I’s decease. Ben Jonson
Sidney and Spenser: The Poet as Maker (Pennsylvania and London: Pennsylvania University 
Press, 1989), p. 96n.l45.
From Remains, in Bate, ed., Romantics, p. 518. The ‘noble scene’ in question is the fifth of Act 
III.
Norman K. Farmer Jr., Poets and the Visual Arts in Renaissance England (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1984), p. 37.
M.H. Abrams, gen. ed.. The Norton Anthology o f English Literature, 6*^  edn,, 2 volumes (New 
York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), I, pp. 1696-98,11.27 and 37-9.
Commendatory poems in the First Folio (1647), in Arnold Glover, ed.. The Works o f Francis 
Beaumont and John Fletcher, 10 volumes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1905), I, p.
XXXV.
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appears here as ‘our English Horace, whose steele pen / Can diawe Characters 
which will never die’ —  a description in which we find Chettle forced into the 
paradoxical position of having to stress Jonson’s articulate, painterly prowess, in 
order to condemn, by association, its attendant muteness/^ Ben Jonson, indeed, 
is a popular subject of such reflections. Moving into the nineteenth century, 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge measured ‘our great master’ Shakespeaie against 
Jonson, his only ‘original’ contemporaiy. Shalcespeaie is not found wanting, of 
course, but Coleridge is forced to concede that ‘there is not one whim or 
affectation in common life noted .., which may not be found drawn and framed 
in some comer or other of Ben Jonson’s drama’. That such a robust application 
of local coloui* is likewise a distinguishing featuie of Hogarth’s work is 
mentioned in the same lecture.^  ^ A century later, T.S. Eliot remarked on the 
satirist’s ‘handling of large bold designs in brilliant colouis’.^ ^
Examples could be multiplied: comparisons like these aie commonplace 
and might even be considered inevitable. It is actually quite difficult to discuss a 
poet’s representation o f his subject matter without resorting to a synonym for the 
word ‘portiay’. Whether he delineates, depicts, illustrates, figures or sketches, 
the poet is invariably assumed to have produced a work more visible than 
audible. One of the rare exceptions to this is the word ‘render’, whose early use 
in Piers Plowman (an oral poem, o f course) derives fi'om rendren, to ‘say over’ 
or ‘recite’.
The appai ent ubiquity o f this motif notwithstanding, there is at least one 
respect in which Shakespeare’s workmanship has been distinguished fiom that of 
his fellow artists. In a volume appropriately entitled The Singularity of 
Shakespeare, Kenneth Muir examines the disparate nature of artefacts fashioned 
by this playwright and several notable others, including Molière, Racine and
Englandes Mourning Garment (London, 1603), sig. D2v.
Selections from ‘Lectures’, in Kathleen Raine, éd., Samuel Taylor Coleridge: Selected Poetry 
and Prose (London: Penguin, 1957), pp. 292-3.
T.S. Eliot, ‘Ben Jonson’, in The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism, rpt. (London: 
Methuen, 1976), p. 121.
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Ibsen. Appropriating the by now familiar par allel, Muir himself draws strong 
lines of demarcation which serve to separate the techniques o f these ‘gr eat 
dramatists’ from Shalcespeaie’s own. Muir’s specific concern is with the 
regularity of characterisation evident in Le Tartuffe, certain of Racine’s tragedies 
and Ibsen’s Rosmersholm. Tt is almost as though the poets had based [their 
protagonists] on lucid, well considered char acter sketches, in which every stroke 
was entirely consistent’, he argues. ‘There is no ambiguity in Molière’s portrayal 
of Tartuffe’; in Racine ‘we find the same refusal to blur the outlines o f his 
characters’. Similariy, although ‘Ibsen’s portrait of Rebecca West’ is both 
‘detailed’ and ‘complex’, it is still one ‘which is not open to diverse 
interpretations’
By transferring terms from one art form to another, Muir is able to 
compare the ‘remarkably unambiguous’ creations of Molière, Racine and Ibsen to 
the blurred, kaleidoscopic vitality of Shakespeare’s. The analogy is neat, but 
surely far from remarkable.^  ^ As we have already seen, Shakespeare has long
Muir is responding to a lecture given by Una Ellis-Fermor on ‘Shakespeare and Ibsen as 
Dramatic Artists’, reproduced in Kenneth Muir, ed., Shakespeare the Dramatist and Other 
Papers (London; Methuen, 1961).
Kenneth Muir, The Singularity o f Shakespeare and Other Essays (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 1977), pp. 130-31.
Nor is it necessarily original. See, for example, René Wellek and Austin Wairen, Theory o f  
Literature, rpt. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1961), on Oskar Walzel’s application to &ama of H. 
WOlfflin’s distinction between Renaissance and Baroque art. In his Principles o f Art Histoty 
(1915), Wdlfflin ‘constmcted a scheme of contraries applicable to any kind of picture, piece of 
sculptui'e, or specimen of architecture in the period. Renaissance art, he held, is “linear,” while 
Baroque ait is “painterly.” “Linear” suggests that the outlines of figures and objects are drawn 
clearly, while “painterly” means that liglit and color, which blui* the outlines of objects, are 
themselves the principles of composition. Renaissance painting and sculpture use a “closed” 
form, a symmetrical, balanced grouping of figures or surfaces, while Baroque prefers an “open” 
form ... Renaissance works of art are “clear,” while Baroque works ai e relatively “unclear,” 
blurred, indistinct’ (131-2). In his attempt to transfer Wôlffiin’s categories to literature in 1916, 
Walzel’s findings anticipate Muir’s in a number o f respects. Studying the composition of 
Shakespearean diama, Walzel concluded that this diamatist belonged to the Baroque, ‘since his 
plays are not built in the symmehical manner found by Wolfflin in pictuies o f the Renaissance. 
The number of minor chaiacters, their unsymmetrical grouping, the vaiying emphasis on different 
acts of the play: all these characteristics are supposed to show that Shakespeare’s technique is the 
same as that of Baroque art, while Corneille and Racine ... are assigned to the Renaissance type’ 
(132-3). Comparisons of Shakespeaie to Corneille were, in turn, being made as early as the 
eighteenth century by William Richardson, for example, in A Philosophical Analysis and 
Illustration o f Some o f Shakespeare’s Remarkable Characters (London, 1780). The emphasis 
here (and in eighteentii-century compai'isons in general) is on the difference between ‘imitation’ 
and ‘description’. Shakespeare is usually identified as a writer who imitates the passions, and set 
against Corneille (a poet o f the ‘second class’, according to Richardson), by whom the passions
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been thought to have written plays which are wide open to diverse and even 
apparently contradictory interpretations. When considered in the light o f Joshua 
Reynolds’s remarks, for example, Muir’s take on the ‘singularity’ of 
Shakespearean ambiguity might not unjustifiably strike us as little more than a 
dusted down re-presentation o f earlier criticism’s adulation of Shakespeare, the 
poet of ‘human nature’. Is it not just a spruced-up way of refening to a 
playwright who opened his career by dismissing ‘the heroine of the romances’ as 
a ‘shadowy, pale and bloodless abstraction’, so as to replace her with a vigorous 
and plausible ‘flesh and blood heroine’ by the name of Julia?^  ^ Does it not, in 
fact, simply echo the rather trite ‘commonplace that Shakespeare uses every hue 
except black and white
Not quite. These evocations of Shalcespeare’s tendency to ‘blur’ stark 
outlines, of his reluctance to ply his brush with monochromatic shades, cannot 
simply be read as yet more grist for the mill which chums out well-worn 
pronoimcements on Shakespeare’s unparalleled ability to fill his stage with ‘real’ 
people.^ "^  Nor are they merely indicative of his recognition that ‘even in good 
characters some unevenness will appear’ that there is ‘no sweete, but hath
are described, Corneille is considered capable of ‘invent[ing] the most beautifol imageiy’ (29), 
but only Shakespeare is said to possess a talent for ‘imitation [which] is very different from that of 
description, and fai* superior’ (41).
See the introduction to Bertrand Evans’s edition of The Two Gentlemen o f  Verona, in Sylvan 
Barnet, gen. ed.. The Complete Signet Classic Shakespeare (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1972), p. 365. Such allusions to Shakespeare’s innovative treatment of his female 
protagonists ar e popular. In his introductory discussion of The Merchant o f Venice, ipt. (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1994), John Russell Brown argues similarly that ‘Portia simply and 
easily fulfils the outline drawn ages ago in the Romances, but the picture has come alive; her 
beauty is matched with a spirit to give it motion’ (xlviii). In a lectur e delivered in 1877, part of 
which is reproduced in G.E. Hughes’s anthology, George Meredith declared that ‘Shakespeare is 
a well-spring of characters which are saturated with the comic sph it; with more o f what we will 
call blood-life than is to be foimd anywhere out of Shalcespeare’ (191, italics mine).
Alfred Harbage, As They Liked It: A Study o f  Shakespeare's Moral Artistry (New Y ork: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1961), p. 62.
The idea of Shakespeare as a kind of nebulous proto-impressionist painter is used in mid- 
twentieth-century criticism without affectation. Writing in 1959, for example, John Wain 
admitted that the ‘elementary business of getting Shakespeare’s concerns into focus is, as yet, by 
no means complete. This, unfortunately, applies to detail as much as to outline. If the broad lines 
of Shakespeare’s designs are still not clear to so many of those who love him, neither are the 
concrete details of his procedure’. ‘The Mind of Shakespeare’, in John GarTett, ed., More Talking 
o f Shakespeare (London: Longman, 1959), p. 166.
Seneca, De Ira, in Jolm W. Basore, ed., Seneca: Moral Essays, 3 volumes (London: William 
Heinemann, 1928), 1,2.31.5.
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some sower: The wine is not without his Lees; and the Bee, as it hath Hony, so it 
hath a sting’ or, as Shakespeaie’s own Mariana endeavours to convince 
Isabella, that ‘best men are moulded out of faults, / And, for the most, become 
much more the better / For being a little bad’.^  ^ A little bad; much more the 
better —  Maiiana’s relativistic qualifications of chaiacter reveal much about the 
cultural context in which they were spoken first. ‘Perfect virtue or perfect vice is 
not seen in oui- time, which is altogether humorous and spuiting’, noted John 
Hoskins in 1599, acknowledging ‘Machiavel’ as the wellspring of this 
characteristically pragmatic obiter dictum.^^
The main problem with assessing the importance of Shakespeaie’s 
propensity to ‘use every hue except black and white’ is that the meaning of this 
phrase has (in our own time) been largely emptied out. Is there really any place 
for such statements in an historicised account o f Shalcespeai'can drama? The 
answer to this question is surely ‘yes’, primarily because Shalcespeai'c’s original 
audience would have attached more significance to his deployment o f ‘colour’ 
than we do.
When the youthful William Shakespeare —  determined, perhaps, to leave 
school with rather more than a ‘small’ grasp of Latin —  when this Shakespeare 
turned to the word color in his Latin/English thesaurus he would have discovered 
a bi-fold definition. A color, according to Thomas Cooper, is both ‘the extemall 
face or beautie o f a thynge’ and ‘a cloke or pretence’. U s e  of the second sense 
of the word ‘colour’ as a synonym for deceit or duplicity is spread liberally 
thr ough the literatur e of the period. Frequently it is linlced to the application of 
cosmetics— the ‘borrowed beauty’ used (almost invariably) by women to paint 
out their underlying moral filth. ‘If beautie it selfe be thus vaine and brittle’, 
lamented Barnaby Rich, ‘what is then this borrowed beautie and first how many
Daniel Tuvil, Asylum Veneris, or a Sanctuary for Ladies (London, 1616), p. 149.
Measure for Measure, ed. J.W. Lever, ipt. (Walton-on-Thames: Thomas Nelson & Sons,
1997), 5.1.437-9.
John Hoskins, Directions for Speech and Style, ed. Hoyt H. Hudson (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1935), p. 41.
® Thomas Cooper, Thesaurus Linguae Romanae et Britannicae (Menston: Scolar Press, 1969). 
A facsimile of the 1565 edition.
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vices aie hid under these painted faces, what defomiitie covered with vailes & 
masks, what crooked minds under streightned bodyes, what violating of honour 
under counterfeit showes of comlines’/^
Rich’s aversion to painted faces is typical of the attitude expressed by 
many of his male contemporaries. Characteristically unstraightforward, 
Shakespeaie himself (or, more properly, Shakespeare’s sonneteer) refers to the 
daik lady of his dreams and nightmai es as an icon of natural beauty, whose 
appearance humiliates those who ‘put on nature’s power’ with ‘art’s false 
boiTOwed face’.^  ^ Hostility to malce-up, however, was by no means an 
exclusively eaiiy modem phenomenon. Appearing in the notorious image of the 
whore of Babylon, presented in the Book o f Revelations as arrayed in ‘purple and 
scarlet’, it also informs numerous pictorial representations of the Magdalene 
shown (prior to her conversion) guarding a jar o f ointment with jealous and 
provocative regard.^  ^ Certain early church fathers believed that women had been 
taught to use cosmetics by the fallen angels themselves. That rouge and white 
lead are not the ‘adornment o f the Lord’ but ‘the veil of the Antichrist’ was the 
message preached by Saint Jerome.^ ^
The mere idea of a Satanic peddler o f blusher and lipstick is more likely 
to make us laugh than fear for our souls. Excessive as it seems, however, this 
deep-rooted detestation of cosmetic adornment continued unabated into the 
seventeenth century. In a treatise devoted to attacking various early modem 
vices, PAINTING AND TINCTURING OF MEN AND WOMEN is assumed 
sinftil enough to require censorious attention before either Murther and 
Poysonmg, Pride mià Ambition, or Adulterie and Witchcraft Dealing quickly
™ Bamaby Rich, The Excellency o f Good Women (London, 1613), p. 21.
William Shakespeare, The Sonnets and A Lover’s Complaint, ed. John Kerrigan, rpt. (London: 
Penguin, 1995), 127.5-6.
See Aimette Drew-Bear, Painted Faces on the Renaissance Stage: The Moral Significance o f  
Face-Painting Conventions (London: Associated University Presses, 1994). The whore of 
Babylon (51) and the Magdalene (43) aie both discussed in this thorough tieatment.
Jerome is alluded to by Juan Luis Vives in De Institutione Feminae Christianae, fans. C. 
Fantazzi, eds. C, Fantazzi and C. Matheeussen, 2 volumes (Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill, 
1996), I, p. 81.
Thomas Tuke’s long title is A Treatise Against Painting and Tincturing o f Men and Women: 
Against Murther and Poysoning: Pride and Ambition: Adulterie and Witchcraft. And the Roote o f  
All These, Disobedience to the Ministeiy o f the Word (London, 1616).
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with these apparently more venial slips, the pamphlet concludes with ‘The Pictur 
of a Pictur, or, The Character of a Painted Woman’: ‘a creature that had need to 
be twice defined', for she is not that she seemes’ —  an aberration of nature whose 
‘devotion is fine apparel deere bought, & a fine face lately borrowed, & newly set 
on’/ '
When considered in the light of this commonplace collapsing of 
‘borrowed beauty’ into hypocrisy, Cooper’s two-part definition seems merely 
tautological. In the description of a ‘colour’ as the ‘externall face or beautie o f a 
thynge’, ‘extemall’, apparently, is the operative word. Wye Saltonstall’s 
suggestion that a widow’s apparel is ‘much like herself... and serves but as a 
painted cloath to cover a rotten wall’ fits without strain into the misogynist strand 
of early modem discouise, in which, more often than not, ‘extemall beautie’ is ‘a 
cloke or pretence’ The idea of beauty as a ‘face’, in other words, seems to 
automatically preclude the possibility o f that beauty having spread outwards from 
within. Indeed, as far as tlie sixteenth-centuiy humanist Juan Luis Vives was 
concemed, internal and external beauty were mutually exclusive categories. 
Seeldng to reclaim the women whose use of gold and jewels is designed to 
‘bedazzle’ onlookers’ eyes. Vives implores them to imitate the ‘humble and 
fiugal’ mother of Christ, whose ‘outward garb was made of common and cheap 
material’, but whose ‘inner vesture is of the most beautiful gold, set and 
interwoven with precious stones. You cannot be golden in both parts’, these 
glittering women are reminded. ‘Which do you wish to be of gold, your body or 
your soul[?]’^^
By fai' the most prominent featuie o f such attacks on the deceptive 
properties of colour —  whether red, white, or gold —  is how heavily they aie 
gendered. Purporting to contain a denunciation of male as well as female 
reliance on the artificial enhancements colour affords, Thomas Tulce’s treatise 
staggers under the weight o f authorities, both ancient and modem, whose ferocity
Ibid., pp. 57 and 59 (italics in original).
Wye Saltonstall, Pictnrce Loquentes, or Pictures Drawne Forth in Characters, ed. C.H. 
Wilkinson, Luttrell Society Reprints 1 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), p. 23. Based on the 1631 
edition.
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is targeted specifically at the forbidden arts practised by the painted woman/^ 
The fact that ‘women’ can often be discovered linking in close proximity to 
other, rather more unusual, evocations of ‘colour’ points strongly to the existence 
of a tacitly held agieement on the natural affinity between them. Whether the 
woman in question resemble Jane Graye, the wily widow reported in a late 
sixteenth-century legal tianscript to have aiiived at her healing accompanied by 
the husband she was accused of swindling, ‘to color her fraude herein’ or 
whether she be one of the Witches believed by James I to use Phairies as ‘a 
colour of safetie for them, that ignorant Magistrates may not punish them’, 
members of the female sex are frequently shown to have profited in some way 
from an immoral exploitation of ‘coloui*’/® But it is not as simple as that, of 
course. Sir Thomas Overbury’s ‘Dissembler’ also ‘dieth his meanes and his 
meaning into two colours’, and indeed, resembles no-one so much as Thomas 
Tuke’s painted lady, in needing a ‘double definition, for hee is not that hee 
appears’.
Vives, De Institutione, I, p. 85.
One o f the rare exceptions to tins comes in the shape of Paulus Secimdus, Bishop of Rome, 
from whom Tuke expects no better, he being a Catholic and therefore affianced to the scarlet 
‘Whore’ (9). In Quo Vadis? A Just Censure ofTravell (London, 1617), Joseph Hall refers 
similarly to ‘that courtesan of Rome’ who ‘sets herself out to sale in tempting fashion; here want 
no colors, no perfumes, no wanton diesses; whereas the poor spouse of Chiist can only say of 
herself, “I am black, but comely’” (15-16).
Jane Graye’s case is briefly referred to by Tim Stretton in Women Waging Law in Elizabethan 
England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 123.
See Book III of James’s Dcemonologie, in The Workes (Hildesheim and New York: Georg 
Ohns Verlag, 1971), p. 133. A facsimile of the 1616 edition. Keith Thomas’s magisterial 
Religion and the Decline o f Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Century England (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), provides an account o f how various 
types o f misconduct were explained by faiiy beliefs in the late Elizabethan and Jacobean periods, 
which wimessed a series of episodes in which ‘professional tricksters extracted money from their 
victims under the pretence of investing it with the fairies’. James’s own remark coiresponds 
interestingly with the Protestant ‘myth’, described by Thomas, wherein fairy beliefs were assumed 
to be a Catholic invention of the Middle Ages, devised specifically by Popish priests ‘to cover up 
their knaveries’ (pp. 606-14, at pp. 613 and 610). For an antithetical treatment of the theme, see 
James Orchard Halliwell’s Illustrations o f the Fairy Mythology o f ‘A Midsummer Night’s Dream ' 
(London: Printed for the Shakespeare Society, 1845), a collection o f documents relating to the 
history of the superstition as it existed in the age of Elizabeth. Halliwell channingly laments the 
demise of the tradition in his own time, presenting faii ies as fundamentally benevolent creatures, 
who enjoyed a ‘pleasant prank’ and amongst whom there were ‘no oaths ... for they detested 
nothing so much as lies’(xv and x).
Sir Thomas Overbury, The Overburian Characters, p. 6.
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Additional uses of the word ‘colour’ in early modem discourse 
complicate the matter still further. In his Dictionarium Linguae Latinae et 
Anglicanae, Thomas Thomas reproduces Cooper’s original definition and adds 
another pah of meanings: ‘figures and ornaments’ and ‘colourable proofes’.^  ^
Writers fiom the Middle Ages on have used the word ‘coloui*’ in the first o f these 
senses to refer to the ‘ornaments’ or figuies and tropes of speech.*  ^ When he 
speaks in The Franklin’s Tale o f the ‘colours of rethoiyk’, Chaucer is exploiting 
a figure of speech that itself signifies the ‘figuies of speech’. T w o  centuiies 
later, George Puttenham relies on the same word to separate the ‘ordinarie use of 
speech’ from that which the ‘excellent Poet’ has ‘gallantly arrayed in all his 
colours which figure can set upon it’.^ ' Laying the foundations for a discussion 
‘Of coloures and omamentes to commende and set forth an Oration’, his near 
contemporary Thomas Wilson praises the ‘divers goodlye coloures, and delitefull 
tianslations’ by which ‘oure speache’ is made to ‘seme as bryghte and precious, 
as a lyche stone is fayre and orient’. A n d  in a dedicatoiy epistle which is itself 
lavishly adorned with images of radiance and luminosity, Hemy Peacham
Dictionarium Linguae Latinae etAnglicanae (Menston: Scolar Press, 1972). A facsimile of the 
1587 edition.
According to James J. Murphy, use of the tenn ‘colour’ to refer to a literaiy device that 
embellishes —  literally ‘gives colour’ — to ordinary language was a medieval innovation, not 
seen before the middle of the eleventh century. It was not until 1050, for instance, that Onulf 
Speyer’s tieatise on figures appeared under the title o f Colores Rhetor id . See Murphy’s 
discussion in Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine 
to the Renaissance (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1974), 
pp. 189-90. It is also worth noting, though, that sixteenth-centuiy writers on the subject did 
assume that this paiticulai* use of the word ‘colour’ had its provenance in classical antiquity. In 
his discussion o f amplification in A Treatise o f the Figures o f Grammer and Rhetorike (London, 
1555), Richard Sheny observes that ‘the figures o f sentences, whereby the copye, bothe of 
wordes and matter, is wonderfully increased ... be called of the Rhetoricians by divers names, as 
some where [j/c] of Quintilian they be named argumentes, and maners of amplificatio, vertues 
also of an oration, and lightes, and colours’ (http://collections.chadwyck.co.idc).
As Wendy Steiner points out in her preface to The Colors o f Rhetoric: Problems in the Relation 
Between Modern Literature and Painting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). James 
Muiphy suggests that Chaucer’s use of the term color rhetorici in the second half o f the 
fourteenth century indicates that It had by that time become a petrified phrase, meaning figm ative 
language in a general sense. See Muiphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages, p. 190.
^ The Arte o f English Poesie (Menston: Scolar Press, 1968), p. 132. A facsimile of the 1589 
edition.
Thomas Wilson, The Arte o f Rhétorique, ed. Thomas J. Derrick (New York and London: 
Garland Publishing, 1982), pp. 354 and 339.
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advertises the ‘figuies and formes o f speech’ to be tieated thereafter as ‘stai*s to 
give light’ and ‘orient colours to beautifie reason’/^
The ‘coloui'able proofes’ to which the lexicographer Thomas Thomas 
refers last ai e also part of the armoury belonging to the orator or rhetorician, and 
this time can be traced back to a much earlier, classical tradition/^ Cicero and 
Quintilian both use the word color to describe the ‘particulai* aspect given to a 
case by the skilful manipulation of the facts —  the “gloss” or “varnish” put on 
them by the accused or tlie accuser’/® The classical orator’s deployment of 
‘colour’ has been displaced in our own time, of course, by the accomplished 
political rhetor’s use of ‘spin’. It is a new name for an old term. The continuing 
impact of ‘colours’ on the day-to-day running of modem political systems is 
more than evident in Cliristopher Brookmyre’s satirical, fictional account of the 
new Scottish parliament at its inception. Here we encounter figuies such as Ian 
Beadie, a hack turned PR gum, renowned for his ability to ‘neutralise, or at least 
dilute’ the most damning of circumstances ‘with boundless means of dissemblage 
and distraction’. Radical approaches to damage limitation (or the defence of an 
‘accused’) are worth less in this context than an ability to provide ‘changes in 
tack and important shirtings of perspective’. Indeed, Beadie proves himself able 
to avert the disaster a dead body would normally occasion ‘by putting a positive 
spin on the whole thing’. ‘Guilt and innocence’, he remarks, are ‘like everything 
else in this world, entirely about perception’. Survival in this environment 
depends, as it did in ancient Rome, on the ‘skilful manipulation of facts’, which.
Peacham, Garden, ‘To the Right Honourable Sir John Puckering’.
^ For an analysis of Rudolph Agricola’s conflation of the two senses of the word ‘coloui*’, 
meaning both rhetorical figures and the ‘paiticulai* emotional tonality or shading— the point of  
view which an orator gives his speech’, see Wayne A. Rebhom, “‘The Emperour of Mens 
Minds”: The Renaissance Trickster as Homo Rhetoricus\ in David Quint, Margaret W. Ferguson, 
G.W. Pigman, III and Wayne A. Rebhom, eds., Creative Imitation: New Essays on Renaissance 
Literature in Honor ofThoinas M. Greene, Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies 
(Binghamton, New York: 1992), pp. 46-7 and passim.
Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, trans. H.E. Butler, 4 volumes (London: Heinemann, 1920-21),
II, 4.2.88.n.l. See also Mmphy’s discussion in Rhetoric in the Middle Ages of Seneca the Elder’s 
collection of declamations, originally called Oratorum et Rhetorum Sententiae, Divisiones et 
Colores, in which the word colores again refers to speakers’ attempts to ‘create a certain “tone” or 
“coloring” in their arguments’ by interpreting actions in a more or less favourable light (39). A 
more detailed account of declamation and Seneca the Elder can be found in George A. Kennedy,
A New History o f Classical Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 166-72.
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however impossible to deny, are nonetheless always already open to the influence 
o f ‘spin’/®
Thus reinvented for the new millennium, the term ‘colourable proofes’ 
refers simply to a speaker’s interpretation of the circumstances and motives 
involved in whatever matter is being debated. As Quintilian described it, each 
different interpretation advanced put a new ‘complexion’ {coloré) on the facts of 
a case.®^  Characteristically bmsque, Aristotle summed up the situation by 
explaining that ‘since the same thing may have been done from several motives, 
the accuser must disparage it by taking it in the worse sense, while the defender 
must talce it in the better’.®^ This is the technique presented by the author of the 
Rhetorica Ad Herennium as the best way of dealing with cases in which the 
‘facts’ of the matter are beyond dispute. If the peipetration of a particular action 
cannot possibly be denied, it can still be given either a positive or a negative 
‘colour’. The stiategy itself involves a shift in emphasis from straight accusation 
or defence to the evaluation and inteipretation of the ‘facts’ in question.
‘Colours’ are about maldng the best of what you’ve been given. They aie about 
showing that the moral value attached to an action by one’s opponent is capable 
of being re-read in a different light. With the help of colours (as we saw in 
Chapter I) an action described as judicious can be re-inscribed as cowardly; an 
example of ‘courage’ presented instead as the ‘reckless temerity of a gladiator’, 
and so on.®^
As Wesley Trimpi has shown, the ability of ‘colours’ to blur moral 
boundaries troubled the Greek and Roman writers of antiquity.®"^  This suspicion 
was inherited by eaify modern writers —  the composer of an ‘Epitaph on a Dyer’ 
in Wits Recreation claiming ‘there no matter was so foule that he could set a
Chi'istopher Brookinyre, Boiling a Frog (London: Wainer Books, 2001), pp. 28,149,299 and 
264.
Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 1 ,3.6.92.
Ailstotle, The ‘A rt’ o f Rhetoric, trans. John Henry Freese (London: Heinemann, 1926), 3.15.10- 
15.
”  [Cicero], Rhetorica Ad Herennium, trans. Harry Caplan, rpt. (Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1999), 3.3.6.
See ‘The Meaning of Horace’s UtPictura Poesis\ Journal o f the Warburg & Courtatdd 
Institutes 36 (1973): 1-34.
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colour on it handsomely’/ '  In no mood to joke about it, Dudley Fenner 
described ‘Sophistrie’ as ‘the feined Art o f Blenches, or coloured reasons’, 
adding, in no uncertain terms, that a ‘colourable reason, or Blenche, is a shewe of 
reason to deceive withall’/^
These ‘colourable reasons’ are what Francis Bacon called the ‘Colours of 
Good and Evil’; they do not, o f course, actually ‘prove’ anything at all. ‘Tr*ue 
and solid reasons’ are in fact carefully distinguished by Bacon from ‘colours, 
popularities, and circumstances’. Unlike ‘true and solid reasons’, colours lack 
the persuasive backing of rational evidence, but ar e nonetheless ‘o f such force, as 
they sway the ordinary judgment either o f a weak man, or of a wise man, not 
fully and considerately attending and pondering the matter’.®^ Encoded in this 
passage is a subtle message from Bacon to his more discerning readers. While 
the wealc man may be easily swayed, he implies, the wise man will avoid being 
convinced by a fallacious application of ‘colour’, so long as he pays full and 
continuous attention to the matter at hand.®*
Bacon malces the perception o f truth sound simple. Other commentators, 
both before him and after, were to view the problem of ‘colour’ in very different 
terms. Far from preying only on minds momentarily distracted, colours were 
often regarded as tools designed to prohibit ‘attendance’ from the start.
Following a closely linlced chain of associations back to its genesis in Plato, 
Jacqueline Lichtenstein shows how the Greek philosopher distinguished the ‘pure 
and colorless colors of black and white’ from the confusing impurity of other 
colours, which ‘dazzle the eye and set off a flash, bluiTing vision rather than
Wits Recreation, Selected From the Finest Fancies o f Moderne Muses (London, 1640).
Dudley Fenner, The Artes ofLogicke andRethorike (London, 1584). 
(http://collections.chadwyck.co.uk).
O f the Colours o f Good and Evil, in Brian Vickers, ed., Francis Bacon (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 97.
In his dedicatoiy epistle to Lord Mountjoye, Bacon suggests that The Colours o f Good and Evil 
will best please ‘the taste of such wits as are patient to stay the digesting and soluting unto 
themselves of that which is shaip and subtile’ (italics mine). The epistle can be found in The 
Essays o f Lord Bacon (London: W.W. Gibbings, 1891), p. 117.
79
illuminating it’/® One of the consequences of Plato’s foray into the science of 
optometry is to attach to such ‘colours’ an indissoluble ediical ambiguity. Rather 
than inveigling (from MF aveugler to delude or make blind) only those unable to 
see through them, these colours are themselves responsible for the ‘dazzle that 
blinds the gaze’ and the ‘sparkle that obscures vision’. In the face of the ‘flash 
set off by an overly violent dilation o f the visual ray’, ‘attending’ (from ME 
atenden to observe or consider; borrowed from Latin attendere to stretch) 
becomes impossible. To couch this chromatic metaphor more simply: ‘colours’ 
disable by means of ‘dilation’ the attention which needs must be at frill ‘stretch’.
These dazzling colours are the stock-in-trade of ‘the sophist whose 
“gaudy speeches” and “glistening words” ... seduce the listener with then 
ambiguity and deceiving sparkle’; o f ‘the rhetorician who wins his audience’s 
approval through the colors that adorn his argument’; and of ‘the painter who 
seizes the viewer with his enchanting coloris'. ‘Flattery, cosmetics, artifice, 
appearance’, Lichtenstein ar gues, ‘all the terms of this metaphorical chain linking 
the critique of painting, o f sophistry, and of rhetoric, also qualify the effects of 
color as effects of seduction; they are also the effects of illusion and pleasure’.^ ®®
Lichtenstein’s elegant assimilation of these various senses o f the word 
‘colour*’ is beautifully cohesive. It even manages, unintentionally, to incorporate 
all the meanings enfolded in Thomas Thomas’s 1587 definition of the term. 
Caution is advisable, all the same. To allow the sophist and the rhetorician to 
enter the conceptual space already occupied by the poet and the painter is to risk 
squeezing any real relationship between them further and further out. At issue is 
the extent to which the painter’s use o f red, yellow, and blue pigment, for 
instance, is in any meaningful way comparable to the sophist’s manufacture of 
‘colourable proofs’. David Bevington is one critic for whom such an alliance 
seems inevitably doomed. Thus the over-zealous forger* of intimate connections 
between the arts is reminded, rather ster*nly, that too often the con*espondence 
discovered is inherently imstable: one side o f it being ‘based on something
The Eloquence o f Color: Rhetoric and Painting in the French Classical Age, trans. Emily 
McVarish (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 52.
Ibid., p. 53
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physically real and objective to our senses’; the other involving ‘a metaphoric 
leap through which we attempt to describe our affective response to the 
comparison’/®^  Susanne Langer is equally keen to keep poetry, painting, 
rhetoric, and sophistry apart. The idea that their union should never have been 
contemplated is implicit in her suggestion that ‘there are no happy marriages in 
art —  only successful rape’.^ ®^
Less sceptical than Langer or Bevington, other critics have been unwilling 
to start proceedings for such an ineversible divorce. Fai* from excluding 
‘rhetorical theory’ from the ut pictura poesis debate, Alison Thorne imagines it 
as an intermediary between poetiy and painting: the main discursive agent 
‘through which the visual and verbal arts were welded together and which 
thereby facilitated the translation of particular effects fr om one type of language 
to another’. ^ ®^ Perhaps the best reason for maldng a leap of the kind Bevington 
fr owns upon is that early modem theorists were appar ently only too willing to 
make it themselves. Consider, for example, Henry Peacham’s account of the 
rhetorical figure descriptio:
Descriptio is a generall name of many and sundry kindes of 
descriptions, and a description is when the Orator by a diligent 
gathering together of circumstances, and by a fit and naturall 
application of them, doth expresse and set foi*th a thing so 
plainly and lively, that it seemeth rather painted in tables, than 
declared with words, and the mind of the heai er therby so 
drawen to an earnest and stedfast contemplation of the thing 
described, that he rather thinketh he seeth it than heareth it.
Although Peacham expresses no doubt about the ability of ‘colour s’ to 
move, his evocation of their power to ‘draw’ a listener to an ‘ear*nest and stedfast 
contemplation’ makes the effects of ‘colour*’ sound far* more tame than they 
appear in the accounts of other writers. That colour s were thought to be capable 
of doing rather more than ‘dr awing’ a listener to contemplate his subject
David Bevington, Action is Eloquence: Shakespeare’s Language o f Gesture (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 189.
Susamie K. Langer, Problems o f Art: Ten Philosophical Lectures (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 86.
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‘earnestly’ is obvious from the example of Bonlt, the pander’s servant in 
Shakespeare’s Pericles.
Returning to the brothel, having cried the newly-arrived Marina through 
the market, Boult is asked by the Bawd how he has fared:
Boult: I have cried her almost to the number of her hafrs; I 
have drawn her picture with my voice.
Bawd: And I prithee tell me, how dost thou find the inclination 
of the people, especially the younger sort?
Boult: Faith, they listen’d to me as they would have hearken’d 
to their father’s testament. There was a Spaniard’s mouth 
water’d and he went to bed with her very description.^ ®"^
Far from ‘drawing’ the drooling Spaniard to an ‘earnest contemplation’ of 
Marina, or even ‘inclining’ him (as the Bawd suggests) toward her, Boult’s 
colours have directed him to bed as if physically propelled. The worldly reader is 
invited to realise that this is not because he is tned.
A textbook Englished in 1570, Joannes Stumrius’s Ritch Storehouse or 
Treasurie harbours a comparable example of the sixteenth-century tendency to 
ascribe the same affective power to rhetorical and actual colours alike. Around 
ten pages into the translation we find Sturmius advising his students on the kinds 
of writer with whom they should be acquainted. One of the chief functions of 
this section is to distinguish authors such as Xenophon, whom ‘you may read by 
yourselves’, from ‘writers that be harde to understand’, and who therefore ‘must 
be learned at the handes of. . .  professours o f the tongues and 
Schoolemaisters’.^ ®' Included in this advanced league of difficult writers are 
Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides and Lucan. ‘Such among Orators are Demosthenes 
and Tullie’, Sfrmnius continues:
not for that their sayings be obscure but bicause their Arte is 
secret and close. And as the eye sight is often glimsed by the 
beames of the Sunne: so is the sharpnesse of the witte
Vision and Rhetoric in Shakespeare, p. xiv.
Pericles, 4.2.91-9,
A Ritch Storehouse or Treasurie, ti'ans. T. B[rowne] (London, 1570), pp. 9v-10r.
82
sometime dulled with the brightnesse of the sentence being 
amply adourned and beawtifully set forth/®^
Palpably fretful, Sturmius imagines the colourful rhetorical flourishes of 
Demosthenes and ‘Tullie’ to be suitable material for youthfiil consumption only 
when in the presence of adult supervision. Cicero and Demosthenes become 
curiously X-rated authorities, more hazardous, even, than Ovid. Speaking of 
their amply adorned, strikingly beautiful phrases, Sturmius seems to struggle, 
implicitly, with the tension created by their voluptuous and vibrant sensuality.
The seductive nature of rhetorical colour hinted at by this worried pedagogue is 
made absolutely explicit some hundred years later by John Dryden in^i Parallel 
of Poetry and Painting. Watchful chaperones are banished from this more 
permissive environment, in which the hypothetical poet’s deployment of 
rhetorical ‘tropes and figures’ is allied to the painter’s use of ‘colour’ in a picture. 
‘Colouring’, as Dryden puts it, is Uena sororis; in plain English, the bawd of her 
sister, the design or drawing’:
she clothes, she dresses her up, she paints her, she makes her 
appear more lovely than natmally she is; she procures for the 
design, and malces lovers for her: for the design of itself is only 
so many naked lines. Thus in poetiy, the expression is that 
which charms the reader, and beautifies the design, which is 
only the outline of the fable. ^ ®^
Radiating sex appeal, pleasure incarnate, this painted woman is obviously 
far fr om repellent to Dryden. On the contrary, he seems half in love with her 
already. If Thomas Nashe had lived to witness Dryden’s infatuation he would 
surely have pronounced him beyond hope —  a perfect, because pathetic, example 
of a man fallen under the debilitating influence of rhetorical colour, and 
specifically, her ability to mesmerise her percipients. In a passage discussing (as 
Sturmius had) the reading matter appropriate for impressionable minds, Nashe
‘“ ibid.,p. lOr.
A Parallel o f Poetry and Painting, in W.P. Ker, ed., Essays o f John Diyden, 2 volumes 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 1, pp. 147-8.
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attempts to eradicate this danger by forbidding outright ‘the excessive studies of 
delight’:
wherwith young Students are so besotted that they forsake 
sounder Artes to follow smoother eloquence, not unlike to him 
that had rather have a newe painted boxe, though there be 
nothing but a halter in it, than an old bard hutch with tieasure 
invaluable/®^
In his depiction of the uninitiated young man, led as if hypnotised to 
‘followe’ the ‘newe painted boxe’ that is eloquence, Nashe draws on the 
‘archetypal features of the woman encoded in the legends of Pandora, Eve and 
Lilith’/®® The traits belonging to such charming temptresses abound in Henricus 
Cornelius Agrippa’s sketch o f ‘subtile Eloquence, [who] with exquisite 
coloui’inge of woordes, and with a false likelihoode of the ti uth doth allure the 
mindes o f the simple, and leadeth them into the prison of erroure, seekinge to 
sub verte the sence o f the truthe’/^ ® Incontrovertibly feminine, rhetorical coloui* 
exhibits all the characteristics of the woman: both are portrayed ‘as disguising 
behind false appearances, using [their] beauty and finery as a vehicle to dazzle 
men to their destruction’/^  ^ It is no accident, surely, that Milton’s Eve is 
presented as ‘adorned and lovely to attract’, nor that, having followed her into 
sin, his wits ‘dulled’, perhaps, by the ‘brightnesse’ of her beauty, post-lapsarian 
Adam inveighs against her (in terms recalling Nashe’s ‘newe painted boxe’) as a 
‘novelty on earth’/^ ^
Although prevalent in devotional literatuie, the use of ‘progress’ or 
‘pilgrimage as a metaphor for hermeneutic enquiry’ also appears in the many 
early modem texts which claim to provide a ‘plaine’ pathway to mastery of their
Thomas Nashe, The Anatomie o f Absurditie, in G. Gregoiy Smith, ed., Elizabethan Critical 
Essays, 2 volumes (Oxford: Claiendon Press, 1904), 1, p. 333.
Efrat Tseëlon, The Masque o f Femininity: The Presentation o f Women in Everyday Life, rpt. 
(London: Sage Publications, 1997), p. 12.
O f the Vanitie and Uncertaintie o f the Artes and the Sciences, trans. James Sanford (London, 
1569), p. 19v.
Tseëlon, Masque o f Femininity, p. 12.
John Milton, Paradise Lost, ed. Alastair Fowler, 2"“* edn. (London and New York: Longman,
1998), 10.147-8 and 10.891.
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subject/Here,  as in Nashe’s discussion, ‘Eloquence’ is blamed for ‘alluring’ 
men away from the straight and naiTow, and is assumed to do so, very 
specifically, by causing them to lose sight o f their goal. It was precisely this 
belief in the power of rhetorical colour to dazzle men, and thus to lead them 
astray, that prompted one o f the most notoriously belligerent attacks on figurative 
language ever composed. The aggressor in question was John Locke; the vent for 
his animosity, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
In this text, as Catherine Peaden has noted, Locke set up ‘anew the old 
quarrel between rhetoric and philosophy, but with a difference: Rhetoric is 
explicitly personified as a seductive woman’ whose power to mislead men’s 
judgements depends on her ability to move their passions. ‘The analogy of the 
deceitful female to a figurative rhetoric does not stand alone in the Essay\
Peaden argues, ‘but is pait of textual system of fearful or disparaging images of 
women’s/rhetoric’s deceptive wiles’. L o c k e ’s awaieness of the futility 
involved in attacking ‘those Arts of Deceiving, wherein Men find pleasuie to be 
Deceived’ does not deter him from mounting a one-man campaign against 
them.^ '^
The account of rhetoric in the Essay is not very long, but it oozes a 
strangely imperious venom. With this in mind, Peaden’s description of it as a 
‘quand’ seems apposite; on the other hand, one of the most notable features of 
Locke’s critique is the gap between his teiminology and the motifs and images 
traditionally used in discussions of oratory or rhetoric. The prospect of engaging
In Gender and Literacy on Stage in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), Eve Rachele Sanders suggests that this ‘pilgrimage’ metaphor provides 
the narrative structm e for Book I o f The Faerie Queene, where ‘putting oneself in peril of 
damnation, swerving from the true path, has a strictly gendered meaning: to stray is to turn 
womanish, to abandon one’s masculine role, to lay by one’s aimoui* to recline in the shade’ (30- 
31).
Catherine Hobbs Peaden, ‘Understanding Differently: Re-reading Locke’s Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding’, Rhetoric Society Quarterly, Special Issue: Feminist Rereadings in the 
History of Rhetoric, 22.1 (1992): 75-89, at pp. 81-2. For an analysis o f Den Ida’s reading of 
Nietzsche’s perception o f ‘Woman’ as the ‘very antithesis o f philosophical ti'uth ... whose 
“dissimulating ways” are tiaps set on purpose to lure the philosopher from his appointed path’, 
see Christopher Norris, ‘Post-stnicturalist Shakespeare: Text and Ideology’, in John Dralcalds, ed., 
Alternative Shakespeares (London and New York: Methuen, 1985), pp. 52ff,
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1975), 3.10.34.
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with Quintilian’s oratorical warrior, whose command of figurai language allows 
him to fight ‘with weapons that are not only effective but polished and gleaming’, 
would, one feels, have left Locke unfazed in the e x t r e m e / I t  is by no means 
certain, either, that he would have fled tenified from Martianus Capella’s 
Rhetorica, to whom we are intioduced in Capella’s allegorical treatise on the 
seven liberal arts. De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii}^^ Rhetorica's resplendent 
entry is described by Capella in Book V of the De Nuptiis:
Helmeted and crowned wiüi royal majesty, she held ready for 
defense or attack weapons that gleamed with the flash of 
lightning. Beneath her armor the vestur e draped Romanwise 
about her shoulders glittered with the various light of all 
figurae, all schemata', and she was cinctured with precious 
colors for jewels.^
All woman she is, undoubtedly, but Rhetorica's movement is surely hampered by 
her pendulous baubles and the weapons that crash and ‘clatter’ as she moves. In 
this respect Rhetorica bears no small resemblance to Shalcespeare’s Venus, 
another supposed femme fatale, whose overbearing and sweaty chubbiness malce 
her less seductive than absurd. No; Locke’s concern is with the ‘Prevailing 
beauties’ of rhetoric; his fear, that men must face a combatant more cunning 
altogether.
A figure better fitting such criteria might be formd in the account of 
‘Eloquence’ given by Valerius Maximus, the classical master of reportage. 
Eloquence, like Rhetorica, is still ‘armed’, but now with ‘appropriate elocution 
and suitable bodily movement’. ‘When she has equipped herself with these’,
Institutio Oratoria, ed. Donald A. Russell, 5 volumes (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), IV, 8.3.3. A long list o f examples in which oratory is envisaged 
as combat can be found in Wayne A. Rebhom, The Emperor o f Men’s Minds: Literature and the 
Renaissance Discourse o f Rhetoric (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 34-5 
and chapter \,passim.
Robert Payne suggests that Capella’s separation and definition of the seven liberal arts is 
responsible for the well-known shape of the educational system in the Middle Ages, wherein the 
seven clearly designated areas of knowledge are then divided into the two groups of preparatory 
and advanced studies, the trivium and the quadrivium. See The Key o f Remembrance: A Study o f  
Chaucer’s Poetics, rpt. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 27.
Translated by C.S. Baldwin, in Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (to 1400): Interpreted from 
Representative Works (New York: Macmillan, 1928), pp. 93-4.
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says Maximus, ‘she attacks men in three ways: by herself invading their minds 
and by handing their ears over to the one and their eyes over to the other to be 
charmed’/^ ® Unencumbered by helmet or armour, ‘Eloquence’ is lithe enough to 
slip unnoticed into the recesses of men’s brains. It is she of whom Locke is 
afraid.
Although the image of rhetoric as a seductive woman clearly has its 
provenance in classical antiquity, Locke’s own appropriation of the concept may 
well have been influenced more directly by early modem sources .Drawing on 
the work of Lisa Jardine, Catherine Peaden claims that Locke adopted the tenets 
of Baconian rhetoric and dialectic, wherein ‘grammar was seen to provide the 
bricks which dialectic built into its walls, [and] rhetoric was limited to gracing 
the facade of this edifice of discoui'se’.^ ^^  For Locke, following Bacon, ‘rhetoric’ 
consisted entirely of elocutio; for elocutio Locke read ‘figurative language’, and 
‘figurative language’ he denounced as ‘the perfect cheat’. Far from brandishing 
what Henry Peacham called ‘martiall i n s t r u m e n t s ‘Rhetorick’ was in Locke’s 
opinion itself a ‘powerful instr ument o f Err or and Deceit’ —  susceptible to 
suspicion because laid on from the outside to beautify the matter underneath.
The philosopher’s perception of figurative language as a Idnd of ‘facing’ 
is made manifest in his infamous claim that ‘all the artificial and figur ative 
application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to
Valerius Maximus, Memorable Doings and Sayings, trans. and ed. D.R. Shackleton Bailey, 2 
volumes (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2000), II, 8.10.
For a related instance of Locke’s belief in the ability of real women to influence the thinking of 
men without them noticing, see chapter 3 of William Walker’s Locke, Literary Criticism, and 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 55-67. WaUcer ai'gues 
persuasively that Locke’s designation of women as ‘pernicious and displaced determinants of 
belief (56) is evident from Book I of the Essay. Here it is the male child’s mother and his nurse 
who are accused of planting hrational superstitions in the child’s brain, before either his 
consciousness is developed or his faculty o f memory activated. Because women are a foimative 
influence at the earliest stages of the child’s experience, he grows up without recognising the 
impact of female thinking on his own thoughts, and assumes that whatever he has been told by 
these female carers is true.
For a brief discussion of Renaissance iconography in which Rhetoric or Eloquence is 
represented as a woman, see John Steadman, The Hill and the Labyrinth: Discourse and 
Certitude in Milton and his Near-Contemporaries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1984).
Peaden, ‘Understanding Differently’, p. 81.
Peacham, Garden, sigs. AB3r-v.
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insinuate wrong Ideas’ In this scheme, figurative language is not merely 
‘artificial’. To the extent that it is also ‘applied’, rhetorical ornament performs 
exactly the same act of deception as malce-up or paint. Given Locke’s apparent 
indebtedness to Bacon in other p l a c e s , i t  seems likely that this particular 
insight owes something to the earlier philosopher’s distrust of ‘persuasions that 
are wrought by eloquence ... which do paint and disguise the true appearance of 
t h i n g s H a v i n g  been first reviled and then dismissed, ‘Rhetorick’ herself 
emerges from the accounts of both Locke and Bacon, triumphantly unabashed, as 
a close relation of Thomas Tuke’s painted lady— a hypocrite ‘whose devotion is 
... a fine face lately borrowed, & newly set on'.
In an effort to heal the wounds inflicted by John Locke’s savage attack on 
rhetoric, certain twentieth-century critics have looked to antiquity to prove that 
elocutio was perceived of neither as ‘meaningless ornament’ nor as ‘separable- 
decoration-stuck-on’.^ ^^  While some early modem defenders of figurative 
language simply denied that its purpose was ‘to blinde [its percipient] with 
untruthes, or deceive him with lyes’,^ ^^  their twentieth-century coimterpaits
124 Locke, Esscy, 3.10.34 (italics mine).
The possible influence on Locke of Francis Bacon’s approach to the dissemination of 
unfamiliar philosophical concepts, for example, is an area Catherine Peaden leaves unexplored. 
Dealing with the ‘deliveiy and teaching o f loiowledge’ in Book II of The Advancement o f  
Learning, ed. William Aldis Wright, 5“' edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920), Bacon suggests 
that ‘knowledge which is new, and foreign from opinions received is to be delivered in another 
form than that that is agreeable and familiar ... For those whose conceits are seated in popular 
opinions, need only but to prove or dispute; but those whose conceits aie beyond popular 
opinions, have a double laboui*; the one to make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and 
demonstrate. So it is o f necessity with them to have recoui se to similitudes and ti anslations to 
express themselves’ (174). In the preface to the Essay, similarly, Locke claims to have ‘taken 
some Pains, to make plain and familiar to [his readers’] Thoughts some Truths, which established 
Prejudice, or the Abstractness of the Ideas Themselves, might render difficult’; resorting, ‘when 
the Notion is new ... or out o f the ordinary Road’, to looking at familiar objects ‘turned on every 
side’. In spite of his later condemnation of figurative language, Locke himself illustrates his more 
complicated concepts with ‘similes that function as unacknowledged metaphors of mind’. As 
Philip Vogt ai'gues in ‘Seascape with Fog: Metaphor in Locke’s Essay’, Journal o f the History o f  
Ideas 54.1 (1993): 1-18, ‘these metaphors all seiwe a purpose in the Esscy similar to that 
perfoimed in the Platonic dialogues by myth, functioning as substitutes for the proofs that 
metaphilosophy simply cannot provide and offering something familiar and analogous—  
something persuasive in the absence of proof—  instead’ (4).
Francis Bacon, The Advancement o f Learning, in Brian Vickers, ed., Francis Bacon (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 218.
The phrases occur in Rosemond Tuve’s Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery: Renaissance 
Poetic and Twentieth-Centuiy Critics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 51.
John Downame, A Treatise Against Lying (London, 1636), p. 26.
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prefer to confront the charge by challenging the fundamental and crucial 
assumption that ornament is ‘applied’. The success of this strategy depends on 
the critic’s ability to prove that rhetorical ornament is a product of essence; that 
embellishment cannot be ‘false’ because it is born out of the matter it enliances. 
The champion of figurative language must therefore play down its artificiality 
and emphasise its foundation in nature. A concerted effort to do just this appeals 
in recent work by John Briggs, who supports his case by recoui se to the ‘prime 
synonyms for ornament, such as exornation and furnishing':
The prefix of exornation, attached to the Latin verb ornare, to 
furnish, gives the ornamental action an outwaid movement.
L i k e w i s e , d r a w s  heavily from the meaning offornir, 
retained in French: to complete. Raiment is of course a 
shortening of arrayment, a setting forth or placing in order.
Adorned by decoration that pushes outwards from within, matter is not 
‘covered’ or disguised by ornament; nor is it ‘disordered’ or significantly 
changed. This argument for an almost organic link between style and substance 
is not without precedent. Cicero’s insistence upon their close proximity is 
apparent in his demand that everything the eloquent poet adds be ‘di awn fr om the 
nature of the subject, either by metaphor, or epithet, or by other means that are 
inherent in nature itself The Roman orator’s impact on Renaissance theory is 
also perceptible in Angel Day’s eai’ly modem wiiting manual, wherein 
Eloquution is supposed to be ‘greatly put forward by nature’; ‘annexed unto the 
stile, which evermore is also tyed to the argument and substaunce of eveiye 
Epistle’.P u b l i s h e d  two years later, Abraham Fraunce’s Arcadian Rhetorike is 
another sixteenth-centuiy handbook which upholds the sense of a ‘natmal’ 
relationship between matter and ornament. Although Fraunce describes a ‘trope 
or turning’ of a word as that by which it is turned from its ‘natuiall signification
John C. Briggs, Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric o f Nature (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvai‘d University Press, 1989), p. 93.
Cited in Briggs, Francis Bacon, p. 85.
Angel Day, The English Secretorie (Menston: Scolai* Press, 1967), p. 20. A facsimile of the 
1586 edition.
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to some other’, he also notes that it should be done ‘so convenientlie, as that it 
seem rather willinglie ledd, than di'iven by force to that other signification’/^ ^
But Fraunce’s affable approach to metaphor-making was not shared by at 
least one of his contemporaries. George Puttenham, the author of the Arte o f  
English Poesie, was obviously less wonied than either Day or Fraunce were 
about maintaining a natural link between ornament and matter. There is, in fact, 
ample evidence in Puttenham’s treatment of the subject alone to prove Locke’s 
suspicion of the deceptively superficial nature of rhetorical ornament well- 
founded. Where Fraunce’s advice on figurative language suggests that words be 
gently led away from their natural signification, Puttenham refers to a ‘kinde of 
wiesting of a single word fiom his owne right signification, to another not so 
natuiall’. ‘Figurative speech’, in Puttenham’s view:
is a noveltie of language evidently (and yet not absuidly) 
estranged from the ordinaiy habite and manner of our dayly 
talke and writing and figme it selfe is a lively or good grace set 
upon wordes, speaches and sentences to some purpose and not 
in vaine, giving them ornament or efficacie by many maner of 
alterations,
These words mark Puttenliam’s significant depaifuie fiom classical authority. 
Against Cicero’s belief that ‘style ornaments a thing of beauty the way blood 
permeates and colours a living being’,^ '^ we can place Puttenham’s description of 
figurative language as something ‘set upon’ (not belonging naturally to) words, 
speeches and sentences. And Puttenham’s erosion of the aigument for a ‘natural’ 
relationship between ornament and matter does not stop here. He goes on to 
explain how these ‘alterations’ work: ‘sometime by surplusage, sometime by 
defect, sometime by disorder, or mutation’. S u c h  metamorphoses seem as
Abraham Fraunce, The Arcadian Rhetorike, ed. Ethel Seaton, Luttrell Society Reprints 9 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1950), p. 3.
George Puttenham, The Arte o f  English Poesie (Menston: Scolar Press, 1968), p. 148. A 
facsimile of the 1589 edition.
Puttenham, vf pp. 132-3.
Cited in Briggs, Francis Bacon, p. 82.
Puttenham, Arte, p. 133.
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contrary to ‘nature’ as can be, and his subsequent descriptions of figures which 
alter a word’s meaning by ‘abuse’ and ‘cross-naming’ only heighten this effect.
Obviously different in many ways, perhaps the strongest link between 
Puttenham and the other writers on rhetoric, both ancient and modem, is their 
shared belief that the ‘addition’ made by ornament is in no way superfluous. 
Figurative speech, wrote Puttenliam, is set upon words, speeches and sentences 
‘to some purpose and not in vaine’. On this point, the Arte upholds the 
twentieth-century argument that refuses to see ornament as a ‘meaningless’ 
‘facing’, whose only function is to grace the ‘edifice of discouise’. And yet there 
is a sense that, in channelling their energies into proving that Elizabethan 
rhetoricians conceived of ornament as they do, critics like Briggs are eliding an 
equally if not more important issue. As Jacqueline Lichtenstein argues, Plato, 
another authority under the weight of whose condemnation rhetoric has suffered:
knew very well, too well sur ely, that ornament was never 
simply ornament, a supplement added to the thing, whose 
excesses could be avoided by control of its use. He thought of 
it rather as a principle of perversion that held the germ of 
dissolution since it wiped out the differences upon which 
philosophy established the authority of its realm.
For Plato, then, as well as for Locke, the point is not that ornament is gratuitous: 
on the contrary, as Puttenham realised, it is very necessary indeed. Presumably 
Plato would not have railed so hard at rhetoric if it was only ‘meaningless’; the 
danger quite clearly resides in its ability to alter sense. Had Puttenham’s figures 
of ‘cross-naming’ and ‘abuse’ — which effect alterations by ‘disorder’ and 
‘mutation’ — been available for Plato’s comment, there is little doubt he would 
have used them to illustrate exactly the ‘principle of perversion’ he feared 
rhetoric might engender.
Such a principle is in no way evident to Marion Trousdale, who also 
claims that the vernacular rhetoricians did not believe in it either. ‘A metaphor, a
Jacqueline Lichtenstein, The Eloquence o f Color: Rhetoric and Painting in the French 
Classical Age, ti*ans. Emily McVarish (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 49.
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metonomy, an anaphora are essentially ti’ansformations, which the Elizabethans 
called tianslations {translatio)', she argues:
They do not provide the means by which meaning is 
discovered or altered. Rather, they provide the means by 
which the ‘bare and nalced body’ is ‘attired in rich and 
gorgeous appareil’ so that it ‘seemeth to the common usage of 
th’ eye much more comely and bewtifull then the naturall.’
What can be said by figures, then, theoretically can be said 
without figures. They provide in the strictest sense, albeit in 
small compass, the poetic means of variation, a technical 
means by which the language of the philosopher can be 
transfoimed so as to bring forth a golden world.^ ®^
What Trousdale sees as the power of ornament to ‘bring forth a golden 
world’ anticipates the argument John Briggs makes for it as a kind of 
‘completion’ —  an addition which draws out the goodness already contained in 
that to which it is applied. But if the ‘Elizabethans’ to whom Trousdale refers 
include Puttenham and Peacham, her sources themselves destabilise the 
cornerstone of her hypothesis: namely, that ‘translations’ do not alter meaning. 
Henry Peacham, for example, classifies metaphora and metanomia, at least, as 
‘Tropes of words’, or an ‘alteration fiom the proper and naturall signification, to 
an other not proper, but yet nye and likely’. A  figure, similarly, is described as 
‘a fashion of words. Oration, or sentence, made new by Arte, tourning fiom the 
common manner and custom of wryting and spealdng’ (sig. Bl). If the precise 
meaning of making a word ‘new’ by aif was in any doubt, moreover, Peacham 
tells us plainly that ‘the difference betweene the Trope and the Scheme, is this, 
that in the Trope there is a change of signifycation, but not in the Scheme’ (sig. 
Elv).
Puttenham, too, is characteristically thorough in his description of ‘the 
figures [including metaphor] which we call sensable because they alter and affect
Marion Trousdale, Shakespeare and the Rhetoricians (London: Scolar Press, 1982), p. 83. 
Henry Peacham, The Garden o f Eloquence (Menston: Scolar Press, 1971), sig. B lv. A
facsimile o f the 1577 edition.
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the mind by alteration of sense’ Thomas Wilson agreed that a ‘trope is an 
alteration of a word or sentence from the proper signification to that which is not 
proper’ In addition to this he claims that the turnings effected by figures like 
metaphor-— an alteration of a woorde from the proper and naturall meanynge, 
to that which is not proper, and yet agreeth therunto, by some likeness that 
appeaieth to be in it’ —  lie at the veiy heart of persuasion. ‘Neither can anye one 
perswade effectuouslye, and winne men by weight of his Oration’, he counsels, 
‘withoute the helpe of woordes altered and translated’ (344). Metaphor is 
distinguished by Wilson from metonymia and transmutacion as a figme that 
‘helpeth much for vaiiety’ (349). This final distinction recalls Trousdale’s 
emphasis on poetic ‘variation’, and thus provides the only evidence from these 
‘Elizabethans’ that seems remotely capable of corroborating her claim.
The power of ornament, or rhetorical colour, to ‘alter’ or ‘transform’ and 
its place in Shakespearean drama is the subject of the next section of this chapter.
Thus fai’ I have attempted to show how many early modem writers, 
whether they defend the use of ornament or attack it, also beti'ay an anxiety about 
the linlc between the power of ornamentum to transform, and the way in which, 
as a beautiful attire, its peculiar function is to cover something else entirely. 
Analyses so different as Puttenham’s and Locke’s do not disagree on the point 
that ornament covered or ‘attired’ something that existed before it —  what each 
man thought such covering achieved is where they pait company. Consequently, 
all ornamenta were susceptible to being praised or condemned for their ability to 
persuade listeners or readers, either by attractively adorning matter or by 
transfoiming sense. But as work done by Quentin Skinner has revealed, one 
figme in particular was reckoned to perform both functions simultaneously, and, 
for this reason, appears time and again alongside the word ‘cloalc’. The name of 
this figme is paradiastole.
Puttenham, Arte, p. 148.
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Skinner’s reading of certain aspects o f Renaissance literature in the light 
of this rhetorical figui’e might be described as a sophisticated talce on the now 
much maligned (if not completely discarded) ‘appeai'ance and reality’ theme in 
the texts of the period. Professor Skinner claims that paradlastole can be held 
partially responsible for the construction of moral ambiguity in many early 
modem texts —  the plays of Shalcespeare among them. Drawing on the two 
senses of the term ‘coloui*’ examined earlier in this chapter: the first being the 
rhetorical colours of diction; the second, what Francis Bacon described as 
'colouiable proofs’, Skimier argues that the vernacular rhetoricians identified two 
ways in which a spealcer might hope to ‘move’ his audience:
The more important is said to be the use of the figuies and 
tropes to lend additional colour to our utterances, thereby 
malcing them more persuasive and ‘colourable’. But the other 
and contrasting method ... is that of challenging and replacing 
descriptions instead of attempting to enhance them. The 
orator’s aim in this case is taken to be that of redescribing a 
given action or situation in such a way as to augment or 
extenuate its moral significance, thereby hoping to alter the 
attitude o f the audience and enlist them in his case.^ "^ ^
As Skinner points out, the vernacular' rhetoricians (and Puttenham, in 
particular) were intrigued by the powerful implications o f ‘redescription’. More 
interested than Skinner in the crucial role it played in life at the Elizabethan 
court, Frank Whigham ventures to call paradiastole a ‘master trope’ that controls 
the ‘ongoing adjustment o f public information by redescribing an utterance or 
action in such a way as to reverse the polarity of its meaning’. Sherry, Wilson 
and Peacham all give similar examples (bonowed for the most part fi*om
Thomas Wilson, Arte o f Rhétorique, ed. Thomas J. Demck (New York: Garland Publishing, 
1982), p. 344.
Quentin Skinner, ‘Moral Ambiguity and the Renaissance Art of Eloquence’, Essc^s in 
Criticism 44.4 (1994): 267-92, at p. 273. For an extended discussion o f the aspect of ornatus 
related to ‘the use of the figures and tropes to lend additional colour- to our utterances’ see 
Chapter 5 of Skiimer’s Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy o f Hobbes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Frank Whigham, Ambition and Privilege: The Social Tropes o f Elizabethan Courtesy Theory 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1984), p. 40.
94
Quintilian) of the tr ansformations performed by its apt deployment.
Puttenham’s account of paradiastole emphasises the significant part it plays in 
damage limitation: it enables a spealcer to ‘malce the best o f a bad thing, or tume 
a signification to the more plausible sense’. The force of a charge can thus be 
moderated by redescription so that ‘an unthrift [becomes] a liberall Gentleman: 
the foolish-hardy, valiant or couragious: the niggard, thriftie: a great riot, or 
outrage, an youthfull pranlce, and such like termes’.
The fact that such redescription was plausible, or even possible at all, 
Skinner argues, attests to the ‘continuing influence of Aristotle on the moral as 
well as the rhetorical thought of the Renaissance’:
The clue is said to lie in recognising that many of the virtues 
and many of the terms we consequently use to describe and 
appraise human actions, constitute a mean between two 
extremes of vice. The crucial implication is that many virtues 
and vices must therefore stand in a relationship of proximity 
with each other.
Skinner’s theory about how a speaker may ‘always hope to extenuate an evil 
action by hnposing on it the name of an adjoining virtue’ is supported among the 
classical tlieorists by Quintilian’s assertion that ‘there is a certain neighbourly 
quality between a number of the virtues and vices’, but it is Cicero’s advice that 
we ‘talce care lest we find ourselves deceived by those vices which appear to 
imitate virtues’ that provides the basis for his reading of paradiastole in 
Renaissance literature.
Cicero’s comment is the more important for Skirmer’s analysis because it 
includes the word ‘imitate’. It is this word in particular- that allows Skinner to 
argue that ‘the poets and moralists o f the English Renaissance offer a very similar- 
analysis o f what makes rhetorical redescription possible. They exhibit a special 
fondness for images of disguise, stressing how the nearness o f good and evil
144 See Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 148-9.
George Puttenham, The Arte o f English Poesie (Menston: Scolar Press, 1968), p. 154. A 
facsimile of the 1589 edition.
‘Moral Ambiguity and the Renaissance Ait o f Eloquence’, Essays in Criticism 44.4 (1994); 
267-92, at p. 276.
'“"’ Ibid.pp. 276-7.
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makes it all too easy for the vices to mask themselves by hiding under a mantle of 
goodness’ (277).
Although he never malces the comparison explicit, Skinner’s paradigm 
allows us to compare literal images o f ‘dress’ or ‘covering’ to the ‘cloak’ or 
‘face’ provided by rhetorical colour. In this model, it is ornament —  and the 
figure ofparadiastole in particular- —  that serves to cover something quite 
different with a ‘faire attire’. That paradiastole was indeed credited witli this 
ability is made manifest in an early seventeenth-centur-y poem by Anthony 
Sherley:
Craft weares the hood of Pollicie,
Rashness the sword o f Vallour-:
Falshood the maske of Honestie,
Lewdnes the face o f Pleasure.
... Pride is now cleanlines: the prodigall 
Is now the liberall; nice Superstition 
Goes for Relligion: Rashnes true Vallour call.
Thus Vice weares Vertues clothes; O vile Tradition!
Sherley’s poem may be emphatic but great literature it is not. Skinner himself 
selects a more famous example (which scans rather better, too) from Spenser’s 
Faerie Queene. The key passage occurs at the beginning of Book I, Canto VII, 
which opens with Spenser lamenting the mendacity o f exterior shows; how easily 
‘with fowle words tempting faire’, the fair can be persuaded to abandon vir-tue 
and to follow the truly foul. ‘What man so wise, what ear-thly wit so ware’, he 
wonders:
As to descry the crafty cunning traine.
By which deceipt doth maske in visour faire.
And cast her colours dyed deepe in gr aine 
To seeme like Truth, whose shape she well can faine.
And fitting gestur es to her purpose frame;
The guiltlesse man with guile to entertaine?
Great maistresse o f her art was that false Dame,
The false Duessa, cloked with Fidessaes name.^ '^ ^
Sir Anthony Sherley, ‘Of Vice’, in Witts New Dyall (London, 1604), sigs. K2r-v.
Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, ed. Thomas P. Roche, Jr., rpt. (London: Penguin, 1987),
1.7.1.
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Duessa is here shown in possession of all the qualities and trappings most 
calculated to deceive. She has the ‘faire visour’, the protean ability to assume a 
shape that ‘seemes like Tmth’, the ‘cloke’ (both literal and metaphorical) to hide 
her ‘true’ (in the sense of ‘real’) deceit, and the ‘guile’ to proficiently cany out 
the deception. In a context in which Archimago has taught Duessa to ‘imitate 
that Lady trew, / Whose semblance she did cairie under feigned hew’, the 
‘lending of additional colour-’ serves to obscure what is tr-uly ugly. It is motivated 
purely (or perhaps impurely) by malevolence, and this, I will argue, is what 
malces this literary example incontrover-tibly ««ambiguous.
To explain further, I would like to return, briefly, to Sherley’s poem, ‘Of 
Vice’, in which ‘craft’ masquerades as ‘pollicie’, and so on. In several instances, 
Sherley suggests that such sartorial deceptions are a recent phenomenon: ‘Pride’, 
he claimed, writing in 1604, ‘is now cleanlines: the prodigall / Is now the 
liberall’. In fact, his allusion to the strategy as a ‘vile Tradition’ is closer to the 
tr-uth: Sherley is describing the duplicitous practices of the figur e in medieval and 
Tudor morality drama known simply as the ‘Vice’. In his still unsmpassed study, 
Bernard Spivack argues that the Vice’s method is ‘first, last, and always deceit’, 
his chief weapon being ‘dissimulation in the form of moral, abetted often by 
physical disguise’. ‘The ‘characteristic effort of human nature to miscall by a 
palatable name the evils to which it is addicted is a constant theme of the 
moralities themselves’, he continues, and goes on to suggest that:
Such deceit is the central characteristic of [the Vice’s] role, 
tr anslating into vivid dramatic image the habitual self- 
deception or blindness o f mankind to the real nature of the 
temptations to which it succumbs —  a subject which receives 
nowhere a more searching treatment than in the plays of 
Shakespeare, with their continual emphasis on appearance and 
reality.''^
150 Bernard Spivack, Shakespeare and the Allegory o f Evil: The History o f a Metaphor in
Relation to his Major Villains (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 155. 
Ibid., pp. 156-7.
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Spivack then proceeds to quote the famous passage from The Merchant o f  
Venice, in which Bassanio, contemplating the thi-ee caskets, regrets that ‘There is 
no vice so simple but assumes / Some mark of virtue on his outwar d paris’ —  au 
example also offered by Quentin Skinner as part of his claim that ‘a number of 
episodes in the literature of this period presuppose an understanding of 
paradiastole and its uses’
As an example of the rhetorical construction of moral ambiguity, 
however, this example is surely far from ambiguous. On the contrary, the young 
man poised before the caskets is not only self-assured, but, in addition to this, is 
completely confident of his moral footing. When Bassanio speaks of ‘Hiding ... 
grossness with fair ornament’, he is referring to the practices of the hypocrite. 
Like the golden casket which opens to reveal a Death’s Head, Spenser’s Duessa, 
Skiimer’s other example, is eventually ‘despoild’, and, ‘robd of royall robes’, is 
presented to the ‘appall[ed]’ spectators as ‘A loathly, wrinclded hag, ill favoured, 
old’ (1.8.46). Both examples suggest that:
Wherever there is appearance there is also the removal of 
appearance, and where there is a mask, the lifting o f the mask; 
and this is not in the sense of some superficial happy ending 
but rather in the sense o f an elucidation, a clarification.
People, things and relationships are examined down to their 
real core, what is umeal and deceptive in them is uncovered, 
and truth and reality are brought to light’.
This observation fr om Wolfgang Clemen, made in an essay on ‘Appeaiance and 
Reality in Shalcespeaie’s Plays’, occurs after the ubiquitous allusion to the 
caskets, though here we ai e reminded, as is the unlucky Prince o f Morocco, that 
‘Gilded tombs do woims infold’.
To place such faith in the ‘elucidation’ achieved by the ‘lifting of the 
mask’, however, is to join forces with the satirist, who is committed (whether 
faithfully or otherwise) to disclosing ‘the worm beneath the skin’ and ‘the real
Skinner, ‘Moral Ambiguity’, p. 279 (italics in original).
Wolfgang Clemen, Shakespeare’s Dramatic Art: Collected Essays (London: Methuen, 1972), 
p. 173.
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body or character which hid behind cosmetics and pretentious clothing’ As 
Ian Gordon has noted, the satirist tends to describe himself ‘in an aggiessively 
militant way. He points, brands, dashes, bares, lashes and strips his enemy’. 
Duessa is punished for her duplicity by being thus humiliated, but what happens 
in cases where there are no clothes to strip, no veil to lift, no mask to remove?
Skinner is right to draw attention to the early modem cognisance of the 
deceptive properties of disguise. At the same time, he takes no account of the 
uneasy tension in which it existed alongside another (potentially far more 
alarming) conviction, especially evident in anti-theatrical writings, that, far fi'om 
being mere ‘costume’, clothing was constitutive, and, as such, had the ability to 
transform its wearer. ‘Investiture’, in the early modem period, as Ann Rosalind 
Jones and Peter Stallybrass have noted, was ‘the means by which a person was 
given a form, a shape, a social function, a depth’. R a t h e r  than being the 
‘supplements to a preconceived self, textiles, armour, and jewels were ‘the 
material forms out of which a hybrid subject was fashioned’. Described by 
them as ‘deep-wearing’, this theory is supported by Laura Levine, who claims 
that a ‘fear that costume could actually alter the gender of the male body beneath 
the costume’ was the driving force behind many early modern pamphlet attacks 
on the theatre.
The hypothesis itself has important implications for our discussion of 
rhetorical colour, and the figure of paradiastole in particular*. Although in his 
argument Skinner claims that paradiastole ‘challeng[es] and replac[es] 
descriptions instead of attempting to enhance them’, his literary examples show 
exactly that process of enhancement— the use of eloquence to paint out a rotten 
sepulchr e —  in operation. To envisage rhetorical colour as a cloak which
Mai'gai-et Felling, ‘Appearance and Reality: Barber-Siirgeons, the Body and Disease’, in A.L. 
Beier and Roger Finlay, eds., London 1500-1700: The Making o f a Metropolis (London and New 
York: Longman, 1986), p. 91.
Ian Gordon, A Preface to Pope, 2"*^  edn. (London and New York: Longman, 1993), p. 113. 
Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass, Renaissance Clothing and the Materials o f Memory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 3.
Ibid., p. 59.
Laura Levine, Men in Women’s Clothing: Anti-Theatricality andEffeminization, 1579-1642 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 3.
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‘covers’ something quite different, then, is to agree with Marion Trousdale that 
‘translations’ ‘provide the means by which the “bare and naked body” is “attired 
in rich and gorgeous appareil’”, when vernacular rhetoricians including Peacham, 
Puttenham and Wilson, all took pains to stress the ability of such translations to 
effect ‘alteration’.
One of the clearest examples o f this occurs in a text produced some time 
later, and in which ostentatious references to disguise ar e conspicuous by their 
absence. In The Art o f Sinking in Poetry, Alexander Pope (himself masquerading 
as Martinus Scribler*us) tells us ‘o f the Magnifying and diminishing Figures’ that 
a ‘GENUINE Writer of the Profund will take Care never to magnify any Object 
without clouding it at the same time’:
His Thought will appear in a tr*ue Mist, and very unlike what it 
is in Nature. It must always be remember’d that Darkness is 
an essential Quality of the Profound, or if there chance to be a 
Glimmering, it must be as Milton expresses it,
No Light, but rather Darlmess visible
Pope’s account of the ‘Magnifying and diminishing Figures’ seems at fh'st 
to echo Henry Peacham’s individual description of the rhetorical figure aenigma 
—  ‘a sentence of which for the darlmesse, there can be no certaynty gathered’.
But it is not long before Pope explicitly relates the power of these figuies to 
‘cloud’ or obfiiscate meaning to what he says ‘aie commonly call’d the Colours 
0 Ï Honourable and Dishonourable\ The crucial reference to ‘colours’ occurs 
shortly after Pope has solemnly reminded his readers that 'Gain or Profit... [is] 
the whole end of our Writers and Spea1œrs\^^  ^ In order that they might feel this 
benefit at once, Pope instincts his students on ‘the quickest Method’ o f 
composing the Dedication and the Panegyric. ‘Forasmuch as the Duty we owe 
the Publike’, he writes.
Martinus Scriblerus, The Art o f  Sinking in Poetiy, in Miscellanies in Prose and Verse [by X 
Swift, A. Pope and Others], 4 volumes (London, 1727), IV, p. 51,
The Garden o f Eloquence, sig. D2r. A facsimile of the 1577 edition.
Pope, The Art o f Sinking in Poetty, p. 77.
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doth often require that we should put some things in a strong 
Light and throw a Shade over others, I shall explain the 
Method of tuming a vicious Man into a Hero.
The first and chief Rule is the Golden Rule o f  
Transformation, which consists in converting Vices into their 
bordering Virtues. A man who is a spendthrift and will not pay 
a just Debt, may have his Injustice transform ’d  into Liberality;
Cowardice may be metamorphos’d into good Nature and good 
Fellowship, Coiruption into Patriotism, and Lewdness into 
Tenderness and Facility.
The ingenuity o f this account lies in the civility of its tone, which, when 
used by a writer capable of being vehemently ‘ Juvenalian’ —  of railing at the 
‘worm beneath the skin’ in good set terms —  also gives a sense of the intractable 
ambiguity of such rhetorical ‘ti-ansformations’. But the apparent moral certitude 
which allowed Pope to satirise those who use ‘the Duty [they] owe the Publike’ 
as an excuse to ‘tuin’ vicious men into heroes is, I would argue, nowhere 
apparent in Shalcespeare. The ‘Truth’ which Thomas Heywood claimed enabled 
men to ‘distinguish Fortitude from Rashnesse; Constancie from Perversenesse; 
Liberality fiom Profusenesse; [and] Friendship from Flatterie’, is no permanent 
fixture in Shalcespearean drama either. Unlike Spenser, Shakespeare never- 
created char acters named Una or Duessa.
Thus, while Judith Dundas may be correct in claiming that by the time he 
wrote Timon o f Athens, ‘Shakespeare had long been using the word “painted” to 
signify falsity of behaviour’, his actual use of ‘colour ’ is more radically 
ambiguous.When Shakespeare’s characters use or comment upon 
paradiastole they do so not from aside, nor in soliloquy, but in the context of 
discussion or debate. In addition to this, it is not always clear what the users of 
paradiastole have to ‘gain’ or ‘profit’ fi-om so doing. To be ‘call’d purgers, not 
murderers’ for killing Caesar ‘boldly but not wrathfully’ might well help Brutus
Ibid., pp. 78-9.
Thomas Heywood, The Hiérarchie o f the Blessed Angels (London, 1635), p. 279.
Judith Dundas, Pencil’s Rhétorique: Renaissance Poets and the Art o f Painting (London and 
Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1993), p. 86.
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and his fellow conspirators assume power after Caesar’s d e a t h / B u t  consider 
the conversation between Menteth, Cathness, Angus and Lenox in the final Act 
of Macbeth. When Menteth enquires after the movements of their sovereign, 
Cathness replies:
Great Dunsinane he strongly fortifies.
Some say he’s mad; others that lesser hate him.
Do call it valiant fury: but, for certain.
He cannot buckle his distemper’d cause 
Within the belt o f rule.^ ^^
It is not apparent here what separates those who believe Macbeth to be ‘mad’ 
from those who regard his actions as ‘valiant fury’, nor what the benefits might 
be of holding one opinion over the other. Perhaps the most important point, 
however, is that Cathness, a rebel against this ‘tyrant’, is not ‘certain’ which 
description best fits him either. And whilst the ‘belt’ within which Macbeth 
cannot buckle his mle might (at a stretch) qualify as one of the many ‘clothing’ 
metaphors in this play, there is certainly no sign of masks or veils in this 
particular exchange.
And then there is Isabella, who, as Angelo reminds us in Act II of 
Measure for Measure, ‘seem’d of late to make the law a tyrant, / And rather 
prov’d the sliding of [her] brother / A merriment than a vice’.^ ^^  Isabella’s 
attempt to excuse her brother’s crime is a perfect example of what Puttenham 
described as the effort to ‘excuse a fault, and to make an offence seem less than it 
is’. Is Isabella ‘miscall[ing] by a palatable name the evil’ to which Claudio is 
addicted? Or is she rather reminding Angelo that ‘all things should be taken in 
the better sence, and favourably construed’? Isabella has nothing to ‘gain’ or 
‘profit’ fi-om thus ‘transforming’ Claudio’s failings.
William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, ed. David Daniell (Walton-on-Thames; Thomas Nelson 
& Sons, 1998), 2.1.179; 2.1.171.
William Shakespeai e, Macbeth, ed. Kenneth Muir, rpt. (London and New York: Routledge, 
1994), 5.2.12-16.
William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, ed. J. W. Lever, ipt. (Walton-on-Thames: Thomas 
Nelson & Sons, 1997), 2.4.114-16.
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Chapter III 
White Lies and Blackened Characters
Better speake truth rudely, than lye covertly/
At the beginning of The French Lieutenant’s Woman, John Fowles’s 
narrator tells us how the travels abroad of Chailes, his young protagonist, ‘had 
regrettably rubbed away some of that patina of profound humoui lessness (called 
by the Victorians earnestness, moral rectitude, probity, and a thousand other 
misleading names) that one really required of a proper English gentleman of the 
time’/  I would like to begin this chapter with the example of another ‘English 
Gentleman’, though this time a rather more dubious one: Sh John Falstaff.
In the first Act o i l  Henry IV we come upon Falstaff and Prince Hal, the 
latter of whom is exercising his wit on his friend’s predilection for dishonest 
pastimes. The fat Icnight responds:
Maiiy, then, sweet wag, when thou art king, let not us that aie 
squires of the night’s body be called thieves of the day’s 
beauty; let us be Diana’s foresters, gentlemen of the shade, 
minions of the moon; and let them say we be men of good 
government, being governed as the sea is, by our noble and 
chaste mistress the moon; under whose countenance we steal/
This ‘simile game’, as Russ McDonald points out, is ‘recreational in two senses’:
it amuses the paiticipants, o f course, but it also represents their 
various efforts to make their conversation and their days and 
nights more vivid, less conventional and humdrum. Such 
verbal games keep the Prince fiom thinldng about his courtly 
responsibilities and keep Falstaff from facing the truth about 
himself, a tiuth he knows but prefers not to contemplate."^
‘ Wits Recreations, Selected From the Finest Fancies o f Moderne Muses (London, 1640), 
‘Outlandish Proverb’ 767.
 ^The French Lieutenant’s Woman, rpt. (London: Vintage, 1996), p. 22.
 ^William Shakespeare, IH em y IV, in Peter Alexander, ed., Shakespeare’s Histories (London and 
Glasgow: Collins, 1951), 1.2.22-7.
Shakespeare and the Art o f Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 67-8.
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Mrs Elizabeth Griffiths, the upright blue-stocking fiom whom we heard 
in Chapter I, would not have agreed more, with the last pait of McDonald’s 
account, at least. Herself determined to select, extract and confine, specific 
instances of ‘morality’, holding them up to view like so many butterflies pinned 
on felt, she, however, found rather more to despise in the ‘palliating epithets’ by 
which men ‘disguise the nature o f their vices’.^  For her, such ‘games’ had two 
‘dangerous consequences’; serving not only to ‘blunt the edge of remorse in 
ourselves’, but also to ‘induce a milder censure in others, upon the most flagrant 
enormities’:
Thus a profligate fellow, who debauches every women in his 
power, is stiled a man o f galantryf a pennyless adventuier, 
who carries off a rich heiress, is called a soldier o f fortune', a 
duellist, dubbed with the title o f a man o f honour, a sharper, un 
chevalier d ’industrie', an atheist, a free-thinker, and so forth.^
In this short passage Mrs Griffiths lends considerable support to Phyllis 
Rackin’s claim that ‘the questions with which we approach the past are the 
questions that trouble us here and now, and the answers we find (even when 
couched in the words of old texts) aie the products of our own selection and 
aiTangement’.^  Outwardly, at least, the assortment of deceivers whom Mrs 
Griffiths considered so alaiming would be more at home in an eighteenth-century 
novel than they would in a late sixteenth- or early seventeenth-centuiy play by 
Shakespeare.
But having passed judgement on Falstaff, Mrs Griffiths 
uncharacteristically refrains fi om pressing the immorality of this passage home. 
The specimen she dropped, however, was talcen up and re-examined, some two
 ^The Morality o f Shakespeare’s Drama Illustrated (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1971), p. 
207.
® Use of this particulai* ‘palliating epithet’ was clearly widespread. ‘As if  to put distance between 
their behaviour and the adulteiy that had as recently as the 1650s been a capital offence, English 
practitioners of the adulterous arts adopted the euphemism ‘gallantly’ to describe their activities’. 
See Roderick Phillips, Untying the Knot: A Short History o f Divorce (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 106.
’ Griffiths, Morality, pp. 207-208.
® Phyllis Rackin, ‘Historical Difference/Sexual Difference’, in Jean R. Brink, ed., Privileging 
Gender in Early Modern England (Kirksville, Missouri: Sixteenth Century Publishers, 1993), p. 
37.
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hundred yeai's later, by the twentieth-century Shalcespearean Anne Bai'ton— not, 
this time, as an illustrative example of what Mrs Griffiths called ‘deceitful 
phraseology’, but to demonstrate instead the ‘transforming power of language’/
Where Mi*s Griffiths elected to condemn Falstaff s effort to ‘disguise the 
nature of [his] vices’. Barton presents him as ‘an example of how to avoid the 
plain and consequential word “thief’, how to employ language to metamorphose 
fact’. ‘Falstaff s one aim’, she argues, ‘is to transform the facts of a world of 
time and harsh reality into more attractive entities. The distinguishing featuie of 
his wit is its extraordinary ability to malce things look like something they aie 
not’
Thus, Falstaff s management of words is important to Bai'ton, but not 
because it is immoral or wrong. Her treatment of him depends on a perception of 
language that is also appaient in Marion Trousdale’s account of the metaphorical 
‘transformations’ by which the ‘bare and nalced body’ is ‘attired in rich and 
gorgeous appareil’, so that it ‘seemeth to the common usage of th’ eye much 
more comely & bewtifull than the natural’. Sir John’s appropriation of the 
classical motifs best suited to di ape his occupation in a gauzy haze of 
romanticism provides a perfect example of how the ‘language o f the philosopher 
can be transformed so as to bring forth a golden world’. This world is populated 
by ‘gentlemen of the shade’, ‘minions of the moon’ and ‘Diana’s foresters’.
Since no philosophers dwell in Falstaff s world, no thief can dwell there either. 
Neither woman denies that Falstaff s aim is to ‘transfoim the world of time and 
harsh reality into more attractive entities’. They are separated only by the 
different moral value they attach to the talent of a shabby knight to ‘malce things 
look like something they aie not’.
We might call the linguistic strategy Falstaff is using here ‘euphemism’.
A concept familiar enough to us, the word ‘euphemism’, however, was absent 
from sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century dictionaries like Elyofs (1538) and 
Hemy Cockeram’s (1623) until 1656, when it appeared in Thomas Blount’s 
Glossographia with the accompanying definition, ‘a good or favourable
 ^Anne Barton, ‘Shakespeare and the Limits of Language’, Shakespeare Survey 24 (1971): 19-30, 
at p. 22.10 Barton, ‘Shakespeare’, p. 22.
105
inteipretation of a bad word’/^ It turns up again in Elisha Coles’s 1676 English 
Dictionary as ‘a speaking well of; putting a favourable interpretation on a bad 
word or thing’, but even by the eighteenth centuiy no complete naturalisation of 
the word ‘euphemism’ from the Vulgate euphemismus appeal's to have taken 
place: neither Thomas Sheridan, in his General Dictionary of the English 
Language (1780), nor Dr Johnson considered the word important enough to 
include.
One writer who did was John Smith, who described the rhetorical figure 
euphemismus as one ‘whereby in Scripture you shall finde a fair name put on a 
foul vice, and a word of a good and bad signification inteipreted to the better 
part’.^  ^ His emphasis on the way in which euphemismus puts a ‘fair name’ on a 
‘foul vice’ might lead one to infer that Smith harboured doubts about the moral 
integrity of this particular figure. Strangely, though, this is not the case, and in 
writing of euphemismus Smith is able to confoim to his practice of citing first 
‘ScriptuiaT then ‘English’ examples of each figure he describes. In the 
explication of euphemismus, indeed, scriptural examples far outnumber English 
ones; ‘[t]hus incest and adulteiy is sometimes exprest by a modest tearm of 
uncovering the nalcednesse: this you have in Lev. 18.6.20; 11,17. Ezek. 22.10’. 
The significant word here is ‘modest’: euphemismus, as Smith explains, ‘is also 
when things (which would offend a modest and chast ear) are vailed with 
periphrasis, or circumlocution’.^ ^
Published more than half a century after the handbooks by Puttenham and 
Peacham, Smith’s differs from theirs in its assignment of a separate name to this 
figuie. The Elizabethan rhetoricians settled instead for incorporating the practice 
of ‘vail[ing]’ ‘things which would offend a modest and chast eai ’ ‘with 
periphrasis or circumlocution’ into their discussions of these figures. In The 
Garden o f Eloquence, Peacham gives two accounts of periphrasis, as befits its 
status in his text as ‘a figure both of construction, and also of amplifycation’, 
‘when that whiche might be sayd with one word, or at the least with very fewe, is 
explicated with manye’.
“ Thomas Blount, G/oi'irograp/î/a (Menston: Scolar Press, 1969).
Thomas Smith, The Mysterie o f  Rhétorique Unveil’d  (London, 1657), p. 225. 
Ibid.
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Not usually a writer much inclined to playfulness, Peacham risks a little 
self-irony by tur ning his conclusion into a demonstration of what periphrasis is 
not: ‘[n]ow because I have exemplifyed it before among the figures of Gramer, I 
neede not here rehearse it agayne so largely’/"^  Where he has elaborated upon it, 
Peacham’s explanation of the practice of using many words instead of one is 
neatly divided in ‘three manner of wayes, by explication of the name ... as when 
for this word philosopher, we say a man o f studious wysedome’; ‘by annotation, 
that is when by certayne marks or signes we describe any thing, as ... for the 
spring time, we say that time, when trees begyn to bud, flowers to blossome, and 
Birdes to build their neastes’; and, by ‘diffinition, as for Rhetoricke, the Arte of 
spealcing well’. Only after explaining these types of periphrasis does Peacham 
move on to its usefulness as a tool for ‘vailing’ that which ‘would offend a 
modest and chast ear’; ‘this fygure’, he continues, ‘is used somtime for cause of 
necessity, to shun the playne telling of bashfull matters, and thinges foule to be 
spoken, as I must goe to the privy, for &c’.^ ^
Reluctant even to sinlc to substituting an ‘etcetera’ for the unveiled means 
of expressing such foul things as one’s desire to ‘goe to the privy’, Wilson 
modestly selects the example of ‘such a one defiled his body with such an evil 
woman’, to illustrate his ‘circumlocution’; ‘a laige description either to set forth 
a thing more gorgeously or else to hide it if  the ears cannot beai' the open 
speaking’.
Rather surprisingly, George Puttenham appears to have been slow to take 
advantage of the valuable opportunities for spar ing offence that the figure 
periphrasis offered his courtier-poets. This notwithstanding, his explanation of it 
—  ‘when we will not in one or a few words expresse that thing which we desire 
to have knowen, but do chose rather to do it by many words’ —  concurs with the 
definitions given by the other Elizabethan rhetoricians. In addition, Puttenham 
supplies a metaphor which brings periphrasis closer to our contemporary 
understanding of what is involved in speaking indirectly. A frustrated listener
Hemy Peacham, The Garden o f Eloquence (Menston: Scolar Press, 1971), sig. K3r. 
Ibid., sig. N lv.
Thomas Wilson, The Arte o f Rhétorique, ed. Thomas J. Derrick (New York and London: 
Garland Publishing, 1982), p. 201.
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today is more likely to resent a speaker for ‘going round the houses’, or for 
‘beating about the bush’ than he is to complain about his heavy-handed use of 
periphrasis. Four hundred years ago, though, Puttenham had already decided 
that this figure might be termed ‘somewhat o f the dissembler, by reason of a 
secret intent not appearing by the words, as when we go about the bush’/^
Rhetorical strategies that enabled a spealcer to skirt around an issue were 
also employed for purposes other than hiding a thing ‘if the ears cannot bear* the 
open speaking’, hr The Merchant o f Venice, for example, Bassanio’s recourse to 
the metaphor of the two lost aiTows defends, he hopes, against Antonio taking 
offence at yet another petition for cash. Here, Bassanio’s Icnowledge that it is to 
Antonio whom he ‘owe[s] the most in duty and in love’ prevents him from 
‘unburthening’ his ‘plots and purposes’ plainly or candidly. But ironically, 
Antonio’s response to Bassanio’s fable —  ‘You know me well, and herein spend 
but time / To wind about my love with circumstance’ —  betrays his regret that 
Bassanio thinlcs too little of him to speak directly.
An approach similar to the one taken by Bassanio is employed to much 
the same purpose by Claudio in Much Ado. Being more financially solvent than 
Bassanio, Claudio’s wooing of his ‘lady richly left’ does not depend on his 
convincing Don Pedro to unlock his purse. What each younger man is broaching, 
however, is his intention to embark on a project which will alter irrevocably the 
dynamic of liis relationship with his listener. Such changes require some 
explanation.
Thus Bassanio and Claudio both begin by circling warily round their 
subject; neither electing to attack the matter head on by speaking of their present 
condition. Bassanio’s ‘in my school-days, when I had lost one shaft, / 1 shot his 
fellow of the self-same flight / The self-same way’ (1.1.140-2), is matched in 
Much Ado by Claudio’s hop back in time to the point at which Don Pedio ‘went 
onward on this ended action’. D o n  Pedro’s reaction is not, as Antonio’s has 
been, to take offence at his friend’s speech. Instead, he warns Claudio that his
George Puttenham, The Arte o f English Poesie (Menston: Scolar Press, 1968), p. 203.
William Shakespeaie, The Merchant o f  Venice, ed. John Russell Brown, ipt. (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1994), 1.1.31 and 1.1.153-4.
William Shakespeare, Much Ado About Nothing, ed. A.R. Humphreys, rpt. (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1994), 1.1.276.
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indirection is liable to ‘tire the heaier with a book of words’ (1.1.287), especially 
when the ‘twist[ing] of so fine a stoiy’ (1.291) malces his real subject no less 
obvious. Clearly half relieved to have been thus discovered, Claudio admits to 
preparing for a more substantial build-up. Had he not been stopped he ‘would 
have salv’d’ the breaking of his news ‘with a longer tieatise’ (1.295), the bashful 
lover confesses.
Don Pedro’s answer must convince Claudio that he disapproves of such 
indirection. Fai* fiom being personally affronted by Claudio’s reluctance to speak 
home, Don Pedi'O suggests a better way of making excuses. ‘What need the 
bridge much broader than the flood?’, he asks, ‘the fairest grant is the necessity. 
Look what will serve is fit: ‘tis once, thou lovest, / And I will fit thee with the 
remedy’ (1.1.296-9). In addition to providing him with the ‘remedy’ for his as 
yet unrequited love, Don Pedro also offers Claudio an alternative to put in the 
stead of his ‘longer treatise’: dichologia, or the figuie of ‘brief excuse’. As if  
schooling him on how to behave in the futuie, Don Pedro instructs him in the 
ways of arguing by necessum (‘the fairest grant is the necessity’), and warns him 
against transgressing the boundaries of decoiiim (‘look what will serve is fit’).^ °
In pointing out his friend’s propensity to ‘tire [his] hearer’, Don Pedro 
simultaneously discourages Claudio’s use ofperiphrasis and instructs him in the 
various ways of ‘entiy’ into a defence of a cause. His comment on Claudio’s 
prolixity equates him with speakers who, according to Thomas Wilson, 
‘oftentimes begin as much from the matter as it is betwixt Dover and Bai wick, 
whereat some talce pity, and many for weariness can scant abide their beginning, 
it is so long or they spealc anything to the purpose’. D o n  Pedro’s maxims, or
My own reading of this exchange thus conflicts with the psychoanalytic one offered by Janice 
Hays, who suggests that ‘Claudio almost seems to be asking Don Pedro to protect him from the 
intensity of his feelings by seconding the young man’s tentative suggestion that he ought to 
exercise restraint. But instead o f advising caution and thus assuming the role that strong fathers 
customarily fill for then adolescent sons, Don Pedro rather urges Claudio to proceed without 
delay: “What need the bridge much broader than the flood?”’. See her ‘Those “soft and delicate 
desnes”: Much Ado and the Distrust o f Women’, in Carolyn Ruth Swift Lenz, Gayle Green and 
Carol Thomas Neely, eds., The Woman’s Part: Feminist Criticism o f Shakespeare (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1980).
Wilson, Arte, p. 138. Compare A.D. Nuttall’s recollection in Openings: Narrative Beginnings 
fi'om the Epic to the Novel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), o f Coleridge’s observation, ‘apropos 
of Mistress Quickly in Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part Two, that uneducated persons, lacking any 
firm sense of “point”, are obliged to recoimt an event laboriously from some point of 
acloiowledged origin far removed from the immediate needs of the listener’ (214).
109
sententiae, on speaking only of what is ‘fit’ and ‘necessary’ also capture 
succinctly Wilson’s requirement that the orator ensuie that his
beginning be not overmuch labouied nor curiously made, but 
rather apt to the purpose, seeming only on present occasion 
eveimore to take place, and so to be devised as though we 
speak altogether without any great study, framing rather our 
tale to good reason than our tongue to vain painting of the 
matter (138).
In some prefatory remarks to Book II o f the Arte, Wilson expands on his 
theories about ‘beginnings’, noting that ‘every matter hath a diverse beginning; 
neither all controversies or matters of weight should always after one sort be 
rehearsed, nor like reasons used, nor one kind of moving affections occupied 
before all men, and in every matter’ (133). In order to deal with all eventualities, 
Wilson begins by describing ‘An Entrance: Two Ways Divided’. Recasting the 
description of the ‘Direct Opening’ given in the Rhetorica Ad Herennium, he 
calls the first ‘a plain beginning, when the hearer is made apt to give good eat* out 
of hand to that which shall follow’; the second, equivalent to the Ad Herrenium’s 
‘Subtle approach’, is named ‘a privy twining or close creeping-in, to win favour 
by much circumstance, called insinuation’.^ ^
Since Don Pedro obviously counts Claudio’s intentions towards Hero as 
matters ‘honest, godly, and such as of right ought to be well liked’ it follows 
that he should advise him to use the ‘open beginning’. By twist[ing] so fine a 
stoiy, Don Pedro implies, Claudio risks giving the impression of needing to ‘win 
favour with much circumstance’: an approach only necessary ‘when the cause is 
dangerous and cannot easily be heard without displeasme’. A ‘privy beginning, 
or creeping-in, otherwise called insinuation’, stresses Wilson, ‘must then and not 
else be used, when the judge is grieved with us and our cause hated by the 
hearers’. So what might prejudice an audience against a cause in this violent 
fashion? Wilson lists tliree reasons: first, if  ‘either the matter self be unhonest 
and not meet to be uttered before an audience’; second, ‘if  the judge himself by a
Rhetorica Ad Herennium, ti ans. Hany Caplan (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), 1.6.9; Wilson, Arte, p. 133.
Wilson, Arte, p. 133.
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former tale be persuaded to talce part against us’; and finally, ‘if  at that time we 
aie forced to speak when the judge is wearied with hearing of others’
By this reckoning Claudio’s ‘cause’, his love for Hero, does not merit 
approach by insinuation. But Much Ado contains another pleader whose case is 
‘not liked’ for at least the first two of these reasons. When Claudio makes public 
his radically revised opinion of Hero, persuading the majority of the assembled 
company that she is ‘no maiden’ (4.1.87), the Friai* is faced with defending a 
cause in which it seems, quite literally, that ‘the matter self be unhonest’. Adding 
fiiel to the fire by giving her this title, Don John is also adamant that her ‘vile 
encounters’ with the ruffian at her window ar e ‘not meet to be uttered before an 
audience’: ‘Fie, fie’, he inten-upts, as Claudio prepares to give particulars, ‘they 
aie not to be nam’d my lord, / Not to be spoke of! / There is not chastity enough 
in language / Without offence to utter them’ (4.1.95-8).
Faced with such a hostile audience, including a father who asks why he 
seeks ‘to cover with excuse / That which appears in proper nakedness’ (4.1.174- 
5), there is no wonder that the Friai* hits upon a means of defending Hero which 
seems to epitomise the ‘subtle approach’. If Claudio thinks Hero is dead, he 
reasons:
Th’idea of her life shall sweetly creep 
Into his study of imagination.
And every lovely organ of her life
Shall come appareil’d in more precious habit.
More moving-delicate and full o f life.
Into the eye and prospect o f his soul 
Than when she liv’d indeed.^ ^
Ibid., p. 136, Wilson’s reasons correspond closely to the author of the Ad Herennium’s claim 
that there are ‘tlu ee occasions on which we cannot use the Direct Opening ... (1) when oui' cause 
is discreditable, that is, when the subject itself alienates the hearer from us; (2) when the hearer 
has apparently been won over by the previous speakers of the opposition; (3) or when the hearer 
has become wearied by listening to the previous speakers’ (1.6.9). In the De Inventione, in De 
Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica, trans. H.M. Hubbell, rpt. (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London; Harvard University Press, 1993), the youthful Cicero suggests 
similarly that the ‘insinuation’ is to be used when the case is difficult or ‘when the spirit of the 
audience is hostile’. He likewise claims tiiat such hostility ‘arises principally from three causes: if  
there is something scandalovB in the case, or if those who have spoken first seem to have 
convinced the auditor on some point, or if the chance to speak comes at a time when those who 
ought to listen have been wear ied by listening’ (1.17.23).
Much Ado, 5 A.230.
I l l
Not only does the Friar’s plan fail, its methods are in complete contrast to 
the directness privileged by Don Pedro and later by Claudio. In recommending a 
beginning wherein the idea of Hero will ‘creep / Into [Claudio’s] study of 
imagination’, the Friar quite literally eschews Wilson’s advice that one ‘spealc 
altogether without any great study’, and, by implication, indulges instead in ‘vain 
painting of the matter’. Not surprisingly, such winding, insinuative approaches 
did not have the best of reputations. In his dedicatoiy epistle to Philip Sidney, 
Stephen Gosson suggests that his own ‘homelie brought up’ character Phialo 
‘ought the more too [^ zc] be esteemed, bicause hee useth no going about the 
bushe, but treades Dunstable waye in all his travell’.^  ^ ‘A snake while she is 
living winds and tumes every way’, asserted Thomas Shelton, ‘but being dead is 
laid out straight and length: so wicked subtile men have many shifts and devises 
while they live, but when they die, all is discovered and laid open’.^  ^ In Much 
Ado, it is Don John’s ‘shifts and devises’, which, once discovered, allow for the 
‘rebirth’ of Hero. But even were this not the case, the Friar’s ‘winds and tumes’ 
hardly seem to warrant his relegation to the ranks of the ‘wicked subtile men’ 
described in Shelton’s simile. After all. Much Ado is a comedy, and in the 
comedies, according to Inga-Stina Ewbank, ‘we are obviously not asked for 
moral outrage at the feigning which is part o f the game of homo ludens'?^
In what remains of this chapter I would like to question Ewbank’s thesis 
by arguing that, even in the comedies, and in Much Ado in particular', certain 
Icinds of ‘feigning’ might well have been regarded with suspicion by an early 
modem audience. And I will do this, for reasons which I hope will become clear', 
by approaching the issue in the light of a text written some time later: William 
Thackeray’s Vanity Fair,
Set during the Napoleonic wars, Thackeray’s Vanity Fair depicts a society 
riddled with hypocrisy. Few of its members escape the charge of this vice:
Becky Sharpe, appropriately, does not, but she is called hypocrite less often than 
the benevolent, long-suffering Dobbin, and is only painted as black, in this
Stephen Gosson, The Ephemerides o f Phialo (London, 1586), p. 4.
Thomas Shelton, A Century o f Similes (London, 1640), pp. 32-3.
^ Inga-Stina Ewbank, ‘Shakespeare’s Liars’, in E.A.J. Honigmann, ed., British Academy 
Shakespeare Lectures 1980-89 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 91.
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respect, as her positively angelic friend Amelia. Seeing her father crumble under 
the shame of his financial ruin, Amelia determines ‘with all her might and 
strengtli to try and make [him] happy’, ‘walk[ing] him out sedulously into 
Kensington Gardens’ and listening ‘to his stories with untiring smiles and 
affectionate hypocrisy’ Becky, similarly, never lets her husband perceive the 
opinion she has of him, and consequently, Rawdon continues as what Thackeray 
describes as a ‘very happy... married man’. ‘Who has not seen a woman hide the 
dulness of a stupid husband or coax the fiiry of a savage one?’, he asks. ‘We 
accept this amiable slavishness, and praise a woman for it; we call this pretty 
treacheiy truth. A good housewife is of necessity a humbug’; ‘the best of women 
... are hypocrites’.^ ®
So what happens if this proposition is combined with Brian Vickers’s 
claim that ‘there are few women hypocrites in Elizabethan drama?’^^ Does it 
mean that a search through Shalcespeare, for example, would yield no woman fit 
to be called one of ‘the best’? Centuries of critics would argue otherwise: in that 
case, the nature of hypocrisy must have altered duiing the course o f the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or alternatively, Vickers is either wrong, or 
is understanding hypocrisy as a purely negative phenomenon. Given that he 
identifies ‘the liar and the hypocrite [as] enemies o f society since they pervert 
language to their own gain and other people’s harm’ (90), the latter option seems 
the more probable.
A further distinction must also be made between Vickers’s Elizabethan 
‘enemies of society’ and Thackeray’s hypocrites, those ‘domestic models, and 
paragons of female virtue’ (211): the distinction, that is, between telling the truth 
about oneself and telling the truth about others. Where Vickers speaks of ‘the 
pretence of good’ which is ‘a cover for the continuing practice o f one’s own 
faults', ‘adopted to achieve power, riches, or sensual giatification’ (90), the 
pretence Thackeray called hypocrisy meant ‘iiid[mg] the dulness’ of a stupid 
husband or father, and resulted in his ‘happiness’.
William Makepeace Thackeray, Vanity Fair, ed. J.I.M. Stewart, ipt. (London: Penguin, 1999), 
p. 664.
Ibid., pp. 210-11.
Brian Vickers, Returning to Shakespeare (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 94.
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In the first part of this section, I will be drawing on theological and 
secular texts from the period to explore the Renaissance provenance of, and 
attitude to, this kind of ‘good’ hypocrisy. In the second part, I will be situating 
Shakespeare’s Much Ado in the context of this debate. To dub the well- 
intentioned hypocrite the ‘enemy o f society’ is too harsh, perhaps; but certainly, 
the eaiiy modern suspicion of such pleasant perversions of the truth cannot be 
overestimated.
Where Thackeray’s falces are concerned, the contest between telling or 
not telling a person the truth about their faults takes place at a domestic or private 
level. Deviations from the truth like Amelia’s are not exactly condoned by 
Thackeray, as is shown by his deliberate mobilisation of the negative 
connotations attached to the word hypocrisy. This said, they aie problematised 
by his intimation that the alternative is to sacrifice at the altar of tmth the 
‘happiness’ of one’s nearest and dearest. Scholarly and historical evidence 
suggests that early modem subjects were not expected to experience a similai* 
division of loyalties. This was a period, according to Stephen Shapin, in which 
‘truthfulness continued to be an ideal’ Daniel Javitch has also noted how 
‘difficult [it is] to find any sanction o f personal modes of deception’ The veto 
on ‘personal’ deception is cmcial here. Even writers such as Justus Lipsius, who 
risked endorsing the political deception that served the state, still gave short shrift 
to the personal one. ‘Many good authors’ claim that to ‘intise another by a ... 
false tale’ ‘be lawfull in a Prince’, he aigued, but ‘it ought not to be amongst 
private persons’.
Friendship literature advised taking a similarly hard line with one’s 
closest companions. ‘So is he to be esteemed a tme and faithful friend’, wiote 
one B.M. in 1596, ‘which hath learned to reprove as well as soothe, and to make 
us sad, as wel as glad, and therefore we ought to have those in suspition, which 
alwaies aie pleasant with us, and sooth us up in al that we say or do’.^ ^
Steven Shapin, A Social History o f  Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth Centufy England 
(Chicago and London: University o f Chicago Press, 1994), p. 101.
Daniel Javitch, Poetty and Cow'tliness in Renaissance England (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1978), pp. 109-10.
Cited in Javitch, Poetry and Courtliness, p. 109n.2.
‘B.M.’, The Triall o f True Friendship (London, 1596), sig. D3.
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Opposition to engaging in such private or personal deceptions was more 
hardened in the Renaissance than in the nineteenth centuiy, apparently/^ Yet a 
similar tension did exist in the earlier period, and, ironically, is most evident in 
explicitly moral or religious texts. In this case, the problem is not that complete 
ti'uth-telling thieatens a harmonious home-life, but that it constitutes a 
fundamental rejection of Christian charity. John Holme, for example, begins his 
lament on the preposterous state of an entire people unwilling to ‘beare one 
anothers buiden’ (sig. E2v) in terms that would be echoed soon after in Bussy 
D’Ambois’s assessment of a French couit in which ‘Reward goes backward, 
honour on his head’ :
We have a figure in Rhetoricke, called histeron proteron, and 
yet no figure now a dayes, because it is the truth it selfe ... The 
shippe of the worlde by the waves of wickednesse is turned 
upside down; the heaven that was above is now below, and the 
earth which was belowe, is now above; wisdome is follie, and 
follie is wisdome; love, which was a cover for sinne, and as 
strong as the grave, is now as weake as water, and bewrayeth 
all sinne.^ ^
As we saw in Chapter I, Paul Baynes’s Briefe Directions unto a Godly 
Life also contains a lament on ‘how readily occasions are taken in thinking evill 
of others, how lightly men esteem of hmting others ... [and] how there is no 
meekenesse or mildnesse to forbeare others’/^ A hundred pages later finds 
Baynes still worrying away at this same theme. His section on the duties 
belonging to the ‘name’ o f our neighbour, however, looks set to reconcile some 
of the contradictions inherent in the Christian’s obligation to combine tnrth- 
telling with an active demonstration of charity and forbearance. Attainment of 
the ideal, as Baynes has it, demands that we
rejoice in our neighbouis credit, and sorrow for their infirmities 
... cover their faultes, through love, of whom we have hope, yet 
not by flatterie or dissembling, but by Christian admonition and
Not until 1679, for example, does ‘Irony’, a character in Samuel Shaw’s Words Made Visible 
(Menston: Scolar Press), suggest that ‘dissimulation and deceit are as necessaiy to the practice of 
Vertue as to the propagation of Vice’ (117-18).
John Holme, The Burthen o f the Ministerie (London, 1592), sig. B2v.
Paul Baynes, Briefe Directions unto a Godly Life (London, 1618), pp. 78-9.
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rebuke, not to bewray a secret, when it may be safely and 
without displeasing of God be kept in; for every truth, and the 
whole truth is not alwaies to be uttered, though all kinde of 
slaundering be abhoned/^
In a passage unusual for its willingness to grapple with the practicalities 
of this issue, Baynes shows how the good Christian’s reluctance to harp on his 
neighbour’s wrongdoing is rather a modification than a contradiction of the 
command in Ecclesiastes that he ‘Tell [his] friend his fault lest he be ignorant, 
and say: I have not done it, or if  he have spoken [,] that he do it no more’/®
While this scriptural precept seems to jar with the Christian’s duty to ‘cover’ his 
neighbour’s indiscretions, Baynes is evidently conscious that going to the other- 
extreme, and not telling him, may smack of ‘flatterie and dissembling’. What 
remains is for the charitable neighbour- to dispense ‘Christian admonition and 
rebulce’, an enigmatic hnperative upon which Baynes elaborates no further.
A different opinion again was given by Abraham Fleming in A 
Monomachie o f Motives in the Mind o f Man, where ‘Due Correction’ is set in 
diametrical opposition to the ‘Excusing of Sirme’, in what he calls the ‘Battell 
betweene VERTUES and VICES of contrarie qualities’. A translation of the De 
Conflictu Vitiorum et Virtutum, this speaker-less ‘dialogue’ moves through a 
series of ‘assault[s] given by the sinne’, each of which is followed by a ‘repulse 
given by the vei-tue’. In this respect, Fleming’s text is a potential minefield in its 
open presentation of the persuasive case for vice as well as virtue. Even so, its 
author- is clearly unaware of the existence of a grey area between ‘due correction’ 
and its contrai-y, ‘the excusing of sin’. No advocate of a ‘sparing correction’ left 
even partially vulnerable to charges of flatter-y, Fleming praises God for instilling 
in his prophets ‘such measure of thy spirit, that they discharged their duties with 
all singlenes, truth, and uprightnes, checking and rebuking mightie kings for their 
transgressions’."^  ^ There was nothing remotely ‘sparing’, he implies:
in Samuel sharplie reprooving Saule for his rebellion: in 
Nathan severlie rebuking David for his adulterie: in Aniian 
roughlie reprehending Jeroboam for his idolâtrie: in Elijah
Ibid., pp. 175-7.
The precept is cited by Thomas Cogan, in The Well ofWisedome (London, 1577), p. 39. 
Abraham Fleming, A Monomachie o f Motives in the Mind o f Man (London, 1582), p. 76.
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boldlie checking Ahab for his apostasie: in Hanani stoutlie 
twiting Asah for his mistinstfulnes: in Jeremie controlling 
Zedekiah for his disobedience, and so consequentlie in the rest 
of thy servants both Prophets and Apostles’.
This prayer for strength with which to emulate the sharp, rough, and bold 
behaviour of his exemplary prophets proves Fleming unmindful of the hurtful 
consequences of a truth-teller’s refusal to ‘spare’ a wrong-doer. His reference to 
the ‘vaine motions, which may withdraw us fi-om rating them, that most 
apparentlie offend thy divine majesty’, makes plain exactly where Fleming’s 
allegiances lie."^  ^ The onus for him is on the offence to God that merits the giving 
of due correction; that one may offend men in the process of so doing is of no 
account at all.
If the antagonism between these various directives results in a corpus of 
advice ambiguous enough to confuse any man, contemporai-y accounts suggest 
that the early modem woman’s relation to tmth-telling was even more fraught.
As Kate Aughterson has observed, the ideology of a woman’s behavioui- was in 
this period defined in relation to the power of the man, and linked explicitly with 
a well-stocked house."^ "^  Her relation to truth-telling was, apparently, no 
exception. Indeed, this same associative link between a woman’s skill in 
household management and her private interactions with her husband is 
maintained by Henry Smith in his 1591 Preparative to Marriage, ‘Though she 
be a wife, yet sometimes she must observe the servant’s lesson... and hold her 
peace to keep the peace’, he asserted. ‘Though a woman... have many good 
points yet if  she be a shrew her troublesome janing in the end will make her 
honest behaviom* unpleasant, as her over-pinching at last causeth her good 
housewifery to be evil spoken o f
Strange as it seems that Smith should imagine the loquacious shrew as a 
miser rather than an extravagant spend-thiifr, his confused metaphor upholds the 
link between a woman’s discourse and her responsibilities as a housewife. The
Ibid., p. 76.Ibid., p. 77.
See Kate Aughterson, ed., Renaissance Woman: A Sourcebook: Constructions o f Femininity in 
England (London and New York; Routledge, 1995), p. 67.
Hemy Smith, A Preparative to Marriage (London, 1591), p. 71.
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same eye to ‘economy’ appears in Richard Brathwait’s recommendation that 
bachelors ‘Chuse [a wife] that’s so discreet knows when to spare, / When to 
expresse herselfe in bounty, so / As neither niggard-nature may have share in her 
nor lavishnes’; to choose one who ‘know[s] when and where to spare or spend’ 
Strong objections were inevitably raised by the writers of conduct 
literature to the wife who ‘publish[ed her husband’s] infirmities’/^ That she 
‘must not discover her husband’s imperfections and faults to any’ was the 
seventh duty belonging to a wife, according to William Vaughan’s list in The 
Golden Grove (1608)/^ On the question of whether this ‘any’ included the 
husband himself, there was rather less agreement. ‘If she have occasion to tell 
him of a fault’, hypothesised William Gouge, ‘therein she ought to manifest 
humilitie and reverence, by observing a fit season, and doing it after a gentle 
manner’ Directing his Mirrour o f Modesty ‘to the weaker sexe, unto whose 
use it seemes most proper’, Martin Day made the following perplexing 
pronouncement on how a wife should deal with her husband’s lapses. ‘A Wife is 
for many good resemblances compared to a Conscience’, he begins:
... both prie into our actions, examine, discusse and censure them 
with a strict and impartiall judgement... either clearing the 
suspected, or condemning and lashing the delinquent... The 
quiet spirited woman, like the good Angel of the house ... 
judgeth uprightly, concealeth all infirmities, gently reproveth 
enormious faults, yet never driveth to despaire, but with a storme 
of threats mingles hope and comfort.^ ®
For the early modern woman in sear ch of guidance on how much truth to tell her 
husband, Day’s suggestions, surely, could hardly have been less helpful. 
Considering her obligation to be strict in ‘condemning and lashing’ her husband; 
to ‘conceal’ all his infirmities, but also to ‘gently reprove his enormious faults’, 
Day’s exemplary woman needs must have been verging on the schizophrenic.
Whilst their target audiences and their approaches differ, these accounts 
are alike in their tendency to focus on whether and how to tell the truth to the
Richard Brathwait, The Good Wife: or, A Rare One Amongst Women (London, 1618), sig. B2v. 
Smith, Preparative, p. 70.
William Vaughan, The Golden Grove, in Aughterson, ed., Renaissance Woman, p. 98. 
OfDomesticall Duties (London, 1622), p. 284.
Martin Day, The Mirrour o f Modesty (London, 1629), pp. 54-5.
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peipeù'ator o f some specific ‘transgression’. What is omitted from their 
discussion of truth-telling, and what seems conspicuous by its absence from early 
modem treatments of lying, is evidence o f what we might refer to as the ‘white 
lie’: the one told, not in an overtly political context, or for personal gain in its 
strictest sense, but to avoid offending a person or to spare his feelings. An 
example like this can be found, though not, significantly, in a text about lying, 
but rather in the 1576 translation of Francesco Patrizi’s Moral! Methode o f Civill 
Policye.
The episode tells of the questionable personal hygiene habits of Hiero of 
Syi'acusa; the marginalia invites the reader to dwell upon ‘a modest aunswere of a 
chaste Layde’, Hiero’s wife. The text expands:
Hiero ... being on a tyme chidden by a certein familier ûende of 
his because his breath did stincke ... sayd [that] hee never knewe 
so muche in himselfe before that tyme, & blamed his wyfe, in 
that shee had never admonished hym thereof: to whome his wyfe 
modestly excusinge herselfe: sayde, husband be not angrye with 
mee, for I thought all mennes mouthes had smelled so, and 
therefore I kept silence.^ ^
Whether calculated or not, the effect of this chaste lady’s actions is to 
avoid offending her husband. Yet even this example does not qualify as a white 
lie in the sense that, say, Marlow’s answer to the ‘Intended’ in Comad’s Heart o f  
Darkness does. Hiero’s wife is not really lying at all, in fact, since she spares his 
feelings by ‘keeping silence’, simultaneously ‘holding her peace to keep the 
peace’, and complying with Baynes’s recommendation that ‘every tmth, and the 
whole truth is not alwaies to be uttered’.
Like many of the Renaissance attitudes to lying and truth-telling, the 
authority for Baynes’s justification o f withholding certain truths derives from St 
Augustine’s On Lying. It would be an understatement to describe Augustine’s 
prescriptions on lying as strict; even so, his claim that it is ‘never lawful’ to tell a 
lie is subsequently modified by an admission that it is lawful ‘to conceal at fitting
Francesco Patrizi, A Morall Methode o f Civill Policye, bans. R. Robinson (London, 1576), p. 
43.
Baynes, Briefe Directions, p. 176.
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time whatever seems fit to be concealed’ Choosing to deal with uncomfortable 
truths by holding one’s tongue, then, was not forbidden either by Augustine or by 
his early modern explicators. But while ‘secrecy’, or even ‘dissimulation’ (the 
intentional withholding of truth when truth might be deemed appropriate) was 
sometimes permitted, simulation (the positive intentional act or utterance that 
leads others to believe what is not true) was reckoned far more culpable. Thus 
it comes as no shock to find Augustine had condemned ‘without any hesitation’ 
the kind of lie we might now describe as ‘white’, fixing especially on
those who by a lie wish to please men, not that they may do 
wrong or bring reproach upon any man ... but that they may be 
pleasant in conversation. ... [T]hese lust to please by agreeable 
talk, and yet would rather please by saying things that were true, 
but when they do not easily find true things to say that are 
pleasant to the hearers, they choose rather to tell lies than to hold 
their tongue.^ ^
In his accormt Augustine details eight types of lies and ranks fifth ‘what is 
done with desire of pleasing by agreeableness in talk’ (408), imambiguously 
placing it, along with ‘the capital lie’ and the lie that ‘hmt[s] some man unjustly’, 
among the lies that must be ‘utterly eschewed or rejected’ (408). Willing to 
concede the ‘usefulness’ of the ‘virtuous and merciful lie’, which may, perhaps, 
be serviceable to a sick man’s weak health (388), he will not admit that a similar 
benefit might issue firom the lie which spares someone’s feelings. Pretending to a 
person that his ‘father or grandfather was a good man, when he was n o t... or that 
he has served with the army in Persia, though he never set foot out of Rome’
(403) is the type of lie that does ‘much harm’ to its teller, Augustine concludes, 
for it proves that he ‘want[s] to please people better than the truth’ (403).
Implicit in Augustine’s reference to calling a person’s ‘father or 
grandfather a good man when he was not’ is a motivation not unlike the one that 
prompts Mai'low to lie to the Intended: to tell the lie we might call ‘white’. 
Avoiding, at first, having to spealc dishonestly, Marlow tells her the unfaithful
On Lying, in Seventeen Short Treatises of S. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, trans. Rev. H. 
Browne (Oxford: John Hemy Parker, 1847), p. 402.
See Shapin, Social Histoiy, p. 103 
Augustine, On Lying, pp. 402-3.
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Kmtz has ‘died as he lived’ Pushed further, his ‘anger subsiding] before a 
feeling of infinite pity’, he tells the Intended that her name, not ‘the Horror! ’, was 
the last word Kmtz ever spoke. The truth he ‘could not tell her’, Marlow says, ‘It 
would have been too dark —  too dark altogetherIron ically , though, 
Augustme’s equivalent to this kind of lie, the stimulus for which he claims is to 
‘be pleasant in conversation’, bears almost no resemblance to the first citation of 
the ‘white lie’ given in the OED. The dictionary offers an excerpt from a mid 
eighteenth-century edition of a magazine, in which
A certain Lady of the highest Quality ... makes a judicious 
distinction between a white Lie and a black Lie. A white lie is 
that which is not intended to injure any Body in his Fortune,
Interest, or Reputation but only to gratify a garTulous Disposition 
and the Itch of amusing people by telling them wonderful 
stories.
Comparisons are odious. According to the eighteenth-centmy Lady of 
Quality, white lies are certainly related to the desire of ‘pleasing by agreeableness 
in talk’, but the end product of such a lie: to amuse people by telling them 
wonderful stories, and its motive: to gratify a garrulous disposition, introduces a 
new element of humour into the equation that is unprecedented in Augustine, hr 
On Lyings in fact, Augustine ‘set aside’ from the outset ‘jokes, which have never 
been accoimted lies, seeing they bear with them in the tone of voice, and in the 
very mood of the joker a most evident indication that he means no deceit’. I  
would, however, suggest that the gulf which seems to separ ate the definitions 
given by Augustine and the Lady o f Quality is not actually so wide, and that the 
gap is bridged by a text written in the Renaissance. The link is provided by John 
Downame’s 1636 Treatise Against the Sinne o f Lyings and occms specifically in 
the section on ‘the Divers sorts of Lyes’. Coming to the ‘merry lye’, Downame 
describes it as one
wherein the Iyer propoundeth this end onely, that hee may 
delight his hearer, and not deceive him, or so farre onely to
Joseph Comad, Heart o f Darkness, ed. Robert Hampson, ipt, (London: Penguin, 2000), p. 122. 
Ibid., pp. 122-3.
Augustine, On Lying, p. 383.
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deceive, as that thereby he may delight him. For there ar e some 
(as Saint Augustine saith) who desire by their lyes to please men, 
not that they may injure or reproch any, but that they may bee 
sweete and pleasant in their talke. Now these differ from other 
lyars in this, that they delight to lye, reioycing in the deceit it 
selfe; but these delight to please with the urbanity and 
sweetenesse of their speech, who had rather please by uttering 
tmthes; but when as they cannot frnde true things which are 
acceptable to their hearers, they choose rather to lye, than to hold 
their peace. Now such lyes are either so cunningly fram’d ... that 
they deceive the hear er, and afterwards delight him, when he 
discemeth the jest and findeth his errour; or else spun with so 
course a thread ... that the hearer plainely discovereth them, and 
is onely delighted with the artificiall absurdities ... of the tale ...
So that the hearer is no way deceived by it, knowing that it is 
spoken in jest to move delight.
In spite of his signalled use of Augustine as an authority here,
Downame’s explication is actually a coiTuption of the church father’s text. What 
he does in effect is to conflate Augustine’s observation on jokes with his 
condeirmation o f ‘pleasant speaking’, neglecting Augustine’s emphasis on 
sparing offence and maldng humour its raison d’etre. Closer in time to the 
eighteenth-century than to Augustine, Downame’s teller of lies which delight 
then hearer seems, somewhat uncannily, to anticipate the Lady of Quality’s teller 
of wonderful stories. The lie that is pleasant or agr eeable insofar as it leaves a 
person’s feelings intact, seems to have vanished altogether.
But as home to at least three major deceptions — one malicious and two 
benign, Shakespeare’s Much Ado is certainly a play that engages with our own 
concept o f the white lie. If John Keri'igan’s dating of the sonnets is accurate, in 
fact, it appears that Shalcespeai'e was thinking about this very subject during the 
period of the play’s composition. Soimet 72, in particular, makes specific 
reference to the ‘virtuous lie’ the sonneteer imagines his beloved will be tempted 
to ‘devise’ after his death.®® The repeated references to the ‘shame’ this widowed 
partner should feel ‘to love things nothing worth’, and the poet’s request that his 
‘name be buried where [his] body is’, are echoed in the epitaph which Claudio
John Downame, A Treatise Against the Sinne o f  Lying (London, 1636), pp. 69-70.
John Kemgan, ed., The Sonnets and A Lover’s Complaint, ipt. (London: Penguin, 1995), 72.5. 
See also A. Kent Hieatt, Charles W. Hieatt and Anne Lake Prescott, ‘When Did Shakespeare 
Write Sonnets 1609?’, Studies in Philology 88 (1991): 69-209.
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VOWS to hang on Hero’s tomb —  a tomb from which she emerges alive, having 
died ‘but whiles her slander liv’d’ (5.4.66).
Thus the paradoxical representation of a love so ‘true’ that it seems false 
is paralleled at the level of theme in Much Ado by the Friar’s concealment of the 
still living Hero in the monument. The play’s other significant ‘deception’, the 
gulling of Beatrice and Benedick, also seems to qualify as a ‘white lie’ in the 
sense that we understand it: namely, as ‘a deception rendered venial or praise 
worthy by its motives’.
Equally important fr om a historical perspective is the relative proximity 
of Much Ado to Downame’s text, wherein Augustine’s deception by pleasant 
speaking undergoes a transformation into the ‘merry lie’. This is not a question 
of influence, of course, since Downame post-dates Shakespeare’s drama by some 
forty year's. Nevertheless, in a play that draws from sources obsessed with the 
theme of deception, it is perhaps no accident that one of his own additions to 
these various plots, Beatrice, also ranks among his most self-proclaimed amusers 
of people.
Affronted by the claim that her wit is culled from ‘the “Hundred Meny 
Tales’” (2.1.120), Beatrice is a woman who herself admits having been ‘born to 
speak all mirth and no matter’ (2.1.310-11). In possession of an equally ‘meny 
heart’ is, o f course. Benedick, who returns to Messina, we are told, ‘as pleasant 
as ever he was’ (1.1.34). Yet sometliing always distinguishes the descriptions 
given of these characters’ respective good humour. Though Leonato hopes their 
guests will not ‘mistake’ his niece’s part in the ‘meny war’ (1.1.55) between 
Benedick and her, Beatrice’s wit is seldom mentioned without an accompanying 
reference to its severity. Reflecting while alone upon the ‘base, though bitter 
disposition of Beatrice’, Benedick then tells Don Pedro how she ‘huddl[ed] jest 
upon jest with such impossible conveyance upon me that I stood like a man at a 
mark, with a whole army shooting at me. She speaks poinards’, he adds, ‘and 
every word stabs’ (2.1.227-32). References to Benedick, by contrast, allow that 
he is ‘mer-ry’, while what are aimed as insults at the inefficient dulness of his wit 
actually serve to underline its harmlessness. As Don Pedro reports, Beatrice 
judges his description of Benedick’s ‘good wit’ ‘just’, since ‘it hurts nobody’
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(5.1.161); for Margaret, too, his wit is ‘as blunt as the fencer’s foils, which hit, 
but hurt not’ (5.2.14). This ‘most manly wit’ that ‘will not hurt a woman’ 
Benedick owns to having and also attiibutes to his other male friends. Ironically, 
even as he prepares to take revenge upon Claudio for speaking the words he 
thinks have killed Hero, Benedick claims he ‘break[s] jests as braggarts do their 
blades, which God be thanked hurt not’ (5.1.184-5).
Physically, Claudio’s words have not harmed Hero, who ‘died but whiles 
her slander liv’d’. Before finding this out, though, Claudio has set about refuting 
Antonio’s assessment of him and Don Pedro as ‘Scrambling, outfacing, fashion- 
mongering boys, / That lie, and cog, and flout, deprave, and slander’ (5.1.94-5). 
However glaring are Claudio’s faults, Shakespeare seems anxious to acquit this 
boy of the sin o f lying. ‘Impose me to what penance your invention / Can lay 
upon my sin’, he tells Hero’s father, ‘yet sinn’d I not / But in mistaking’ (5.1.267- 
9). In giving Claudio these lines, Shakespeare was making an unequivocal 
statement about his honesty. In their actual definitions of lying, early modem 
writers on the subject varied little: lying involved speaking contrary to what one 
believed to be true. Whether it was actually true was irrelevant. ‘There is great 
difference betweene lying, and telling or speaking a lye or untruth’, wrote 
Downame,
for in a lye the tongue disagreeth fr om the minde, and falsely 
spealceth contrary to that which the mind thinketh... [Wjhen a 
man speaketh that which is a lye or untruth being perswaded that 
it is true, hee lyeth not, because his minde and tongue agreeth 
together, and he thinketh what he speaketh, but he onely erreth 
and would not willingly deceive, but that himselfe is first 
deceived; so that such a one cannot be said to be a Iyer, seeing 
he mindeth, affecteth and loveth Tmth, but is onely mistaken in 
what hee saith through ignorance, rashnesse or incogitancie.®^
As the ‘mistaking’ Claudio is explicitly cleared of this sin so implicitly is 
Benedick, who, Don Pedr o claims, ‘hath a heart as sound as a bell, and his tongue 
is the clapper; for what his heart thinks his tongue speaks’ (3.2.11-13). In 
contrast to the many references to the veracity and docility of male speech ar e set 
the injurious words of Beatrice. This does not automatically malce Beatrice a liar
Downame, Treatise Against Lying, 19.
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or a hypocrite either. What is interesting is her position in a play where both plot 
and sub-plot depend for their resolution on well-intentioned lies, written in a 
period, moreover, in which a more general anxiety about the mendacity latent in 
pleasant speaking manifested itself, in at least one wi'iter, as a mistrust of 
humour.
Viewing Much Ado in this light destabilises its more usual reading, 
wherein Beatrice is applauded for her wit and Claudio tends to rank alongside 
A ll’s WelPs Bertram as one o f Shakespeare’s more odious romantic heroes. 
Further, in a context in which Beatrice herself is the victim of Hero’s promise to 
‘truly devise some honest slander’ (3.1.84), the actions and speech of these 
women each serve to cast a shadow of suspicion over the other. Yet while 
Hero’s oxymoronic ‘false sweet bait’ looks forward to the ‘pretty treachery’ 
practised by Thackeray’s benign hypocrites, Beatrice’s position remains 
ambiguous. For her character seems to prefigure that of the eighteenth-century 
lady’s teller of wonderful stories, whose garrulous disposition is gr atified by 
amusing people. But Beatrice does not fulfil that lady’s most important 
condition. To be counted innocuous these words must not injirr'e, and Beatrice’s, 
we are constantly reminded, are not nearly so benign.
It would be facetious to claim that Beatrice deserves a place in Brian 
Vickers’s gallery of hypocrites, alongside Richard III and lago. Unlike them, she 
does not adopt a pretence o f good as a cover for the continuing practice of her 
own faults, in order to achieve power, riches, or sensual gratification. At the 
same time, it is implied that the faults she has been prone to are rather continued 
than abandoned. Her compulsion to ‘spell [every good man] backward’ (3.1.61) 
is still in evidence at the play’s close, in Benedick’s reference to her ‘wit so 
forcible’, that It frights ‘the word out of his right sense’ (5.2.52-3). For many 
audiences, Beatrice’s wit, powerful enough, claims Hero, to ‘press [her] to 
death’, is what makes her one of the best of Shakespeare’s women. Lingering in 
these and Benedick’s words, however, is the suggestion that this ‘pleasant- 
spirited lady’, as Don Pedro calls her, is also capable of perverting language to 
other people’s harm. Which of these appraisals is the more accurate, the play 
leaves radically uncerfain.
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Chapter IV 
The Ethics of Negligence
Affection should not be too shaip-Eyed, and 
Love is not to be made by magnifying Glasses/
In an article printed in The Guardian in May of 1999, Alexander
Chancellor expressed an opinion which would not by most standards be 
considered tenibly controversial. Set out in a boldly prominent typeface, it 
heralds his conviction that ‘we should all be allowed to pull the wool over our 
own eyes; this is a basic human right’.^  Lying to oneself is much better than 
lying to others, this writer implies, and indeed, there seems little harm in the kind 
of self-deception to which he refers. Chancellor is a journalist whose subject is 
the vanity that stops people revealing then true age, not a spokesperson for 
Amnesty International, and whilst claiming for himself this ‘basic human right’, 
the columnist’s tongue stays firmly in his cheek. But what is striking is how 
reasonable he sounds. Pausing over his leisur ely Saturday morning cup of coffee, 
the average reader is likely to agree with Chancellor that deceiving oneself is an 
individual’s prerogative, whereas for early seventeenth-century writer Daniel 
Dyke, indulging in ‘that which we may call selfe-deceif had ‘farre more deepe 
and dangerous’ consequences than deceiving others.^
Yet we need not look back four hundred years, or even at a strident 
religious treatise, to encounter beliefs much removed from those held by 
Chancellor. In 1927 T.S. Eliot noticed Othello’s talent for pulling the wool over 
his own eyes and called it bovarysme —  or ‘the human will to see things as they 
are not’."^ Not content merely to comment in passing on this human foible, F.R. 
Leavis launched a fiill-scale attack on such self-inflicted sightlessness. His
 ^ Sir Thomas Browiie, Christian Morals, in Sir Geoffrey Keynes, ed., Sir Thomas Browne: 
Selected Writings (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), p. 219.
 ^‘Senior Disservice’, The Guardian, 15* May 1999, p. 7.
 ^Daniel Dyke, The Mystery ofSelfe-Deceiving, 7* edn. (London, 1622), p. 38.
* T.S. Eliot, ‘Shakespeare and the Stoicism o f Seneca’, in Selected Essays (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1932), p. 131.
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characteristically aggressive contribution to the debate appeared in the foim of 
‘Diabolic Intellect and the Noble Hero’, an example of literary criticism at its 
most personally critical. The humanist most routinely sacrificed at the altar of 
1980s materialist criticism, Leavis also seems to provide a blueprint for ‘the 
subject of liberal humanism’ constructed by Catherine Belsey. His determination 
to expose Othello’s ‘ignorance of se lf (and to criticise the ‘self-idealisation’ 
facilitated by this ‘blindness’) is what makes Leavis the quintessential liberal 
humanist, for whom ‘self knowledge’ is ‘knowledge in its highest form’.®
In this particular essay, Leavis’s censur e is not reserved for the products 
of Shalcespeare’s imagination either. A.C. Bradley is also hauled before his jury 
of readers, once identified by Lionel Trilling (significantly, in this context) as ‘a 
gifted and conscious ... new social class’.® Before them, the author of 
Shakespearean Tragedy stands accused of several crimes, and is found in 
possession of a ‘resolute fidelity’ to the wearing of ‘blinlcers’: eye-wear 
singularly appropriate for a man who ‘prefers not to recognise’ that Othello’s 
‘plunge into jealousy poses us an insoluble problem’.^  For Leavis, Bradley is an 
accomplice more culpable than Othello himself in the Moor’s project of ‘self- 
deception’. Ten times Leavis reminds us how ‘plain’ this is to ‘anyone who can 
read’; ‘but we must not suppose’, he adds, acerbically, ‘that Bradley sees what is 
in front of him’.^
Leavis did not devote thirty year's of his life to a literary journal called 
Scrutiny for nothing. ‘An audacious polemicist and a judge’, determined to ‘train 
a generation in the disciplines o f critical thinking’,^  he was in many ways less 
tolerant of ‘self-deception’ than early moder-n puritan polemicists such as Dyke. 
Though this ear lier writer regar ded self-deceiving as a sin against God, even he 
realised how the ‘intricate ... turmngs of the dark Labyrinths of mans heart’ mean
 ^Catherine Belsey, The Subject o f  Tragedy (London: Methuen, 1985), p. 55.
 ^Lionel Trilling, B^ond Culture (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1966), p. 172 (italics mine).
 ^F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1952), pp. 140 and 159.
® Ibid., pp. 149 and 137.
 ^Robert Boyers, F.R. Leavis: Judgment and the Discipline o f Thought (Columbia and London: 
University of Missouri Press, 1978), p. 2. See also Anne Samson, F.R. Leavis (Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), Chapter I, ‘Leavis and the Growth of English Studies’.
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that ‘nothing is more easie than for a man to deceive himselfe’.^ ® In his Christian 
Morals, Thomas Browne argued similarly that ‘the greatest imperfection is in our 
inward sight... and while we are so sharp sighted as to look through others’ we 
may still ‘be invisible unto ourselves; for the inward eyes are more fallacious 
than the outward’.A cco u n ts  like these suggest that the optimism necessary for 
liberal humanism’s faith in a ‘confederacy of knowledge’ which ‘affirms that 
experience is shared’ belongs to the mid-twentieth century, and not to the early 
modern writer convinced, as Dyke was, that ‘the heart by reason of the great 
wickednesse thereof, is a bottome-lesse and unsearchable gulfe of guile, in so 
much as none can know, not onely another's, but not his own heart’.
Dyke’s epistemological pessimism is sustained throughout the not 
inconsiderable length of his text. Stretching to well over four hrmdred pages, the 
sheer bulk of The Mystery o f Self-Deceiving provides depressing evidence of the 
many and varied means by which a heart might deceive its owner. So what 
precautions may the good Christian take to ward off this danger? The answer 
seems to lie in his constant vigilance; he must always be on his guard against 
remissness, and regard slacking or laxity in any matter as the foundation of his 
ruin. ‘Small leakes in ships, and small breaches in walls, being neglected, leese 
both ships and Cities’, Dyke warns, commenting here on the wiliness of man’s 
heart which tricks him by pretending ‘that there aie some sinnes which aie but 
little ones’. What terrible fallacy is this, he wonders, when ‘as in the body little 
pricks of a pin neglected, have bred wranklings in the flesh, and thence worse 
matters have followed ... so here in the soule, our ... over-favoriable indulgences 
to OUI* smaller sinnes, cannot but invite and call, yea ... forcibly draw unto us 
further and farre more dangerous mischiefes’.^ ^
The significance and the veracity o f Dyke’s prediction would not have
Dyke, Myst&y, sig. A3.
“ Browne is cited in Jonathan Dollimore, Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture (London: 
Allen Lane, 1998), p. 84.
Belsey, Subject o f Tragedy, p. 86; Dyke, Mystery, p. 2. See also Katherine Eisaman Mans, 
Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995).
Ibid., pp. 185 and 199.
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been lost on Robert Greene. Anxious to prove that female whores are more 
‘prejuditiall to the Commonwealth’ than male thieves, Greene’s ‘shee’ conny- 
catcher introduces an English Courtizan whose ‘confession’ includes details of 
how her own little sins bred great ones. The reformed wanton recalls how she 
‘waxed in [her] hell of voluptuousnes, daily worse & worse. I grew so grafted in 
sin’, she says, that:
... Custome of Sin, tooke away the feeling of the sin, for I so 
accustomably use[d] my selfe to all kinde of vice, that I 
accounted swearing no sinne, whordome, why I smile at that, 
and could prophanely sale, that it was a sin which God laught 
at, gluttony I held good fellowship, & wrath honor and 
resolution.
That the Courtizan’s ‘over-favoriable indulgence to [her] smaller sinnes’ 
obliges her to use paradiastole to excuse her enormities needs no pointing out.
In this instance, I am more interested in the cameo role played by the Courtizan’s 
parents —  a devoted pair whom she admits ‘were so blinded with my excellent 
quallities, that they had no insight into my ensuing follies’ (44). The moral 
ambiguity generated by such benevolent neglect, what we might call ‘turning a 
blind eye’, and the ability of such stiategies to spawn what Daniel Dyke 
described as ‘further and faire more dangerous mischiefes’, is the subject of this 
chapter.
Dyke’s text was published posthumously by his brother Jeremiah, who 
added a dedicatory epistle to Lady Lucy, the Countess of Bedford. Although 
Jeremiah’s contribution to Daniel’s work ended here, he uses this preface to 
echo, or rather anticipate, his brother’s rhetoric, setting the tone of The Mystery 
by confirming how ‘justly [he] might have deseiwed the ignominious ceremony 
of spittle in [his] face’, had he displayed ‘negligence or reftisalT in the matter of 
dispatching this work abroad.^ ® Capitalising on the resemblance o f his own state
Robert Greene, A Disputation Betweene a Hee Conny-Catcher and a Shee Conny-Catcher, in 
G.B. Haii'ison, ed.. The Third & Last Part o f Conny Catching and A Disputation Betweene a Hee 
Conny-Catcher and a Shee Conny-Catcher (London: John Lane, The Bodley Head, 1923), p. 73. 
Dyke, Mysteiy, sig. A2v.
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to that o f Lady Lucy, Jeremiah refuses to ‘passe over in silence’ the ‘holy and 
religious course’ of Lucy’s brother, also recently deceased. Although his 
marginalia acknowledges no debt. Dyke is drawing upon the same injunction in 
Psalms as was set out by Nicholas Byfield in The Principles or the Patterne o f  
Wholesome Words —  namely, to ‘Obseiwe Gods workes, keep a Catalogue of 
experiments’/® As if in accordance with this, Dyke reminds the Countess that 
the late Dulce sought always ‘to keep a catalogue or diary of his sinnes against 
God: and every night, or the next morning, to review the faults of the day past: 
Every Saboth morning, or night before, to review the faults of the whole week: 
and at the end of every moneth to survey the whole moneths transgression’.^ ^
Dwelling as he does on the processes and benefits of a ritualised program 
of self-examination. Dyke follows a path well trodden by other ear ly modem 
doctrinal writers.^  ^ The importance of ‘ritual’ (and by implication, discipline) is 
evident in texts such as Johann Gerhard’s A Christian Mans Weekes Worlce, 
which contained fifty-two meditations ‘divided into seaven days exercise’. ‘In 
order to enjoy any hope of salvation’, as Stuart Sherman points out, the believer 
needed to ‘exercise a constant vigilance over thought and action, a ceaseless 
monitoring of the relation between self and God’.^ ®
This is to put it mildly. Early modem devotional literature is positively 
steeped in this rhetoric of the oracular. The follower of Paul Baynes’s Briefe 
Directions unto a Godly Life, for example, was advised to ‘carefully retaine a 
viewing of his sinnes by right examination’.^  ^ Times of ‘tryall’ demanded even
Nicholas Byfield, The Principles or the Patterne o f Wholesome Words, 2‘* edn. (London,
1622), p. 62.
Dyke, Mystery, sig. A5r.
On the idea that inwaidness and self-scrutiny had their provenance in the Augustinian tradition, 
and that these practises were appropriated, not invented, by humanists, see David Aers, Culture 
and Histoiy, 1350-1600: Essays on English Communities, Identities and Writing (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1992).
A Christian Mans Weekes Worke. Or the Daily Watch o f the Soul, trans. Rich[ard] Bruch 
(London, 1611).
Stuait Sherman, Telling Time: Clocks, Diaries, and English Diurnal Form, 1660-1785 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 49.
Paul Baynes, Briefe Directions unto a Godly Life (London, 1616), p. 42.
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greater displays of diligence, according to Thomas Riley, who recommended 
talcing a ‘double suiwey’ of one’s ‘imperfections’, ‘set[ting] a double watch over 
all her by-pathes’, and ‘in the more noted occasions’, he suggests, ‘it were not 
amisse to take a peculiar' Catalogue of them, by some Characters onely knowne 
unto OUI* selves’/^ Counselling him on the acquisition of wisdom through 
experience, Thomas Scott urged his reader to ‘Cast your* eyes backe to Abraham, 
Issac, Jacob, Joseph, David, and all the servants o f God’/^ But notwithstanding 
his admiration for these scriptural worthies, Scott’s most firlsome praise is 
reserved for Solomon, who ‘though in his other words and writings he excell 
other men, yet in his Ecclesiastes, (which is a survey, a review, a censure of all 
[,] both of his life, his words, and workes, and wr itten in age after all this 
addition of experience) he therein excels himself/"^ Thus promoted, Solomon’s 
Ecclesiastes becomes a textual testimony to the importance of continually re­
viewing and re-vising.
Thomas Scott may or may not have applauded Jeremiah Dyke’s casting of 
Bedford as a Solomon-like exemplum. At any rate, Daniel’s assiduous linlcing of 
literal vision and revision to figurative, spiritual vigilance, has still more in 
common with the method of his contemporary, the puritan William Gouge, who 
speaks in a manner similar* to Daniel of ‘their blindnesse who can see no matter 
of thanksgiving’. Those who neglect God’s gifts, who ‘see and w ill not see’, 
and who ‘know there is abundant matter o f thanksgiving, & yet will take no 
notice of any at all’, are here compared unfavourably to the more ‘carefulT 
observers of this duty.^ ® After some digression. Gouge’s criticism of such 
stubborn negligence gives way to a discussion ‘of the causes of di*owsinesse’, 
against which ‘both body & spirit are carefully to be rowsed up’. Only when 
armed with Gouge’s ‘directions for* watchfulnesse’ are mind and body equipped 
to do battle with the ‘abundance of bye, wandring, vaine, earthly, wicked
Thomas Riley, The Triait o f Conscience (London, 1639), sig. C6v.
Thomas Scott, The Belgicke Pismire (London, 1622), p. 45.
Ibid.
William Gouge, The Whole-Armor o f God or the Spirituall Furniture to Keepe Safe Every 
Christian Souldier (London, 1616), p. 415-16 (emphasis mine).
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thoughts, cares, lusts, and other such things, which like vapours arise in our 
soules ... [and] add much unto our natuiall dulnesse and drowsinesse’/®
Gouge’s allusion to these ‘wandring ... earthly ... thoughts’ would have 
been recognised by eaiiy modem readers as a warning about the perils of ‘carnal’ 
security. As David Gunby explains. Renaissance theologians ‘distinguished 
between two kinds of security, or over-confidence: “spiritual” security comprised 
an undue confidence in the certainty o f salvation; “carnal” security an equally 
dangerous concentration on this life, and indifference to the next’.^  ^ In^ 
Wakening of Worldlings, Martin Day makes explicit the comiection between 
spiritual negligence and ‘drowsinesse’, asserting, in grim and ominous tones, that 
‘as sleepe’:
the kinseman of Death ... bindeth up all the sences of the 
body; so that (for the time) there seemes to be little difference 
betweene a man and an Idoll, which hath eies, and seeth n o t...
So the worldly, secure and carelesse (falsely called Christian) 
seeth not, either the bountie or beautie of Divine Benefits ... or 
the brightnesse and sharpness of the sword of Judgements, 
hanging over his head to terrifie him.^ ^
The popularity of texts such as The True Watch Or a Direction for the 
Examination o f our Spiritual Estate, reprinted in various forms an astonishing 
eighteen times before 1648, attests not only to the didactic proclivities of its 
author, John Brinsley, but to the felt need o f his readers to escape the terr ifying 
consequences suffered by those who ‘see and will not see’.^  ^ Other spiritual 
physicians prescribed specific ‘remedies’ for the ‘sleeping evil’.^ ® Without 
knowing anything at all about the reception of texts such as Leonard Wright’s A 
Summons for Sleepers, Henoch Clapham’s The Sinners Sleepe, or the anonymous
Ibid., pp. 492-4.
David C. Gunby, ed., John Webster: Three Plays (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), p. 445. 
Martin Day, A Wakening o f  Worldlings, mA Monument o f Mortalitie (London, 1629), sigs. 
Alr-v.
John Brinsley, The True Watch. Or a Direction for the Examination o f  our Spirituall Estate 
(London, 1606).
See the anonymous Drowsie Disease; or, An Alarme to Awake Church-Sleepers (London, 
1638), reprinted as An Alarme to Wake Church Sleepers, in 1640 and 1644.
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Drowsie Disease, their mere existence must bear witness to the strength and 
vigour* of this linguistic economy in early modern England, and to her subjects’ 
familiar ity with this particular set o f leitmotifs.
‘That it is the Dutie of ever*y one to watch’ the ‘Scripture urgeth’, declares 
Samuel Torshell in The Saints Humiliation?^ ‘It were easie to aboimd in 
Quotations’, he adds, and proves it by producing a str ing of places in which 
variations on this injunction might be found. Omitted from the list (which 
Torshell admits to curtailing for fear of trespassing on time better spent 
watching) Paul’s first epistle to the Thessalonians exhibits a similar* 
preoccupation with watching, sleeping and waking. In Chapter five, Paul lectures 
the Thessalonians on the necessity of preparing for the Lord’s coming, urging 
them to be vigilant, ‘for ye your* selves knowe perfectly, that the day of the Lord 
shall come, even as a thiefe in the night’. Never the most reticent of apostles, 
Paul’s object here is not to upbraid the recipients of his letter. Rather, he affirms 
their status as ‘brethren [who] are not in darkenes’:
Yee are all the children of light, and the children of the day: we 
are not of the night, neither o f darkenesse. / Therefore let us 
not sleepe as do other, but let us watch and be sober. / For they 
that sleepe, sleepe in the night, and they that be drunken, ar e 
drunken in the night. / But let us which are of the day, be 
sober, putting on the breast plate of faith and love, and of the 
hope of salvation for an helmet.
Addressed to the Thessalonians, of whose aler*tness and sobriety he seems 
assured, Paul’s epistle simultaneously praises their qualities and works to 
distinguish them from others, namely ‘they [who] shall say, peace and safetie’. 
Upon such careless Christians, he warns, ‘shall come ... sudden destruction ... 
and they shall not escape’
Admittedly, there hangs about all these texts the piquant aroma of hell- 
fire; so much so that we may well ask how appropriate it is (even as part of an 
historicist project) to read Shakespearean drama in the light of such polemics. In
The Saints Humiliation (London, 1633), p. 18.
Geneva Bible (1587), The First Epistle o f  Paul to the Thessalonians, V: 2-8.
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the case of Othello, however, it seems more than usually justifiable. Before late 
twentieth-century criticism squar ed up to the vexed question of its eponymous 
hero’s race, several critics had noticed the religiousity of Othello— how many of 
its speeches are ‘Christian in ring and signification’.^  ^ Norman Rabkin went so 
far as to claim that ‘nowhere else in Shakespeare are we led to think more 
explicitly in Christian terms’; that ‘o f all the tragic heroes Othello is the most 
emphatically Christian’.F o r  the most pari, however, these accounts tended to 
quarTel over matters eschatological, or to liighlight specific biblical echoes, rather 
than considering the less obvious implications that Othello’s religion has for the 
play as a whole.^ ® One important aspect o f Othello’s Christianity so far* 
uninvestigated, I would argue, is the commitment he shares with Dyke and 
Gouge to staving off the evils of negligence. In the first scene in which he and 
Desdemona are brought together to account for themselves, the newly married 
Othello is adamant that his wife will never make him an authority that neglects 
all office. Thus he assures his superiors:
And heaven defend your souls that you think 
I will youi* serious and great business scant 
When she is with me. No, when light-winged toys 
Of feathered Cupid seel with wanton dullness 
My speculative and officed instrument.
That my disports coiTUpt and taint my business.
Let housewives make a skillet o f my helm
Robert H. West, ‘The Chiistiaimess of Othello\ Shakespeare Quarterly 15.4 (1964): 333-43, at 
p. 333. The measure of this very decisive shift in critical attention may be taken from Ania 
Loomba’s assertion in an essay printed in 1996 that a ‘recent MLA bibliographical search showed 
up nearly 400 essays on Othello produced in the last five years, most of them including some 
discussion o f race’. See her ‘Shakespeaie and Cultural Difference’, in Terence Hawkes, ed.. 
Alternative Shakespeares, Volume 2 (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 165.
Norman Rabkin, Shakespeare and the Common Understanding (New York; Free Press, 1967), 
p. 63.
West’s article, for example, is in part a response to Paul N. Siegel’s ‘The Damnation of 
Othello’, Papers o f  the Modern Language Association o f  America 68 (1953): 1068-78, as is 
Edward Hubler’s ‘The Damnation o f Othello: Some Limitations on the Chiistian View of the 
Play’, Shakespeare Quarterly 9 (1958): 295-300. Hubler’s response is itself answered by Siegel 
on pp. 435-6 of the same issue. See also Lawrence J. Ross, ‘World and Chiysolite in Othello\ 
Modern Language Notes 76 (1961): 683-93; and Lynda E. Boose, ‘Othello’s “Chrysolite” and the 
Song of Songs Tradition’, Philological Quarterly 60 (1981): 427-37. Also, the ‘Comment and 
Bibliography’ on Othello in Roy Battenhouse, ed., Shakespeare’s Christian Dimension: An 
Anthology o f Commentary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 415-18.
134
And all indign and base adversaries
Make head against my estimation/®
David Jeffrey and Patrick Grant take this speech as evidence both of 
Othello’s oveniding concern with reputation and of his belief that even his 
maiTiage is ‘readily imbued with implications for fame’/^ Other critics, Edward 
Snow and James Calderwood among them, have detected in Othello’s words a 
‘pathological male animus towards sexuality’ that appears, significantly in 
Othello’s case, ‘at the point where sexuality comes into conflict with the hero’s 
military business’/* Yet it ought not to be forgotten that the war in which 
Othello is engaged is a Clrristian war, as he himself remembers until the end.
And whilst this testimony underlines his willingness to smite the Turkish dog, his 
promise not to ‘scant’ this Christian business, nor to let Cupid ‘seeT his eyes 
with ‘wanton dullness’, also obey the ‘directions for watchfulnesse’ set down for 
Gouge’s soldierly Christian.
As confident as they sound, Othello’s words are too hastily uttered. 
Instead of using his ‘speculative’ instrument to contemplate his ‘serious and great 
business’ he becomes the ‘supervisor’ lying in wait to ‘grossly gape on / Behold 
[his young wife] topped’ (3.3.397-8). Before long (and much to the subsequent 
disgust of Rymer) he looks only to Desdemona’s linen —  that token of 
‘remembrance’ (1.295) she lets ‘drop by negligence’ (1.315), whilst attempting to 
bind a forehead made painful ‘with watching’ (1.289). As Othello’s faith in her 
crumbles, Desdemona’s negligence becomes a ‘fault’; her misplacing of the 
handkerchief proof positive of her failure to ‘take heed’ (3.4.67). This sinister 
rehearsal of Gouge’s insistence on the ‘great neede of watchfulnesse’ is repeated 
again by Othello in Act V : ‘Take heed, / Take heed of perjury’, he warns her, for 
‘thou art on thy death-bed’ (5.2.50-1).
36 William Shakespeare, Othello, ed. E.A.J. Honigmann, rpt. (Walton-on-Thames: Thomas 
Nelson & Sons, 1997), 1.3.267-75. All subsequent references are to this edition.
David L. Jeffrey and Patrick Grant, ‘Reputation in Othello’, in Battenhouse, ed., Shakespeare’s 
Christian Dimension, p. 421.
James L. Calderwood, The Properties o f  ‘(9r/?e//o ’ (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1989), p. 76. See also Edward A. Snow, ‘Sexual Anxiety and the Male Order o f Things in 
Othello’, English Literary Renaissance 10 (1980): 388-412.
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Too discomforting for a bedtime stoiy, Shakespeare’s story is nonetheless 
obsessed with bedtime. The strangulation of a wife lying on honeymoon sheets 
provides a terrible but fitting conclusion for a play so dominated by nocturnal 
business, in which half-dressed people are routinely plucked untimely from their 
beds to deal with disputes in the small hours.^  ^ Symbolically, according to David 
Bevington, ‘the swift and violent action in Othello, occurring so often at night, 
malces use of visual signs to stress the blindness of human endeavour’/® At 
another level, the tragedy’s repeated plunges into obscurity are necessary for the 
purpose of verisimilitude. lago’s machinations work better under cover of 
darfcness. His plan still inchoate, the ensign Icnows that ‘Hell and night / Must 
bring this monstrous birth to the world’s light’ (1.3.402-3).
But the tenebrous atmosphere o f Othello is significant for other reasons. 
Read in the light of a Protestant anxiety about the dangers of ‘security’ (figured 
variously as an incitement to ‘watchfulnesse’ and a mistrust o f ‘sleep’) one scene 
in particular acquires a compelling new resonance. There is no doubt that lago’s 
transformation of ‘the watch’ into a ‘flock of dmnkards’ succeeds in damaging 
Othello’s reputation— angering and shaming him as a leader of men who quarrel 
privately ‘in night, and on the court and guard of safety’ (2.3.212), But it also 
encour ages his adoption of a distinctly Pauline tone. ‘For Christian shame, put 
up this barbarous brawl’ (1.168), he orders, commanding his own, errant charges, 
as Paul had the more obedient Thessalonians, to ‘let us watch and be sober’. In 
this context it surely matters that the already inebriated Cassio admits that he 
‘hope[s] to be saved’, and further, that the ‘lieutenant is to be saved before the 
ensign’ (11.103-6). In doing so he reveals a spiritual ‘security’ matched only by 
the man whom Paul condemned for being ‘drunke in the night’. His actions 
seem to confirm one early modern minister’s belief that ‘a superlative neglect of
The absolute necessity of ‘taking heed’ is in evidence almost from the moment the play opens, 
of course, with lago’s instruction to Roderigo to call ‘aloud’ (1.1.73), ‘with like timorous accent 
and dire yell / As when by night and negligence the fire / Is spied in populous cities’ (11.74-6), to 
‘Awake the snorting citizens with the bell’ (1.89), and especially the father who should ‘look to’ 
‘his house, his daughter, and his bags’ (11.78-9).
David Bevington, Action is Eloquence: Shakespeare's Language o f Gesture (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 126.
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OUI* spiritual wel-fare doth branch out o f the pestilent roote of di*unkenesse’/^ 
such behaviour from Cassio, lago tells Montano, is ‘evermore a prologue to his 
sleep’ (1.25). And so Othello denounces his charming lieutenant, as if  anxious to 
dispel Montano’s suspicion that the Moor ‘sees ... not’ this negligence, or worse, 
that he ‘Prizes the virtue that appears in Cassio / And ioolcs not on his evils’ 
(11.129-31).
Bearing in mind this accumulation of associations related to sleeping and 
waldng, negligence and alei*tness, it is also interesting to find that the scene in 
which Shakespeare’s Othello ‘put[s] out the light’ marks a depai*ture from the 
same episode in his source. In Cinthio’s Hecatommithi (1565) ‘Disdemona [gets] 
out o f bed’, is floored by a blow from a sand-bag, and presently ‘slain by 
the impious ensign’ Shakespeare arranges matters somewhat differently by 
showing Desdemona mur dered in the bed to which Othello has sent her, as 
though she were a child."^  ^ Impoi*tantly, Desdemona raises no objections to this, 
and indeed, demonstrates a singular* readiness to go. When Emilia asks how does 
the ‘good lady’ recently bewhored, she finds her mistress ‘half-asleep’ (4.2.99). 
As her maid unpins her, Desdemona forgets the order of the lines of her song —  
‘Nay that’s not next’ (1.52), complaining, absent-mindedly, of how her* ‘eyes do 
itch’ (1.51). Figuratively spealdng, at least, Shalcespeare’s presentation of 
Desdemona suggests that she is unable to exercise what William Jeffray called 
‘ Vigilencie, the ever-waking sentinell o f the soule of man’. ‘And certainly’, 
Jeffray continues, as if  writing an uncanny commentary of the fate about to befall 
her, ‘their* death is imminent where there is such emminent drowsinesse’.'*'^
To speculate that Shakespeare’s focus on such imagery is purposeful is 
also to suggest that in Othello he engages with one particular anxiety shared by 
Dyke, Gouge, and Jeffray alike. The quotation fr om Jeffray just cited comes
Luke Rochfort, An Antidot for Lazinesse, or a Sermon Against Sloth (London, 1624), p. 13. 
See Appendix 3 in Honigmann’s edition, at p. 383.
For a summary of the differences between Cinthio and Othello see Lena Cowen Orlin, Private 
Matters and Public Culture in Post-Reformation England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1994), p. 216n.45. Orlin malces no mention of this particular discrepancy.
William Jeffray, The Picture o f  Patience (London, 1629), p. 41.
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from his slim volume of 1629, The Picture of Patience —  an encomium of what 
he calls ‘the ornament o f womanhood and the touchstone of manhood’ (14). 
Culminating with the rousing assurance that ‘the sight of our eyes shall give light 
to our understanding’, Jeffray’s text returns time and again to the same rhetoric of 
watchfulness as is used by Dyke, Day, and Gouge. Here again, for instance, the 
somnolent reader is alerted to the dangers lurking in the ‘sleepy feare of 
adversity’ and the debilitating ‘sleep of securitie’, both of which are ‘feareful’ 
and ‘dreadfull’ (42).
Considering its relative brevity, moreover, the priority this text gives to 
paying attention is far in excess of the attention it receives fr om any other of 
those wr iters. Around a third of the way through his discussion, Jeffray evokes 
the authority of St. Ambrose to claim that 'in comparison . . .o f  such as he 
negligent in divine matters, they are to be called perfect, who with all carefull 
diligence doe walke in the wayes to perfections?^ But even without the backing 
of this early church faüier, Jeffray’s text could still be accused of protesting too 
much. Its author’s dilemma is more pronounced than that o f Dyke or Gouge, but 
all thr ee ar e clearly labouring under their obligation to stress the active virtue that 
must belong to the good Christian, who must also be charitable, forgiving, meek, 
and humble.'*® Patience, as Gouge points out, is an essential component of the 
armour of God, but one that rejects confrontation in favour of sitting still and 
quiet —  of turning, as it were, a blind eye to provocation. The tension latent in 
this formula is made manifest even in Gouge’s choice of metaphor, the ‘shooes 
of patience’.'*^  Emblematically, at least, ‘Patience’ is usually shown seated, but
Ibid., pp. 24-5.
According to Gerald J. Schiffhorst, ‘Christian patience emphasises charity, forgiveness, 
meekness, and humility— a quality which, in contrast to the pagan view, recognises the weakness 
of human reason and will when unsupported by divine strength’. See his The Triumph o f  
Patience: Medieval and Renaissance Studies (Orlando: University Presses of Florida, 1978), p. 7 
and passim.
Gouge’s accoutrements are thus a variation on the ‘armour specified by St Paul in Eph. 6:11 for 
spiritual warfare— helmet o f salvation, breastplate of righteousness, girdle of truth, shoes of 
peace, shield of faith, and sword o f the spirit’. See Sandra J. Pyle, Mirth and Morality o f 
Shakespeare’s Holy Fools (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998), p. 30.
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Gouge talces great care to inject a certain kinetic energy into his own account/* 
‘We know’, he says, ‘that though shooes and greaves make not the way plaine 
without stones, stubs and thomes’ :
yet they make a man better able to tread on them, and pass 
thorow, or over them, and keepe his legs or feet from being 
galled or pricked. So Patience enableth us well to beare all 
troubles, and with some quietnesse to pass them over, and it 
keepeth the soule from being pierced: yea, it malceth great and 
heavy burdens seeme much lighter than otherwise they 
would.'*^
Jeffiay is under even greater pressure tlian Gouge to distinguish between 
two kinds of behaviour, one of which is commendable and one of which is not, 
but which are equally concerned with neglecting things. The raison d’etre of his 
text is to praise a quality he claims ‘makes Troubles and Calamities the Foyle of 
her Lustre’ by exercising a ‘heavenly Neglect’.®® That Jeffray must use the word 
‘neglect’ under any circumstances, given its oft-invoked negative moral value, 
attests to the difficulty involved in proving a quality active that actually insists 
upon doing nothing at all.®*
So what might this add to our* understanding of Desdemona? Potentially 
quite a lot. Pace the old saying. Patience is not a virtue. Indeed, in Pieter 
Bruegel’s famous engravings o f the Virtues and Vices, Patience occupies a 
curious limbo position between the two groups of cuts —  combining in one
For a summary o f early modern emblematic representations of Patience see Schiffhorst, The 
Triumph o f Patience, pp. 13-31. Although he gives two examples of Patience standing—  
manacled from above in Achille Bocchi’s Patientia, and on a squared stone in Wither’s Constante 
Fiducia— he admits that ‘more typical o f the emblematic representations of Patience ar e those 
by Ripa (1603) and ... Brueghel (Patientia, 1554), which show her seated on a rock’. Schiffhorst 
also claims that ‘Shakespeare often conceived of Patience as a seated, female statue-like figure’, 
as is clear- from the ‘two enigmatic Patience similes in Pericles and Twelfth Night’, and ‘less 
conspicuous lines’: Patience is a ‘virtue fix’d’ in Troilus and Cressida and is typically described 
as ‘unmov’d’, as in The Comedy o f Errors (14).
Gouge, The Whole-Armor, p. 188.
Jeffray, Picture, p. 13.
John Sym, for example, in his Lifes Preservative Against Self-Killing (London, 1637), claims 
that ‘the third signe of spirituall life in man’ is ‘his comfortable suffering for the things belonging 
to that life ... by the manner o f his undergoing o f afflictions, in voluntary and active submission,
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image the motifs kept separate in its fourteen companion pieces. Lisa Jardine’s 
suggestion that, when Shakespeare’s long suffering female characters, like 
Desdemona, ‘shift into patient resignation and waiting’ they fall ‘naturally into 
the postures expected of them’ and 'become patient Griseldas’, makes her 
position even more morally fraught.®  ^ For, ‘like allegorical representations in 
general, the emblem of Patience is ambiguous, saying one thing and meaning 
something else —  indeed saying many things and meaning many things’ .®^ As 
the ‘picture of patience’, of course, Desdemona does not ‘say many things’ —  
that is the whole point. But in this role she is incontrovertibly ambiguous.
Othello may have quite unwittingly got it right when he admits he ‘think[s] his 
wife be honest and think[s] she is not’ (3.3.38-9).
When combined with the associations of negligence which stick so 
tenaciously to Desdemona, her confidence that she will be saved, and her 
pleading for one more half horrr of life bear traces of the ‘securitie’ Martin Day 
described in terms of the ‘sleepe’ that ‘bindeth up the sences o f the body’. By 
associating Othello with the rhetoric of fastidious watchfirlness, and Desdemona 
with that frequently used to describe spiritual laxity, Shakespeai’e asks probing 
questions about the viability of such a passively ‘active’ virtue. In spite of the 
contempt in which F.R. Leavis held Othello’s ‘blinkers’, Desdemona’s status as a 
good Christian woman is wholly dependent upon her ability to ignore what is in 
fr ont of her. So is there any way in which such a desideratum might be 
reconciled with the suggestion, made by one of Shalcespeare’s contemporaries, 
that ‘the mind suffers in dignity, when we endure evil only by self-deception and 
looking another way’?®'* That the dramatist’s answer to this question was ‘no, 
there is not’, is evident fr*om his treatment o f the subject in Othello, and the
and not only passive, or by way of coaction, and inforcement... but induring with joyfiiinesse’
Lisa Jardine, Still Harping on Daughters: Women and Drama in the Age o f Shakespeare, 2'“* 
edn. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983), p. 184.
Martha Ronk, ‘Viola’s (Lack of) Patience’, Centennial Review 37.2 (1993): 384-99, at p. 389. 
Francis Bacon, Meditationes Sacrae, cited in Paul H. Kocher, ‘Francis Bacon on the Drama’, in 
Richard Hosely, ed.. Essays on Shakespeare and Elizabethan Drama: In Honor o f Hardin Craig 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1962), p. 305.
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answer itself, I think, is responsible for the intractable moral ambiguity of 
Desdemona’s position.
But Desdemona has no need to assume allegorical dimensions to be 
complicit in a project that involves ‘bear[ing] all troubles, and with some 
quietness ... pass[ing] them over’.®® In fact, although unusual, her situation is 
perhaps not very different from the one Francis Bacon said was ‘commonly seen’ 
when ‘women that marry husbands of their own choosing against their friends 
consents, if  they never be so ill used, yet you shall seldom see them complain, but 
to set a good face on it’.®® My own concern is with how Shalcespeare’s newly­
wed Venetian manages that. Certainly, she never complains about him, but nor 
does she apply what the vernacular rhetorician Henry Peacham called ‘plaisters 
of pleasaunt words’ in the service o f excusing Othello to the witnesses of liis 
‘much changed’ behaviom*.®^  Or, at least, she does not always do so. While 
Othello seems merely to be distracted, Desdemona willingly searches for 
extenuating circumstances to explain how it is that her ‘lord is not [her] lord’. 
‘Something sure of state’, she reasons.
Either from Venice, or some unhatched practice 
Made demonstrable here in Cyprus to him.
Hath puddled his clear spirit, and in such cases 
Men’s natures wrangle with inferior things 
Though great ones are their object...
Nay, we must think men are not gods 
Nor of them look for such observancy 
As befits the bridal.®*
But as Othello’s behaviour grows more violent, her responses to it alter. 
After he strikes her in public, Desdemona pauses only to register how little she 
deserves the blow, then leaves his sight. Their next encounter finds Othello 
insulting her verbally, yet in neither instance does she resume her hunt for
Gouge, The Whole-Armor, p. 188.
Francis Bacon, O f the Colours o f Good and Evil, in Brian Vickers, ed., Francis Bacon (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 97-101, at p. 101.
Henry Peacham, The Garden o f Eloquence (Menston: Scolar Press, 1971), sig. 12 v. A 
facsimile of the 1577 edition.
OrM/o, 3.4.125; 3.4.141-51.
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excuses. In the circumstances this is not surprising. Reluctant to ‘put [her father] 
in impatient thoughts / By being in his eye’ (1.3.243-4), having ‘love[d] the Moor 
to live with him’ (1.249), then followed that Moor to Cyprus, Desdemona has all 
but severed her Venetian ties. In a somewhat unliappy application of the proverb, 
our heroine has made the bed in which she now must lie. So if Othello later 
subjects her to so ‘veiy much’ that ‘it would not be believed in Venice’ (4.1.241- 
2), she still cannot confront Lodovico with a full-scale exliibition of Peacham’s 
medela —  those plasters of pleasant words with which, he says, we seek to heal 
the ‘offences of oui* friends’ that ‘are so gieat that we cannot honestly defend 
them, or so manifest that we cannot well denye them’.®®
This rhetorical first-aid kit tucked out of sight, its restorative powers 
denied her, what does Desdemona do instead? She sets a ‘good face’ on matters 
involving her husband by proceeding in a manner not unlike the one Thomas 
Wilson recommended for handling such blatant displays of wrongdoing. The gist 
of his advice is summarised in The Arte ofRhetoriqueSs marginalia: ‘Matters, 
haid to avoide’, it announces, ‘shuld alwaies bee past over, as though we saw 
them not at al’.®® In the body of the text, Wilson makes it obvious that he is 
addressing defenders of their own cause: ‘if  any matter be laied against us’, he 
says, ‘whiche by reason can hardely bee avoyded, or the whiche is so open, that 
none almoste can deny, it were wisdome in confutying all other reasons, to passe 
over this one, as though we sawe it not, and therefore spealce never a worde of it’ 
(38).
What Wilson seems to be advocating —  assuming this strategy could be 
used to vindicate others as well as oneself—  is that a defender simply ignore any 
misdemeanoui* too momentous to be publicly excused. Wilson doesn’t use the 
word ‘ignore’, however, and neither does Shalcespeare, but (according to the 
OED) no-one used the word in this sense at that time. The first appearance of the 
word ‘ignore’ to mean ‘disregarding’ a matter ‘intentionally’, or shutting ‘one’s
Peacham, Garden, sig. I2v.
^  Thomas Wilson, Arte o f Rhétorique, ed. Thomas J. Derrick (New York: Garland Publishing, 
1982), p. 38.
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eyes to it’, recorded there dates from 1801. This does not mean that its sense did 
not exist either, of coui'se, just that a different word described it. And in keeping 
with the distinctly physical manoeuvre Wilson recommends for passing a matter 
over, ‘as though we sawe it not’, it is unsurprising to find it replaced, on many 
occasions, with the word ‘winlc’. To ‘winlc’ today means to close one’s eyes 
momentarily; indeed, it means to keep one eye open. In early modem contexts, 
the word is used to refer to all kinds of pai tial-sightedness, both literal and 
metaphorical.
It occui's in religious contexts; in Abraham Fleming’s Monomachie o f 
Motives in the Mind o f Man the practice of ‘winlcing’ is mentioned on no fewer 
than thi’ee occasions. Most pertinently, it appears in the ‘prayer for the virtue of 
Due Confection’ which, in Fleming’s diametrical schema, as we saw in Chapter 
III, repulses the assault made on it by its ‘contrarie’, the ‘Excusing of Sin’.
‘Open rebuke is better than secret love’, claims Fleming, tai'geting his prayer for 
strength to effect this conection at those inclined to ‘neglect this Christian dutie’. 
‘O talce fr om us all vaine motions, which may withdrawe us fr om rating them, 
that most appaientlie offend thy divine Majestie’, he begs:
and not to seeme blind, or to winke at their offences, least we 
be counted paifalcers of their wickednes: knowing that thy 
sonne our Saviour giveth us this for a lesson to be learned & 
followed, namelie, when we see our brother commit anie 
ti'espas, to rebuke him, that he may repent and obtaine 
forgiveness.®*
Here, Fleming’s use o f the word ‘winlce’ refers to a dereliction of duties, 
which translates as a refraining from action, or more properly, fr om speaking out 
against the perpetrator of some ‘trespas’. In John Carpenter’s opinion, God 
taught something rather different: namely, ‘how unseemely a thing it is, either for 
children to note or display their owne fathers faults; or for the inférieurs to be
Abraham Fleming, A Monomachie o f Motives in the Mind o f Man (London, 1582), pp. 73 and 
77.
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judges and correctors of their supérieurs’. Indeed, he claims, ‘the Scriptuie 
telleth’ :
that Shem and Japhet, the two sonnes of Noah, did so 
dissemble their fathers faults, that they did not onely car e, not 
to behold them, but also had great regard to cover and conceale 
them and therefore they went towards him to cover him their 
faces being turned away. And the same Scripture saith, that 
because Cham had um*everently revealed his fathers fault, he 
was much disliked of his brethren, and of his father.
Summarising this example in his text’s marginalia, Carpenter infomis us that 
‘Shem and Japhet winked at and covered their fathers faults’. Placed side by 
side, these two examples, both taken from religious texts, give some sense of the 
intiactable ambiguity involved in the deployment of this strategy. It is further 
problematised, moreover, in a text whose generic proximity to Othello makes it 
even more pertinent to this issue. The text in question is Jolin Webster’s The 
Duchess o f Malfl.
Unlike Desdemona’s father, Brabantio, who remains blissfully unaware 
that his daughter is also a wife until it is too late, the Duchess of Malfi’s brothers 
are ever alert to the threat posed by her maiTying a second ‘husband of [her] own 
choosing against her friends consents’. Visiting her chamber early in the play, 
Ferdinand uses a very unfriendly tone to warn his sister that ‘the joys’ of tliis (as 
yet hypothetical) marriage night, ‘[tjhose lustful pleasures, are like heavy sleeps / 
Which do forenm man’s m ischief, and having thus made his position 
transparent, he departs.^  ^ Already resolved, having concealed her beloved 
Antonio behind the anas, the Duchess talces no notice. In the face o f such 
flagrant fr aternal opposition, her decision to disregard her brothers’ commination 
is crucial. ‘Shall this move me?’, she asks Cariola, her maid:
If all my royal kindred
Lay in my way unto this marriage:
John Carpenter, A Preparative to Contentation (London, 1597), p. 93.
^ John Webster, The Duchess ofMalfi, ed. Elizabeth M. Brennan, 3^  ^edn. (London: A & C 
Black, 1993), 1.2.245-6. Subsequent references are to this edition.
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ril’d make them my low foot-steps. And even now,
Even in this hate ...
So I, through frights and thieat’nings, will assay 
This dangerous venture. Let old wives report 
I winked, and chose a husband.^ "^
In the Duchess’s decision to defy her brothers, one can imagine a version 
of a scene never written by Shalcespeare, in which Desdemona stands shivering at 
the water’s edge, waiting to board the gondola that will take her to be married, 
reflects on the inevitability o f her father’s disapproval, and elects to go anyway. 
And if  Desdemona’s situation is similar enough to the Duchess’s to suggest that 
Brabantio’s daughter, too, has ‘winked and chose a husband’, there is 
consequently little to surprise in the fact that, once married, the Duchess declares 
herself‘now ... blind’ (1.2.407).
The progress of the Duchess’s marriage is very different from that of 
Desdemona’s, of course; Desdemona is killed by her husband, the Duchess at the 
order of the Cardinal and Ferdinand. In addition to this, there is no evidence in 
Webster’s tragedy to suggest that his heroine’s initial act of defiant winking 
results, as it does in Desdemona’s case, in her subsequently being obliged to turn 
a blind eye to (or as Francis Bacon put it, ‘to set a good face on’) the ill-use she 
suffers at her husband's hands. The Duchess is nothing if not dignified, and it is 
hard to imagine either her or Desdemona reminding her spouse, in the manner of 
the ‘jealous’ wife in John Taylor’s Juniper Lecture, how she forsook ‘many a 
good match only for [his] sake, when all [her] friends and kindred were utterly 
against it’. ‘Thus by yom* lewd course and company you are made a laughing- 
stocke’, she adds, venomously, ‘and I poor woman [am] pointed at as I go along 
the streete, for bearing it so patiently’ Yet all thiee aie wives, and, as such, 
might be expected to possess the virtues of what Mary Beth Rose calls the
Ibid., 1.2.260-68.
John Taylor, A Juniper Lecture, 2”^  edn. (London, 1639), pp. 41-2.
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‘heroics of maiTiage’ —  ‘the inner strength and courage required to act when 
necessary, but also to refrain fr om dfrect action, to suffer and endure’
Thus far I have connected Desdemona’s behaviour to the paradoxically 
passive action of ‘winldng’ by examining semantic and ideological associations 
embedded in Othello and other early modern texts. Justification for this strategy 
is perhaps provided by what Ralph Berry identifies as Shakespeare’s ‘exceptional 
sense o f the dynamic relations’ between the ‘metaphoric’ and the ‘literal’ and 
‘hence of the impress of language upon the human mind’.^  ^ But however acute 
Shakespeare’s sense of ‘the reciprocity o f metaphor and literal’ might be, there is 
no escaping the fact that the word ‘wink’ appears nowhere in Othello. In Romeo 
and Juliet, however, the Prince gestur es towai'd the sense o f the word related to 
‘intentionally disregarding’ a matter when he tells the heads of the feuding 
houses how he ‘for winking at [their] discords too / Ha[s] lost a brace of 
kinsmen’. In The Tempest, the ‘perpetual wink’ of which Antonio speaks means 
death, as does the ‘lasting winlc’ Leontes intends for Polixenes in The Winter’s 
Tale, though here the same word is also used by Perdita’s clownish brother to 
refer to sleep.A pparently, Shakespeare realised long before Dickens’s Pip that 
‘wonders may be done with an eye by hiding it’.^ ^
Retuming fr om the evident versatility Shakespeare found in this word to 
Desdemona’s situation may, therefore, be of help in interpreting her rather odd 
behaviour in the scene in which Emilia prepares her for bed. It is Emilia, in fact, 
who wishes Desdemona had ‘never seen’ Othello (4.3.16), an aspiration 
Desdemona doesn’t share: ‘my love doth so approve him’, she says, ‘That even 
his stubbornness, his checks, his frowns / — Prithee unpin m e— have grace and 
favour’ (11.17-19). It is at this point, according to the author of a collection of
^  Maiy Beth Rose, ‘The Heroics of Marriage in Othello and The Duchess ofMalfi’, in Shhley 
Nelson Garner and Madelon Sprengnether, eds., Shakespearean Tragedy and Gender 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996).
Ralph Beny, The Shakespearean Metaphor: Studies in Language and Form (London and 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1978), p. 5.
Romeo and Juliet, ed. Brian Gibbons (London: Methuen, 1980), 5.3.293-4; The Tempest, ed. 
Frank Kermode, ipt. (Walton-on-Thames: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1998), 2.1.280; The Winter’s 
Tale, ed. J.H.P. Pafford, rpt. (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 1.2.317.
Charles Dickens, Great Expectations (London: Penguin, 1999), p. 73.
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Meditations for ‘Noble’ ladies, that Desdemona should ‘fall to [her] Audite for 
the day past’7^  Instead, she speaks a series of distracted non sequiturs, 
inteiTupted with snatches of a song she regrets will not ‘go from [her] mind’
(1.29). As becomes eerily apparent only in performance, this song of ‘Willow’ is 
a kind of lullaby Desdemona sings to herself. More significantly, though, her 
admission that she has ‘much to do / But to hang [her] head all at one side / And 
sing it like poor Barbaiy’ (11.29-31) coincides yet again with William Gouge’s 
disapproving characterisation of those who ‘purposely set themselves to sleep’.
In ‘composing themselves to such gestures as make them sleepe’, he says, ‘they 
hang downe their heads’.
She has been ‘half-asleep’ before, o f course, in the aftermath of Othello’s 
attack on her fidelity, and now the comment malces more sense. Desdemona’s 
readiness to ‘sleep’ (or die) clearly owes to her ability to show patience by 
exercising a ‘heavenly Neglect’, or as Gouge put it, ‘to beare all troubles, and 
with some quietness to pass them over’. But it is also linlced to her tendency to 
‘wink’: ‘to passe over’ a matter ‘hard to avoide’, ‘as though [she] sawe it not’.
Her dazed response to Emilia’s inquiry after her ‘lord’ on this occasion was that 
she had ‘none’, which temporary disowning of her husband must be among the 
most effective means o f ‘passing over’ his actions she could possibly have 
chosen.
At this point I would like to set Wilson’s illustration of the best way of 
dealing with matters ‘hard to avoide’ alongside another rhetorical figure with 
which it has affinities: George Puttenham’s paralepsis, or The Passager. At first 
sight Puttenham’s Passager does bear a striking resemblance to Wilson’s brand of 
damage limitation; where Wilson advocates a ‘passing over’, the Passager 
involves speaking ‘as if  we set but light of the matter, and that therefore we do 
passe it over slightly’. Y e t  in certain respects it differs crucially, for
Three Small and Plaine Treatises o f  Divinitie (London, 1620), p. 23. Part of a meditation for 
‘when your mayd is getting you to bed’.
Gouge, The Whole-Armor, p. 494.
George Puttenham, The Arte o f English Poesie (Menston: Scolai' Press, 1968), p. 194.
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Puttenham’s figure incorporates a pause, the express purpose of which is to draw 
attention to its hasty bypassing of a crime. In the same way, Henry Peacham 
describedpraeteritio as a ‘pretend omitting’: ‘when we say something, in saying 
we will not say it’.^  ^ Both this figure and Puttenham’s Passager owe a clear" debt 
to the Latinparalipsis, which ‘occurs when we say that we are passing by, or do 
not know, or refuse to say that which precisely now we are saying’ As the 
author of the Rhetorica Ad Herennium explained it, there ar e several places in 
which this figure might be usefully employed, but particularly in a matter ‘which 
it is not pertinent to call specifically to the attention of others, because there is 
advantage in malting only an indirect reference to it, or because the direct 
reference ... cannot be made clear, or can be easily refuted’. In such cases, he 
continues, ‘it is of greater advantage to create a suspicion by paralipsis than to 
insist directly on a statement that is refutable’
Although Puttenham took classical texts on rhetoric as sources, he seldom 
failed to stamp his own unique hallmark upon his explication of the figures and 
tr opes. Where the Passager differs from the pseudo-Ciceronean paralipsis is in 
Puttenham’s likening its technique o f seeming not ‘to Imow a thing, and yet we 
loiow it well inough’, to ‘the maimer of women’.
The comparison does not hold in the case of Othello, where the Passager 
is used far more frequently by male than by female characters. As many critics 
have observed, much of lago’s success derives from his ability to create suspicion 
by seeming not to insist on anything. In the words of Patricia Parker, lago ‘“sets 
Othello on tire rack” thr ough pauses, single words and phr ases that seem to 
suggest something secret or withheld, a withholding that fills the Moor with the 
desire to loiow more’.^  ^ lago requires no ‘diabolic intellect’ to Icnow that the 
consequence of his wishing that Othello’s ‘wisdom / From one that so
Peacham, Garden, sig. S2v.
Rhetorica Ad Herennium, trans. Hairy Caplan, rpt. (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: 
Haivard University Press, 1999), 4.26.37.
Ibid.
Shakespeare From the Margins: Language. Culture, Context (Chicago and London: University 
of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 229.
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imperfectly conceits / Would take no notice’ (3.3.151-3), will be that Othello 
talces the keenest interest in what his ensign leaves tantalisingly half-unsaid.
lago’s careful cultivation of suspicion affects Othello’s relationship with 
others too. As well as being an editor’s nightmare, lago’s tortuous exclamation 
in the fourth Act —  ‘What he might be; if  what he might, he is not, / 1 would to 
heaven he were! ’ (4.1.271-2) —  is also preceded by a version o f the Passager. 
‘He’s that he is: I may not breathe my censure’, lago mutters, through apparently 
tightly buttoned lips. Appearing to muse aloud: ‘yet would I knew / That stroke 
would prove the worst’, lago moulds and shapes Othello’s ‘worst’ before the 
Senate’s very eyes. His master’s crimes will be evident to those who ‘shall 
observe him’, says lago, pretending to talce refiige in the inefutable claim that it 
is ‘not honesty in [him] to speak / What [he] has seen and known’. For ‘honesty’ 
Lodovico reads ‘loyalty’, as lago intends he should, and is confirmed in his 
suspicion that Othello’s ensign is seeming not to loiow the thing he loiows very 
well indeed.
As if  having learned fr om lago’s example, moreover, Othello himself 
shows an increasing propensity to use paralepsis, even in private conversations 
with Desdemona. There is excellent irony in the fact that one of Othello’s most 
famous speeches is punctuated by an example of the rhetorical figure paralepsis, 
which he uses apparently for his own benefit: ‘It is the cause, it is the cause, my 
soul! / Let me not name it to yon, you chaste stars, / It is the cause’ (5.2.1-3). 
Indeed, there is more than a passing resemblance (in subject matter, if  not in 
style) between the lines of verse offered by Puttenham in illustration of the figure 
we may ‘liken to the manner o f women’ :
I hold my peace and will not say for shame,
The much imtruth of that uncivell dame:
For if I should her coullours kindly blaze.
It would so make the chast ear s amaze
Puttenham, Arte, p. 194.
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and Othello’s response to Desdemona’s baffled inquiry as to the nature of her 
‘ignorant sin’ (4.2.71). Only she and her husband are present, but still he storms:
I should make very forges of my cheeks 
That would to cinders burn up modesty 
Did I but speak thy deeds. What committed!
Heaven stops the nose at it, and the moon winks.
The bawdy wind that Idsses all it meets 
Is hushed within the hollow mine of earth 
And will not hear’t. What committed!
Impudent strumpet!^ ®
In this exchange, often refeiTed to as the ‘brothel scene’, Desdemona is 
apparently incapable of making excuses for herself. The only defence she offers 
is her ignorance of Othello’s charge; that she ‘understand[s] a fury in his words / 
But not the words’ (4.2.32-3). Yet here again we encounter difficulties.
Othello’s inability to countenance his wife’s protestation of ‘ignorant sin’ is 
ironically exacerbated by his pathological adlierence to the Christian’s ‘directions 
for watchfulnesse’; his blustering disbelief in her ignorance mixed up and shot 
thi'ough with a puritanical suspicion o f the motives of those who claim not to see 
or know. Once more, Othello reveals the worry he shares with Dyke about ‘the 
shifts [man’s heait] useth for excusing of sinfull actions’; how prone it is to 
invent ‘witty and colourable excuses and extenuations’.^  ^ These deceitful 
excuses exist in many forms —  the third one among many listed by Dyke is 
'‘Ignorance, and want of learning’ (148). Whether wilful and affected —  as in the 
ignorance of those who ‘do willingly shut their owne eyes, that they might not 
see’ (137), or plaine and simple —  ignorance, according to Dyke, is no excuse. 
For even in the latter instance, the plea o f ‘ignorance, though it may extenuate, 
yet it cannot altogether excuse’ (137). And this is as it should be, he claims, for 
‘as the Princes lawes are printed & published, and therefore laiown, unlesse we 
be eitlier carelesse or wilful; so also are Gods’ (137). ‘Thou shaft not commit 
adultery’ is, of course, the law Othello believes Desdemona to have smashed to
Othello, 4.2.75-82.
™ Dyke, Mystery, pp. 142 and 145.
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pieces. Her ignorance of it is no excuse for him; her plea reminiscent of the 
‘ignoramus’, meaning ‘we know nothing of this’, written by juries on the back of 
bills for which they had failed to find sufficient evidence.*® Othello mocks this 
plea: there is enough evidence, as fai" as he is concerned, to justify his overwiiting 
Desdemona’s ‘fair paper’ with the verdict of ‘whore’ (4.2.72-3).
Once convinced that Desdemona is more Passager than honest, then, 
Othello cannot exorcise his belief that she is only seeming not ‘to know a thing 
and yet [she] laiow[s] it well inough’. As lago reminds him, she is, after all, a 
woman, and, moreover, comes fiom Venice, where ‘they let God see the pranks / 
They daie not show their husbands’ (3.3.205-6). It is not long before 
Desdemona, as one of lago’s ‘they’ is talcen by Othello for ‘that cunning whore 
of Venice’ (4.2.91) —  a female passer-by of whom her husband vows, ‘though 
that her jesses were my heart-strings, / I’d whistle her off and let her down the 
wind / To prey at fortune’ (3.3.283). Thus, even as he remains half-certain that if  
his wife is ‘false ... then heaven mocks itself, Othello is busy visualising 
Desdemona as a falcon whose talons pierce his chest: one of those birds o f prey, 
perhaps, that in 1624 Captain Smith called ‘passengers’, ‘because they come 
seldom’ —  one of the hawks, even, which, having been ‘inseeled’ by her 
gentleman owner ‘so as she may not see at all’, is then ‘watch[ed] ... all night 
and all the next monow fiom any sleepe’
This realisation returns us to the problem of blinlcers with which we 
began. Othello is a play in which ‘words carry with them all the meanings they 
have wom’.*^  Here it becomes viitually impossible to distinguish between a 
person who is the very pictui e of patience, and one engaged simply in the kind of 
face-saving project Francis Bacon reserved for ‘women that marry husbands of 
then own choosing against their friends consents’. What are we to make of
On ‘ignoramus’ see J.G. Bellamy, The Criminal Trial in Later Medieval England: Felony 
Before the Courts fi'om Edward I  to the Sixteenth Century (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998), pp. 
32-3.
Gervase Markham, The Gentlemans Académie or, TheBooke o f S. Albans (London, 1595), pp. 
1-2 .
Walter Raleigh, Style, 4“* edn. (London: Edward Arnold, 1901), p. 26.
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Desdemona’s losing thi'ough ‘negligence’ the handkerchief Othello has told her 
to take care of as she would her ‘precious eye’ (3.4.68)? How are we to read 
Emilia’s condemnation of Othello, as a man she claims has ‘killed the sweetest 
innocent / That e’er did lift up eye’ (5.2.197-8), when all the semantic and 
ideological associations sunounding Desdemona suggest that she has closed 
them?
Desdemona’s moral position in Othello is radically ambiguous, and 
becomes so, I would argue, in the specific context of her bid to excuse her 
husband. What happens to the women whose attempts to offer excuses ar e far 
more overt than Desdemona’s will be shown in the final chapter of this thesis.
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Chapter V 
A Modest Proposal
Would 1 knew that manner o f asldng: to beg were base, and to cooche low 
and to came an humble shew of entreatie, were too Dog-like that fawnes 
on his maister to get a bone from his Trencher: out Curre I cannot abide it, 
to put on the shape and habit o f this new worlds new found beggars/
Perhaps the most important question to ask at the outset of this chapter is 
what an original audience would have made of Shakespeare’s suppliant women. 
From where might they have assimilated information that allowed them to 
interpret, contextualise, and make judgements upon fictional women who fell to 
their knees and asked for things? Eaiiy modem audiences would doubtless have 
been more accustomed to the sight o f a prostrate subject than we are, of course. 
They prayed more for one thing, and also had at their disposal texts such as John 
Newman’s Looking-Glasse for Petitioners, a work dedicated solely to the task of 
showing ‘every Christian man and woman’ ‘what they are to beg at Gods hands, 
the manner how they ai e to beg, and the assurance of those things which they do 
beg’.^  These divisions duly noted, Newman proceeds to fill by far largest 
proportion of his text with an explanation of ‘the manner how’ an appeal should 
be made. This section includes some very specific advice on the subject o f a 
petitioner’s bodily comportment. A posture expressive of ‘Humilitie’ is 
appaiently considered a prerequisite. To ‘holde downe our heads’ and ‘knock 
OUI* brests’ is a good beginning (23), but should be followed by ever greater 
displays of abjection. The petitioner wishing to be heard must also ‘descend, not 
downe into the earth, but cast [himself] upon the earth’ (25).
This directive seems straightforward enough: a petitioner must prove 
himself humble in God’s eyes by abandoning an upright posture. Some dozen 
pages later, however, Newman closes this ‘how to’ section by claiming only to 
have shown ‘how we must pray in respect o f the inwar d man’ (37). Certainly, 
there are some when they pray who ‘fall upon their knees’ (37), ‘some pray
 ^Henry Porter, The Pleasant Historié o f the Two Angrie Women ofAbington (London, 1599), sig. 
A2, ‘The Prologue’.
 ^John Newman, A Looking-Glasse for Petitioners (London, 1619).
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sitting’, ‘others lay groveling’ (38). But ultimately, Newman insists, the posture 
of a petitioner’s body is o f no account, for ‘it is not the body that the Lord lookes 
upon’ but ‘the hart’ (38). Apparently, David’s injunction to ‘let us fall down’ 
when we come before God need not necessarily mean just that.^  A petitioner is 
not obliged to fall to his knees literally, so long as he is willing to undergo this 
ritual of self-abasement in metaphorical terms."*
This writer’s insistence on the inconsequentiality of the ‘outward manner 
of praying’ is as crucial as it is unusual. In its eagerness to prove just how little a 
petitioner’s posture mattered, Newman’s ‘looking-glasse’ never reflects upon 
how easily conventional signs of piety, including kneeling, may be manipulated 
or abused. Many other commentators were more cynical (and cleariy more 
worried than Newman was) about the potential mendacity inherent in corporeal 
displays of obedience. ‘Show me thy humble heart, and not thy laiee, / Whose 
duty is deceivable and false’, Shakespeare’s York tells Bolingbroke, as the latter 
drops to the ground at his approach.^  Making his nephew feel welcome is not 
high on York’s list of priorities here; rather, his words attest to the immediacy of 
the tlireat posed by the ‘lying knee’ in the early modem imagination. This ‘lying 
loiee’, as Marjorie Garber has elegantly observed, ‘is part o f an articulated 
language of disarticulation, the brealcdown, the dislocation, of a ceremonial 
culture of the body’.® Churchmen like Bishop Launcelot Andrewes who 
represented prayer as a predominantly physical act of petition consequently laid 
themselves open to charges o f encour aging the evils that infuse public, 
performative devotion. Within this context, ‘a great sorte plaie the hipocrites ...
 ^A injunction used in support of kneeling by John Buckeridge in A Sermon Preached Before His 
Majestie (London, 1617), p. 20.
For religious reformers, as Stephen Greenblatt has shown, ‘the figurativeness of language, its 
ability not to mean what it appears to say, is the key to a coirect understanding of scripture’. See 
his ‘Remnants of the sacred in Early Modern England’, in Margreta de Grazia, Maureen Quilligan 
and Peter Stallybrass, eds., Subject and Object in Renaissance Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 340.
 ^William Shalcespeare, King RichardII, ed. Peter Ure, rpt. (London and New York: Routledge, 
1994), 2.3.83-4.
® Mai'jorie Garber, ‘Out o f Joint’, in David Hillman and Cai’la Mazzio, eds., The Body in Parts: 
Fantasies o f Corporeality in Early Modern Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 
25.
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egregiouslie’, the puritan Philip Stubbes declared, ‘and under this cloke of 
Christianitie ... commit all kinde of Devilrie’.^
Stubbes’s comment bears witness to the danger inherent in a perfonnative 
act o f ‘Christianitie’ that can effectively obscure (‘cloke’) its diametrically 
opposed intention (‘Devilrie’). As Shakespeare’s lago loiows, any attempt to 
assess the sincerity o f such gestures will inevitably encounter inteipretive 
difficulties. This he exploits to the full, using it to further his project of 
poisoning husband against wife by ensuring that Othello, too, understands how 
radically indeterminable are Desdemona’s external displays of religious 
obedience. From this lago proceeds to deduce that ‘when [Desdemona] seemed 
to shake, and fear [Othello’s] looks, / She loved them most’.* If even the 
physiological symptoms of teiTor are simple to fake, how much easier is it for a 
person to feign subjection by laieeling?®
lago’s ability to tianslate Desdemona’s supposed religious hypocrisy to 
other of her actions has implications for the study of Shakespeare’s suppliant 
women. Of course, neither Volumnia, Paulina or Isabella is shown in the act of 
pleading to God; but in a culture in which a king was recognised as God’s 
temporal stand-in, and where a husband was the head of his own little 
commonwealth, Newman’s comments aie still veiy relevant indeed. Renaissance 
commentators themselves drew parallels between petitions made to the primum
 ^Cited in Ramie Targoff, ‘The Performance of Prayer: Sincerity and Theah'icality in Early 
Modern England’, in Stephen Orgel and Sean Keilen, eds., Shakespeare andHistoty (New York 
and London: Garland Publishmg, 1999), p. 20.
* Othello, ed. E.A.J. Honigmann, rpt. (Walton-on-Thames: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1999), 
3.3.210-11.
® According to a cultm*e suspicions of bodily signs, blushing was the only physiological alteration 
that could not be faked. See Brian Cummings, ‘Animal Passions and Human Sciences: Shame, 
Blushing and Nakedness in Early Modem Europe and the New World’, in Erica Fudge, Rutii 
Gilbert and Susan Wiseman, eds.. At the Borders o f  the Human: Beasts, Bodies and Natural 
Philosophy in the Early Modern Period (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999). For the contrary view 
that ‘Elizabethans had little faith in the power of man to conceal the deepest motions of his soul’, 
see Jolm S. Wilks, The Idea o f Conscience in Renaissance Tragedy (London: Routledge, 1990), 
p. 17. In A Preparative to Contentation (London, 1597), John Carpenter supports the idea o f the 
‘readable’ face by claiming that malcontented, hypocritical Papists ‘may easily be discerned... 
and that partly by their faces ... in like sort as the trees are knowne by tiieir leaves and fivits. For 
... their cankied hearts cannot but yeelde forth at time and times such a countenance as Cc^n 
sometime expressed towar ds Abel his brother, when the Lorde said to him: Why art thou angry? 
and why is thy countenance abated?’ (16-17). Carpenter’s comment brings to mind another 
envious brother, the villainous Don John in Much Ado, who is reported to have a face dastardly 
enough to turn mille.
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mobile and those made to his substitutes on earth— and with good reason. 
Gestures o f obedience like kneeling, as David Bevington points out, ‘express not 
a contractual relationship of vow as in hand-clasping and embracing, but a 
relationship of dependency and subordination’. Less significant than the context 
of their perfoimance (whether religious or secular) is the fact that these ‘gestures 
aie an aclaiowledgment of inferiority to one whose aid is sought’.*® It is exactly 
this claim of hierarchy that Thomas Granger bows to when he recommends 
‘com[ing] unto God as a poore harmles beggar comes to a King to crave almes’.**
The ease of Granger’s comparison in this example is revealing, and, for 
him, the similarities between religious and secular petitions do not end here. In 
both contexts, the actual language used in a petition is less important than the 
manner of its delivery.*^ One point upon which he is particulaily insistent is that 
no entreaty to God will bear fruit unless the petitioner solicits him with 
‘feiwency’. Proceeding with his analogy, Granger demonstrates the ‘necessity of 
feivent prayer’ by showing how ‘the humble beggar which craveth earnestly, 
doth speede better than he that asketh carelessly, and much better than he that 
asketh commandingly’. That Granger should emphasise the desirability of 
‘earnest’ or ‘fervent’ petitions is o f paiamount importance.*  ^ The English word 
fervency (foimed from English fervence) derives originally from the Latin 
ferventum, ‘boiling’ or ‘glowing’. What this means is that Granger’s main piece 
of advice to God-fearing petitioners is in essence exactly the same as the advice 
Quintilian gave to prospective pre-Christian pleaders, some thousand years 
earlier, in the Institutio Oratoria.
This text contains what is probably the most thorough (surviving) 
treatment of the importance of the system o f Roman rhetorical gestus. Just as
David Bevington, Action is Eloquence: Shakespeare’s Language o f Gesture (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 163.
Thomas Granger, The Blinde-Mans Sermon (London, 1616), n.p.
‘It is not the body that the Lord lookes upon’, agreed Jolm Newman, ‘neither is it the words he 
does respect’ (38).
John Bradford’s Godly Meditations upon the Lords Prayer (London, 1604), also describes 
‘Supplication’ as ‘an earnest and fervent calling upon God for anything’ (2). In The Saints 
Humiliation (London, 1633), Samuel Torshell, argues similarly that ‘We must have zeale and 
heate in our prayers; Jaw.5.16. The effectualfervent prayer availeth much. Zeale puts the heart 
into a good temper and apts it for motion, which cannot be without an heate’ (71).
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men of the cloth like John Newman sti-essed the insignificance of a petitioner’s 
actual ‘words’, Quintilian argued that ‘the nature of the speech that we have 
composed within our minds is not so important as the manner in which we 
produce it’.*"* Along similar lines, the respected classical orator was as anxious 
as Granger would later prove himself to distinguish between ‘fervent’ and 
‘careless’ pleading. On this matter Quintilian states his position unequivocally: 
‘All emotional appeals will inevitably fall flat, unless they aie given the fire, that 
voice, look, and the whole comportment o f the body can give them’.*® Common 
to both descriptions is the image of the ‘glowing’ pleader: ‘fervent’ in Granger’s 
account, ‘fieiy’ in Quintilian’s. In Quintilian’s opinion, as well as in Granger’s, 
there are no circumstances under which a lukewarm or dispassionate pleader can 
expect to ‘speed’:
For when we have done all this, we may still account 
ourselves only too fortunate if  we have succeeded in 
communicating the fire of our passion to the judge; 
consequently, we can have no hope of moving him if we 
spealc with languor and indifference, nor of preventing him 
fi'om yielding to the narcotic influence of our own yawns.*®
To instinct his students in the best way of ‘moving’ a judge is 
Quintilian’s main aim in this passage. But before we constiuct fiom his words a 
template for the perfect pleader, we should recall for whom, exactly, they were 
meant. The ‘teachers’ of the ‘future orators’ Quintilian is addressing were men; 
their pupils —  the ones ‘whom we are training to this end’ —  were boys.*  ^ ‘The
Institutio Oratoria, trans. H.E. Butler, 4 volumes (London: William Heinemann, 1921), IV, 
11.3.2.
On the importance of this tenet see Fritz Graf, ‘Gestures and Conventions: the Gestures of 
Roman Actors and Orators’, in Jan Bremmer and Herman Roodenburg, eds., A Cultural History 
o f Gesture: From Antiquity to the Present Day (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 40.
Quintilian, IV, 11.3.3.
Speaking, in Book I of the Institutes, o f the teacher’s duty to ‘coiTect all faults o f [his student’s] 
pronunciation’, Quintilian concedes that the ‘comic actor will also claim a certain amount o f oui' 
attention, but only in so far as our futui e orator must be a master of delivery. For I do not of 
course wish the boy, whom we are training to this end, to talk with the shrillness of a woman or in 
the tremulous accents of old age’ (1.11.1-4). In A Ritche Storehouse or Treasurie, trans. T. 
Browne (London, 1570), Joannes Sturmius also claims to have written his rhetorical treatise for 
his male pupil: ‘wherein I consider what maner of Gentleman I would traine up, that may be
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dominant ideology of most of the ancient world offered women no place in 
public discourse’,** And, with a veiy few exceptions, no substantial alteration to 
this situation had occurred by the time the Institutes was rediscovered by Poggio 
in the fifteenth century, or used as a pedagogical tool in the two centuries that 
followed. When Hugh Blair claimed that even the ‘diy and tedious’ ‘technical 
parts’ of the Institutes ‘may prove of some use’ to ‘pleaders at the bar’, he was 
not talkmg to or about women— and this was in 1783.*® In the period with 
which we are concerned, ‘the place allowed to women within legal settings was 
carefully circumscribed by rules and by the opinions of observers’.^ ® Women, as 
Tim Stretton has shown, could be litigants, but they could not be judges, jurors, 
or lawyers. Along with heretics, excommunicants and criminals, no woman 
could plead on behalf of another before a judge.^ *
That the law forbade women from pleading before a judge was a fact. 
Nevertheless, in the eyes of some contemporary critics, neither that law nor this 
fact was enough to stop them tiying. Bamaby Rich, for one, clearly felt that the 
legal restrictions imposed on female pleaders did not preclude the possibility of a 
woman taking any available oppoitunity to approach some other authority figure 
and do exactly that.
In a text published in 1613, Rich recounts a story involving four principal 
characters: the ruler Epaminundas, his captain Polipodius, an unnamed woman, 
‘openly knowne to be a common Curtizan’, and a third man, committed to prison
meete to be a councellor of Emperors and kings, and to have govemement in the common welth’ 
(19).
Cheiyl Glenn, Rhetoric Retold: Regendering the Tradition from Antiquity through the 
Renaissance (Caibondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1997), p. 19.
From Lecture 34 in Hugh Blair’s Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, cited in S. Michael 
Halloran, ‘Hugh Blah ’s Use of Quintilian and the Transformation of Rhetoric in the 18th 
Century’, in Winifred Biyan Homer and Michael Leff, eds., Rhetoric and Pedagogy: Its History, 
Philosophy, and Practice: Essays in Honor o f James J. Murphy (Mahwah, New Jersey and Hove: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1995), p. 185. At least one woman did respond to Blair, though 
not in a ‘legal’ setting. See Julia Allen, ‘The Uses and Problems of a ‘Manly’ Rhetoric: Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s Adaptation of Hugh Blair’s Lectures in her Two Vindications', in Molly Meijer 
Wertheimer, ed.. Listening to their Voices: The Rhetorical Activities o f Historical Women 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997).
Tim Stretton, Women Waging Law in Elizabethan England (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), p. 67.
Ibid. The proscription against heretical, criminal or female pleaders comes fr om the 
anonymous Mirror o f Justices, ed. W.J. Whittaker, Selden Society Reprints 7 (London, 1895), p. 
47.
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for his loose manner of living, described only as a ‘base fellow’ Although it 
has landed him in considerable trouble, this nameless figure’s alleged wantonness 
has not robbed him of supporters. His first champion is the charitably inclined 
Polipodius, whose ai'gument for the accused’s ‘inlai'gement’ malces no im*oad 
whatsoever in the ruler’s original verdict. This initial disappointment 
notwithstanding, the base fellow has no real cause for concern. His ‘suite’ is 
taken up quickly by the anonymous Cmtizan, who, ‘comming to Epaminundus 
... obtained his liberty, and had the prisoner presently delivered unto her’ (18). 
Upon learning of the Curtizan’s success, Polipodius is not a little aggrieved. 
Bravely, he confronts the ruler with the ‘unkindnes’ of this strange decision, and 
is told by him to accept the following explanation: ‘Content thy selfe Polipodius’, 
Epaminundus counsels, ‘for if thou couldest advisedly consider of the matter, 
thou wouldest not let to confesse that the suite was fitter to be granted to a 
Curtizan than to a Captaine’ (18).
Whether Polipodius is made easy by this reasoning is not a question that 
occupies Rich. Instead, he drops the stoiy, not to malce room for an analysis o f 
either man’s motivation, but to pass an unmistakably moral judgement upon the 
heretofore undisclosed practices of the Curtizan-pleader. The example. Rich 
admits, causes him to ‘note the impudency of these common creatures’:
that dare insinuate themselves into any presence, be they 
never so gieat nor never so good and daie adventur e to 
undertake any suite be it never so base or never so 
shamefull, and by this againe I doe further gather, that this 
kind of cattle shall prevaile, when those that be honest shall 
have a deniall.
In these desperate tones Rich draws to a close, declaring himself ‘afraid’ that 
‘there be too many of these women suiters in these dayes if all were knowne’
(18). Successfully evoking an image of their author rolling his eyes skywar d as 
he wrote them, these words also bear witness to Rich’s automatic correlation of 
female ‘impudency’ and sexual incontinence. Only a sexually shameless woman 
would ‘dare’ to undertake such a suit; in this instance, in fact, the anonymous
Barnaby Rich, The Excellency o f Good Women (London, 1613), p. 18.
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woman’s roles as ‘common Cmtizan’ and female pleader seem to be inevitably 
predicated one on the other. In the words of the early Dutch humanist, Hemicus 
Cornelius Agrippa, there ‘exists nowhere an orator more persuasive than the least 
of prostitutes’.^ * Similarly, when Rich admits, regretfully, that ‘there be too 
many of these women suiters in these dayes’, it is not clear whether he is 
objecting to female pleaders per se, or simply calling for a crackdown on the 
work done by female inhabitants of the stews. In the terms used by this particular 
naiTative, there is nothing at all to choose between them.^ "*
Although this woeful state of affairs clearly troubles him. Rich makes 
certain to reassme his readers, implicitly, that it was not always the case. The 
touch of nostalgia evident in his reference to ‘women suiters in these dayes’ 
gestm es backwards to the beginning of his text, sharply delineating the antics of 
these ‘cattle’ from the pleading stiutegies of women who existed in a now lost 
golden age. From the outset, this latter group of women— famed for their skill 
in public speaking— have been presented rather as shining examples o f their sex 
than as objects of castigation. Far from being instiucted to avoid them (as one 
might be told to resist the allmements o f ‘common Curtizans’) Rich’s reader is 
actively encouraged to delve into these women’s histories. ‘If we should look 
into a vertuous life’, he hypothesises, ‘who more famed ihmAemelia, Claudia, 
Tusia, NicauliaP ... for rethoricke Hilernia; for oratory Cornelia, for eloquence 
HortensiaT (3). Yet even the most obedient reader is obliged at this point to 
extend his search beyond the boundaries o f this volume. For details o f what 
these unusual women actually did or said he must ‘look’ elsewhere, for Rich has 
effectively finished with them. The Excellency o f Good Women merely provides 
a catalogue of personal pronouns: here, Hilernia, Cornelia and Hortensia function 
more as suggestions for further reading than as protagonists in Rich’s discourse. 
And since they are never heard to practise ‘rhethoricke’, ‘oratory’ or ‘eloquence’, 
the difference between the persuasive techniques used by these women, and those
Declamation on the Nobility and Preeminence o f the Female Sex, trans. and ed. Albert Rabil, 
Jr. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 84.
According to Patricia Paiker, ‘the clear link that would keep women from learning rhetoric as 
specifically public speech is the long association in which a “public woman,” and especially one
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used by the similarly silent Curtizan pleader, is left for the reader to decipher, as 
best he may.
‘Feminine Disputants’ receive a similarly lulcewarm reception in Richard 
Brathwait’s Ar 'tAsleepe Husband?, where their greatest error —  ‘to flow  in 
words, but droppe in matter’ —  is quickly pointed out. ‘Copiously shall you find 
them worded’, he continues, ‘but for matter penuriously stored’. ‘Howbeit’, he 
adds, generously, ‘their very presence ever accompanies their discourse with an 
applausive grace’
Brathwait’s emphasis on women’s ‘very presence’ continues throughout 
his text. In fact, he seems singularly unable to separate women’s discourse from 
the manner of its delivery, with the emphasis falling decisively on the latter. The 
rhetorical figure philophronesis (literally Idnd treatment in Greek) or ‘the attempt 
to mitigate anger by gentle speech and humble submission’ is at a premium in 
Brathwait’s scheme.^ ® ‘Gentleness o f speech’, he explains:
is an affable treaty or conference one with another, or a 
winning kinde of Rhetorick, which of all others, pur chaseth 
most friends with least cost. An excellent grace it gives to 
Hospitality: especially, where a cheerefiill countenance is 
delivered with the mouth: and an entertaining eye becomes 
ready to usher in that speech (102).
Being confronted with an account so dominated by talk of ‘friends’, 
‘hospitality’, ‘welcome’ and ‘enter-taining’, makes one suspect that what 
Brathwait is really doing is imagining his perfect hostess, whose pleasing persona 
will ‘usher in’ her husband’s guests, as well as her own speech.^  ^ It is also clear*, 
however, that Brathwait does not distinguish between, on the one hand, the 
‘winning kinde of Rhetorick’ used in the ‘affable treaty’ of civil conversation.
who spoke in public, could only be called a whore’. See her Literary Fat Ladies: Rhetoric, 
Gender, Property (London: Methuen, 1987), pp. 103-7, at p. 104.
Richard Brathwait, A r’tAsleepe Husband?: A Boulster Lecture (London, 1640), p. 70.
^ The classification and definition does not appear in Brathwait. See Richard A. Lanham, A 
Handlist o f Rhetorical Terms, 2nd edn. (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of 
California Press, 1991), p. 115.
Brathwait’s ideal woman would not have found favour with George Chapman, whose own 
‘Good Woman’ ‘Affects no news, no tales, no guests, no jests’. See Algernon Charles Swinburne, 
ed.. The Works o f George Chapman: Poems and Minor Translations (London: Chatto and 
Windus, 1875), pp. 151-2.
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and on the other, the Idnd used when the stakes are considerably higher. ‘Nor is 
it almost credible what excellent fruits, this Gentle speech graced with a pleasing 
presence have produced both in affaires of peace and warre’ (104), he declares, 
as if  paving the way for a movement from this picture of domestic sociability to 
one of more stately, perhaps ‘Roman Matronly’, proportions. But where 
Heywood had called upon the witnesses more customarily gathered to prove the 
efficacy of female speech in matters o f state-craft (Volumnia being the most 
obvious example), Brathwait intioduces ‘that princely Sophonisba, whose 
‘attractive Majesty’ and ‘unaffected Eloquence’ proves ‘that a sweet and 
debonair speech works wondrous effects’ (105). Effects so ‘wondrous’, 
apparently, that they beggar all description; Sophonisba never utters a word.
Recalled some seventy pages later, the worthy lady has more to say for 
herself. Appearing this time in the category of ‘Prudence’ she comes into her 
own. ‘What wisdome that excellent Sophonisba manifested to the world in the 
discreet carriage of her affaires’ (174), Brathwait eulogises, magnanimously 
handing the reins over to Sophonisba herself. Startling the reader with its 
material incongniity, the next page is dominated by a left-hand column of 
quotation marks that instruct him to hear in what follows the ‘authentic’ voice of 
Sophonisba. But before she has ever opened her mouth, Brathwait has set about 
contradicting his own claims regarding this woman’s propensity for ‘soft speech’.
The anecdote he chooses describes Sophonisba’s customary reaction to 
any ‘Counsellor or Conscript Father’ who ‘seemed troubled’, or ‘shewed the least 
uTesolution’. When this occurred, he says, ‘she would usually interpose herself: 
and chide their wealaiess in this manner’:
Is it fit, grave Fathers, that your advice should be to seeke, 
when the state is ready to sinlce? Will dejected spirits cure 
our distempers? Must Fathers tume Children, and put 
finger in th’ eye, when imminency of perill menaceth the 
States ruine? (175).
With its aggressive stacking of rhetorical questions, and its condemnation of the 
preposterous and unseemly passivity shown by important men, Sophonisba’s 
speech savours more of Lady Macbeth’s incitement of her husband to muiderous
162
deeds tlian it does of the philophronesis in which she was allegedly so expert?* 
By allowing Sophonisba an encore, Brathwait undoes his approval by suggesting 
that she only exemplifies ‘soft speech’ for as long as she says nothing at all. His 
lofty pillar of quotation marks provides material evidence of Sophonisba’s ‘real’ 
compulsion to ‘chide’.
In many respects typical, A r‘tAsleepe Husband? ought not, perhaps, to be 
read in the same terms as certain other texts in the ‘praise of women’ oeuvre. It 
might be better described, in Elizabeth Harvey’s tenns, as a ‘ventriloquization’: 
‘an appropriation of the feminine voice’ that ‘reflects and contributes to a larger 
cultural silencing of women’ In this text (handsomely fronted by a picture of a 
rambimctious looking woman in a mobcap), Brathwait chooses not to adopt the 
blatantly masculine speaking voice apparent in texts such as John Taylor’s 
Juniper Lecture (1639), or Thomas Heywood’s Curtaine Lecture (1637), both of 
which ar e quite clearly written by and for men.*® Here, the process of 
incrimination is more subtle. Like Chaucer’s Wife of Bath‘s Tale, Brathwait’s 
narrative is supposed to be ‘spoken’ by a woman, and its subtitle, A Boulster 
Lecture, acts to steel the reader for a deeply prejudicial account. That this 
umelenting tortur er, a ready stash of examples to her credit, seems bent on 
selecting ones that undermine her own argument for early modern ‘maistrie’ is, 
of course, part of the joke. This discour se on female excellence is served up as a 
case of special pleading at best; at worst, it might easily be read as an exercise in 
nocturnal nagging, and an extremely prolonged one at that. Ar ‘tAsleepe
^ With its emphasis on ‘fitness’ and its derisory attitude to the idea of a voluntary regression from 
manliness, Sophonisba’s speech employs many of the same tropes as Lady Macbeth uses to 
persuade her husband to commit regicide. Informed by Macbeth of his own ‘iiïesolution’, she 
also ‘chides his weakness’: ‘What beast was’t then, /  That made you break this enterprise to me? / 
When you durst do it, then you were a man; /  And to be more than what you were, you would / Be 
so much more the man. Nor time, nor place, /  Did then adhere, and yet you would make both: 
They have made themselves, and that their fitness now / Does unmake you’. William 
Shakespear e, Macbeth, ed. Kenneth Muir, rpt. (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 1.7.47- 
54. That Duncan himself has, only moments earlier, been careful in his observance of gratitude to 
his ‘Fair and noble hostess' (1.6.24) is one of the play’s biggest ironies, and is especially 
intriguing in this context.
Elizabeth D. Harvey, Ventt'iloquized Voices: Feminist Theoiy and English Renaissance Texts 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 12.
In the ‘Epistle to the Reader’, for example, Heywood extends his sympathy to the husband who 
has ‘been often terrified with his Curtaine clamours' (sig. A3v).
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Husband? consists o f hundreds of pages o f haiping on daughters, the very form 
of which seems designed to demonstr ate, by example, the utter folly of allowing 
women to argue their own cases?* In the words of a ‘Satyrist’ cited in Daniel 
TuviVs Asylum Veneris: ‘Brawles chidings, janes, attend the marriage bed; / And 
where a Wife lies, seldome sleepes the Head’?^
The sincerity of Brathwait’s praise leaves much to be desired, but his 
presentation of women famed for their achievements in oratory and state-craft 
has one important affinity with those of more earnest panegyrists. Far from 
reinforcing Quintilian’s insistence that a pleader bring to his appeals all ‘the fire, 
that voice, look, and the whole comportment of the body can give them’, early 
modern commentaries on eminent women prefer to stress their decorous ability to 
moderate their own emotions. Evidence for this appear s in a text published at the 
very end of the sixteenth century, A Womans Woorth, whose author begins by 
shar ing his conviction ‘that by the histories o f many women, every man 
whatsoever may perfectly perceyve, that the gifts and graces of women are 
infinite’?* Like Brathwait, this author is candid about his bias towards female 
‘graces’, which does not bode well for the reader in search of eminent female 
orators. In spite of its unpromising opening, however, the text proceeds to 
relegate the usual favourite topics of women’s chastity,*"* religious piety.
This coiTesponds quite interestingly with Simon Pembroke’s theories on the plethora of stories 
(retold frequently by early modem tr avel writers and anthropologists) about societies organised 
and run by women. According to Pembroke, there is ‘no evidence whatever for the existence of 
matriarchal societies in the ancient world, and the myths about Amazon societies that have come 
down to us were originally designed to indicate how bad things coidd be when women got the 
upper hand. Cited in Mary R. Lefkowitz, ‘Influential Women’, in Averil Cameron and Amélie 
Kuhrt, eds., Images o f Women in Antiquity (London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 49 
(italics mine). A slightly different view is proffered by Simon Shepherd, who claims that the 
‘Elizabethans inherited Amazons from classical authors and travel books’ and, whereas the latter 
tend to porti'ay them as ‘harmless exotic curios’, the ‘Amazons of classical authors tend to be 
glorious figui*es’. See his Amazons and Warrior Women: Varieties o f Feminism in Seventeenth- 
Centwy Drama (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1981), p. 13 and passim.
Asylum Veneris, or a Sanctuary for Ladies (London, 1616), p. 76.
Anthony Gibson, A Womans Woorth, Defended Against Adi the Men in the World (London, 
1599), ‘The Epistle to the Ladies’.
Genevieve Lloyd expresses the commonplace rather neatly, claiming that this period placed ‘an 
emphasis on different vfrtues especially chastity, which was, for women, the central vhtue around 
which all others revolved. Works on education for women at this time often focus on chastity as 
die principal justification for bothering with the education of women at all’. See ‘The Man of  
Reason’, in Ami Garry and Marilyn Pearsall, eds.. Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations 
in Feminist Philosophy (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), p. 113.
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continence, and beauty to a place behind the ‘efficacie’ of the ‘veitue feminine’ 
(4) in the ‘exercise of state affairs and occasions of war’ (8). Her outstanding 
contribution to the field of ‘state affahs’ earns a mention for ‘the mother of 
Coriolanus’, for one, whose skill in saving Rome is attributed to a fortuitous 
application of ‘so manie gieat maximes o f and for the state’ (6).
It is unusual for a male author to admit so ungrudgingly that a woman 
could spealc persuasively and effectively (using ‘great maximes’, for example) on 
matters usually reserved for men. But what might, on one hand, be enjoyed as 
rare praise for Volumnia’s rhetorical prowess has, on the other, the effect of 
making her virtuoso performance seem rather dry, a little cold, vaguely 
‘academic’. No commentator familiar* with the Coriolanus story could have been 
ignorant of the indisputably ‘emotional’ nature of Volumnia’s appeal to her son. 
Yet Gibson deliberately ignores this aspect of her plea, sweeping it aside along 
with the ‘fire’ Quintilian considered so essential a part of such petitions.
To suggest as much sounds like a complaint about the lack of human 
interest in^ Womans Woorth. But this would be an unfair criticism indeed, for 
Gibson is clearly keen to awe his readers by showing how well ^Rhea knew... to 
temper the prodigious crueltie and tyr anny of Saturne, who not onely would 
disinherit her sonnes, but devoure them’ (6v).*® This sensational tale of savagery 
immediately follows another, equally shocking one. This time it is the Romans 
who, when ‘surprized by the Sabines’, ‘were warrented from death and utter 
destruction of their Cittie, by the meanes o f women, who knew how to quenche 
the anger justly enframed in their fathers against their husbands’ (5v). Bearing 
the strengths of these women in mind helps explain why, some fifteen pages 
later, Gibson rebulces himself for ‘forget[ting] Oratours’, and goes on to make 
‘Nature’ his proof that ‘women are or may be the most eloquent’:
considering the organes and instruments of theyr voyce is 
more mylde and gentle, than those in men, whose 
pronounciation is very rough, shaipe and coorsely shapte,
We might compare this to the very pedesti ian account of Rhea given in Giovanni Boccaccio’s 
Concerning Famous Women, trans. Guido A. Guaiino (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964). 
According to Guaiino, Boccaccio makes ‘little or no effort to give this biography distinction of 
style or bring the tragic figure of Rhea to life’ (xxi).
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by reason of the abundance of choller, which (with their
words) drives foorth so much vehemencie of spirit (20r-v).
Reluctant to let mere examples prove his case, Gibson offers a more 
compelling reason for why readers should accept his defence o f female 
eloquence. Grounding his theoiy in biological necessity, Gibson lends 
‘scientific’ weight to the ideological imperative which frowned upon feisty 
women. Implicated in this project is the idea that women are not so much 
disinclined to ‘vehemencie’ as they aie physically incapable o f achieving it. The 
appeals these women make, therefore, are never fiery; they are discreet, 
temperate, and softly spoken. Their oratorical successes are bom out of their 
ability to ‘temper’ and ‘quench’ their listeners’ boiling blood, not to ‘enframe’ an 
already disaffected audience. Finding herself in the thick of such disputes, the 
female pleader is clearly required to imagine herself as extinguisher, not kindling. 
And what is more, these eloquent women of antiquity are presented in this way 
consistently, even if to do so demands a judicious and largely silent coixection of 
source material by their early modem male ‘biographers’.
One such canny handling of a classical account occurs in John Shirley’s 
Illustrious History o f Women. In a chapter entitled ‘Of Teaming’, Shirley 
plunges in boldly by asserting how ‘In Oratoiy women have been found skilful 
Proficients, as appears in many Examples’.*® This supposed embaixassment of 
riches yields only two gems in Shirley’s account: Amasia and Hortensia, neither 
of whom is proficient enough, apparently, to have won herself the right to spealc 
in her ‘own’ words. Ostensibly, there is notliing remarkable in this. As Mary 
Lefkowitz has argued, ‘references to women by biographers and historians tend 
to be anecdotal, and so not necessarily pinned down to particular times or 
events’.*^  It is a commonplace, in other words, that male-authored historiogiaphy 
leaves us almost no record of female speech (hence the familiar* complaint fr om 
feminists that ‘histoi*y’ is ‘/^ /.y-stoiy’). This particular* exclusion of the female 
voice fr om the Illustrious History is made more significant, however, by the fact 
that, in choosing to write about Hor*tensia, Shirley was dealing with the exception
John Shii'ley, An Illustrious Histoiy o f Women (London, 1686), p. 76.
Lefkowitz, ‘Influential Women’, p. 55.
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to the rule. And he would have known it. His omission seems doubly interesting 
when we discover that Valerius Maximus, the writer whom Shirley credits as the 
sour ce of his account o f Amasia, had given directions to the particular* location in 
The Civil Wars at which Appian had ‘recorded’ Hortensia’s famous speech 
verbatim. In shor*t, if Shirley had really wanted to include Hor*tensia’s ‘voice’, he 
would have Imown exactly where to find it.
We will return to Shirley’s Hortensia shortly, but will look first (since she 
appears first in his text) at the classical template from which he for*med Amasia. 
Of this Roman woman Valerius Maximus had written:
Amasia Sentia, being guilty, before a great concourse of 
people, pleaded her* own cause. [Lucius  ^ Titus, the Praetor 
then sitting in Court; and observing all the parts and 
elegancies of a true Defense, not onley diligently but 
stoutly was quitted in her first Action by the Sentences of 
all. And because that under the shape of a woman she 
carried a manly resolution, they call hex Androgyne?^
Armed with these raw materials, the author* of the Illustrious History set about 
painting his portrait of 'Amasia, a vir*tuous Roman Lady’, who,
being accused of a Crime, and ready to undergo the 
Sentence of the Praetor, she in the midst o f a great 
confluence of People, step’d up and pleaded her own cause 
so effectually, and with such Eloquence, that by the 
publique suffrage, she was Acquitted of the Aspersion Layd 
to her char ge, and in that great Affair, used such Decency 
and Modesty, that she got her* self thereby the Sir-name 
Androgyne.
Shirley, apparently, was no stickler for literal translation. The description 
of the Praetor and the swelling crowd are common to both accounts; their 
difference lies in the apparent gulf between the ancient and early modern 
understanding of the kind of behaviour constitutive of ‘Androgyny’. As Valerius 
Maximus has it, Amasia is called Androgyne because she carries ‘under the
Quintus Valerius Maximus, His Collection o f the Most Memorable Acts and Sayings o f Orators 
(London, 1684), 8.3.2.
39 Shirley, Illustrious Histoiy, p. 76.
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shape of a woman’ a ‘manly resolution’. From the Greek for man + woman, 
androgyne is not a word, presumably, whose etymological origins would have 
left Shirley baffled. And yet he seems peculiarly anxious to protect his Amasia 
from anything that looks even vaguely like a man: she is a ‘virtuous Roman 
Lady\ whose androgyny is inexplicably related to her capacity for exhibiting 
‘Decency and Modesty’.
It would be no small understatement to say that this particular reading of 
Amasia’s ‘androgyny’ relies on a very generous interpretation of the term. The 
publication of texts such as the infamous Hie Mulier made the ‘androgyne’ an 
instantly recognisable figure in the early modern period, and one more likely to 
receive censure than praise. As Phyllis Rackin observes, ‘in life as on the stage, 
masculine women were regarded as whores’."*® At the centre of the anti-feminist 
debate, Hie Mulier advertises itself as a medicine to cure the ‘Coltish disease o f 
the Staggers in the Masculine-Feminines of our times’. Exhorting virtuous 
women to protect themselves by the clothing they wear, its author urges them to 
‘shield [their charms] with modest and comely garments ... that no unchaste eye 
may come neere to assaile them’. The maimish women who are the subject of his 
declamation, on the other hand, ar e accused of having ‘cast off the ornaments of 
[their] sexes to put on the garments of Shame’ and of laying by ‘the bashftilness 
of [their] natures to gather the impudence of Harlots’."** Drawing on the 
commonplace that allied women’s use of malce-up with their easy virtue, Thomas 
Tuke described the ‘painted woman’ as ‘both a substantive and an adjective, and 
yet not of the neuter gender: but a feminine as well consorting with a 
masculine’."*^ Androgyny is envisaged in both texts as the antithesis of all that is 
‘decent’ and ‘modest’, a fact that obviously posed serious difficulties for writers
Phyllis Rackin, ‘Historical Difference/Sexual Difference’, in Jean R. Brink, ed.. Privileging 
Gender in Early Modern England (Kirksville, Missouri: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 
1993), p. 43.
Hie Mulier; or, The Man-Woman, in Katherine Usher Henderson and Barbara F. McManus, 
eds,. Half Humankind: Contexts and Texts o f  the Controversy about Women in England, 1540- 
1640 (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1985).
Thomas Tuke, A Treatise Against Painting and Tincturing of Men and Women (London, 1616), 
p. 57.
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like Shirley, whose self-imposed task it was to prove meritorious the conduct of 
such mannish women.
Finding sufficient material in Valerius Maximus to portray Amasia in a 
positive light must have tested Shirley’s powers of inventio to the limit. He is 
obliged, for one thing, to ignore his classical authority’s barely concealed 
disapproval of his subject. ‘Nor must we omit those Women’, Valerius Maximus 
had written, by way of inti'oducing Amasia, ‘whom the condition of their Sex, 
and the Garments of Modesty could not hinder from appearing and speaking in 
publike Courts of Judicature’. The implication is, of course, that the actions of 
such women prove them so unencumbered by the Garment of Modesty that they 
are literally indecent. In this respect, Shirley’s representation of Amasia’s 
oxymoronic, ‘modest’ andi'ogyny, constitutes not so much a willful misreading of 
Valerius Maximus’s text, as a complete travesty of it.
His creativity seemingly inexhaustible, Shirley moves swiftly on to 
Hortensia, of whom he proceeds to make a similarly new woman. As this 
writer’s reading of Valerius Maximus would have taught him, the speech for 
which Hortensia achieved notoriety was praised by Quintilian and recorded later 
by Appian because it was a good speech ‘for the image of her father’s Eloquence 
obtained, that the greatest part of the Imposition was remitted’ Since it is 
mentioned by Quintilian'^ '^  and Valerius Maximus but ‘recorded’ by Appian, we 
must turn to the latter to recover evidence of Hortensia’s ‘own’ eloquence.
hi Book rV of the Civil Wars, Appian discusses the events leading up to 
Hortensia’s famous speech. The speech was occasioned, he explains, by the 
triumvirs publication of an ‘edict requiring 1400 of the richest women to malce a 
valuation of their property, and to furnish for the service of the war such portion 
as the triumvirs should requfre from each’."^  ^ Exasperated by the imposition of 
this tax, the Roman women resolved to force their way into the Forum, and there,
Cited in Cheryl Glenn, Rhetoric Retold: Regendering the Tradition from Antiquity through the 
Renaissance (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1997), p. 69. 
Institutio Oratoria, trans. H.E. Butler, 4 volumes (London: William Heinemann, 1921), I, 1.1.6. 
Appian’s Roman Histoiy, trans. Horace White, 4 volumes (London: William Heinemann,
1923), IV, 4.5.32.
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‘through the mouth of Hortensia, whom they selected to speak’, mounted an 
appeal to the tribunal.
Hortensia’s speech is neither brief nor self-effacing. It describes how the 
ti'iumvirs’ wai* effort has deprived the women of Üieir male relatives. It asks why 
women, having committed no wai-time atrocities, should ‘share the penalty when 
we did not share the guilt’. Indeed, it demands to know why women should pay 
taxes at all, when they have ‘no part in the honours, the commands, the statecraft’ 
which men manage and wrangle over themselves. Significantly, the speech 
preempts male objections to the women’s refusal to pay taxes by citing the 
precedent of their ‘mothers’, who had once made a donation to a war effort, but 
who did so voluntarily, not ‘under fear o f informers and accusers’. Another set 
of precedents, this time of rulers (however despotic) who had not imposed taxes, 
marks the climax of Hortensia’s oration (4.5.32-3).
In her analysis of Hortensia’s speech, the feminist scholar Cheiyl Glenn 
examines several of the features that might have caught Quintilian’s approving 
attention. One of the speech’s main strengths, she claims, is its effective 
handling of the rhetorical question. In addition to this, Hortensia supports her 
case by referring to specific legal precedents, but she also echoes the anti-war 
arguments of Greek literaiy women, and makes positive use o f the timelessness 
of the no-taxation-without-representation trope. Taken as a whole, ‘the stepwise 
logic and cogency of Hortensia’s argument’ aie, in Glenn’s opinion, ‘perhaps the 
most compelling (and traditionally masculine) featui*es of her speech’
This twentieth-century feminist reading of the ‘traditionally masculine’ 
featui’es of Hortensia’s speech might be productively compared to the one given 
by Shirley. His praise of this feminine ‘mouthpiece’ is, ostensibly, singulaiJy 
ungrudging. ‘Hortensia’, he enthuses, ‘the Daughter of Queen Hortensius’,
when the Roman Mations had a large fine imposed on them 
by the Tribunes, and the Lawyers fearful to undertake her 
cause, she as the Advocate o f her Sex, boldly pleaded it 
before the Triumvirate, with such chearfulness and success, 
that the greatest part of the Imposition was remitted (77).
Glenn, Rhetoric Retold, p. 69.
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Having culled this last piece of ‘factual’ information stiaight from Valerius 
Maximus, Shirley’s evident pleasure in his subject spurs him into permitting 
himself a little poetic licence: ‘So that ’tis plain’, he continues, ‘the greatest use 
oth’ Tongue / Which to the fair Inchanting Sex belong, / Is not to schold, as 
Black Detiactors sung’ (77). And with this playful rejoinder to his more 
misogynistically inclined predecessors, Shirley moves on.
This panegyrist’s decision to ignore Appian’s more detailed description of 
Hortensia’s oratorical prowess (as signposted in Valerius Maximus) may spealc 
of nothing other than the material conditions of his text’s production. Perhaps 
Sliirley owned a copy of Valerius Maximus and not one of Appian. Guesses may 
be hazar ded, of cour se, but the real reason for Shirley’s exclusion of Amasia’s 
‘voice’ from the Illustrious History must sadly remain unloiown to us. Less 
mysterious ar e the effects of its omission, one of which is that it enables Shirley 
to present a rather less controversial female worthy. As is made perfectly clear in 
Appian’s account, the Hortensia who approaches the tribunes is not in the best of 
tempers. Justifiably so. She and the other women feel themselves attacked from 
all sides: threatened by the imposition o f a debilitating tax and shunned by one of 
their own number, Fulvia, whose response to their call for support was to repulse 
the women from her door, ‘with a rudeness they could scarce endure’. Still 
smarting from this dual humiliation. Hortensia enters the Forirm to protest against 
the overwhelming unfairness of the proposed taxation. If she stops short of 
calling the men there assembled murderers (‘You have already deprived us of our 
fathers, our sons, our* husbands’), bullies (‘under fear of informers or accusers 
...’) and tyrants (‘Neither Marius nor Ciima imposed taxes upon us. Nor did 
Sulla, who held despotic power in the state’), it is only barely so. Appian’s 
Hortensia is a woman on the war-path.
The most cursory reading of this passage in Appian malces it har d to see 
how Shirley could have constrncted from this oration an image of Hortensia’s 
‘chearfulness’. And since the word is not used by Valerius Maximus either, this 
sprightly, amenable Hortensia is revealed to be very much a product of Shirley’s 
own imagination. Aroxmd this speaker is erected a cordon sanitaire, 
safeguarding her fr om the taint of any association with death or brutality.
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Because he lets nothing that caiTies even a whisper of defamatory speech pass her 
lips, Shirley’s virtuous, silent Roman lady can remain simply ‘fair’ and 
‘inchanting’. His commendatory snatch of verse, moreover, with its indulgent 
and inevitably deflating rhyme, underwrites the primarily decorative 
achievements of this female pleader. In the hands of both Appian and Valerius 
Maximus, Hortensia is referred to, specifically, as her father‘s daughter (her 
father, of cour se, being the renowned orator Hortensius). Revamping her for the 
seventeenth century, Shirley stresses her matrilineage, and presents her as a 
woman whose most admirable qualities are that she is attractive and happy. This 
woman, to whom the practice of ‘scholding’ is so alien, resembles no-one so 
much as Richard Brathwait’s soft spealcer, whose ‘winning kinde of Rhetorick’ is 
figured as an ability to excel in situations ‘where a welcome accompanied with a 
cheereful countenance is delivered with the mouth’ And her appearance in this 
role would naturally involve her calling upon skills learned at maternal, not 
paternal, hands. Who else but a mother, asked Christopher Newstead in 1620, is 
biologically inclined to ‘suckle our mindes with the milke of good manners’
Whether he meant it to or not, Shirley’s appropriation of classical sources 
works to translate the successful female pleaders of antiquity into desirable 
Renaissance women. Amasia’s and Hortensia’s possession of the qualities of 
‘modesty’, ‘decency’ and ‘cheerfulness’ are privileged (or invented if they seem 
not to exist) in the interests of presenting suitably decorous figures fit for female 
emulation. These are the qualities, of course, which pervade seventeenth-century 
discourses dedicated to promoting proper feminine conduct. From the classical 
descriptions of female uniqueness they construct a figure of the ‘pleading’ or 
‘suppliant’ woman that has more in common with the behaviour expected of all 
well-brought up early modern women.
Thus, the seventeenth-century manufacture of ‘illustrious women’ 
demands that they seem to set an ideal standar d. Unsmprisingly, the actions of 
these renowned female speech-makers obey exhortations in male-authored
Brathwait, A r’tAsleepe Husband?, p. 102.
Christopher Newstead,/4k Women; or. Womens Defence (fxmàon, 1620), p. 50.
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conduct manuals to ‘Let the carriage and behaviour be modest’ Or, in the 
words of another concerned counsellor, ‘For your Carriage, in the general, let it 
be a Medium’. T h e s e  prototypical deportment lessons teach the ‘Young 
Gentlewoman’ how ‘to Manage her Gate and Gesture’ —  to ensure always that 
the gestui'e of the body is ‘seemly and commendable’; never to ‘run or go 
extream fast in places o f Concourse ... for in such violent motions it is not always 
in your power to keep your Body steady’ (201). A matching steadiness in speech 
is duly recommended. The youthful woman is warned never to ‘strain your 
words to a pitch of Eloquence ... but let a moderate flouiish suffice’. And the 
axiom by which to live (by now assuming the quality of a catechism), that 
‘Modesty and Moderation is [a woman’s] Ornament, and are in themselves a 
moving Rhetorick’ (204).
So what exactly is happening here? The first thing to notice is how 
effectively writers like Shirley elide the potentially threatening ‘boldness’ of 
Amasia or Hortensia’s speeches, making the eloquent pleas themselves the mere 
vehicles for an exhibition of female comeliness. Thus lifted from the Roman 
Forum we aie deposited in the English gentleman’s household. Here, an attitude 
of supplication is not assumed to plead for a rebate in taxes. Instead, it acts as an 
index of proper female subservience, cleverly situating the woman firmly in her 
place as dutiful wife or daughter. It comes as no shock to discover how well 
Shirley’s Amasia and his Hortensia seem to have reti'oactively assimilated the 
advice he dispenses to less famous women in the second pait of The 
Accomplished Ladies Rich Closet o f Rarities, wherein are found explicit 
directives for behaviour relating to ‘the Female sex, on all occasions’. ‘In all 
your undertaldngs let it be observed that you are an enemy to Sloth’, he suggests, 
‘not only by your eaiiy rising, but by yom* activity’ :
for having neatly diessed you ... having prostrated your self 
before your Maker, and refreshed you with what was 
appointed, fall upon your knees before your Parents, and
Samuel Torshell, The Womans Glorie (London, 1645), p. 113.
John Shirley, The Accomplished Ladies Rich Closet o f Rarities, 2nd. edn. (London, 1687), p. 
192.
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receiving their blessing, hasten to school... doing it with 
cheerfulness (189).
Shielded, presumably, by the ‘modest and comely garments’ which 
distinguish her fiom her masculine-feminine counteipaits, this young woman 
supplicates before God and her paients, not before a coipus of magistrates, and 
cheerfully goes about her prayers and to school. In its passage from preacher to 
conduct manual writer, the injunction to petitioners of both sexes to pray with 
‘feivency’ seems to have been lost. Even in her appeals to God the exemplary 
woman is taught to substitute a ‘glowing’ religious zeal for a more diluted, rosy 
cheerfulness. But having successfully effected Hortensia’s transformation fiom 
fiery, ‘masculine’ orator to ‘cheerful’ lady, Shirley still has work to do. Perhaps 
he was wonied tliat Hortensia’s giim defence of her own wealth would strike few 
as being among the most noble of causes. At any rate, the pleader who ventured 
into Shirley’s Rich Closet was guided down a different path. Instead of spealdng 
and acting, as did Hortensia, on behalf of a group of similarly antagonistic 
Roman Matrons, the young gentlewoman is encouraged to chmmel her powers of 
persuasion into preventing domestic sti’ife:
if youi* parents be angry with their Servants... do you 
become their Mediator: And turn not, by any means, youi* 
face from the Poor; but if it be in your power, without 
offending your Paients, relieve them; or, as you see 
occasion, petition on their behalf: by which demeanor you 
will command Love and Reverence, and gain the character 
of an humble spirit (195-6).
No willing paiticipant in civic affairs, Shirley’s exemplary woman is 
shown in the more familiar role of intercessor in household disputes. On the face 
of it, Hortensia and this lady appear to have little in common, but, oddly, Shirley 
makes no distinction between the behaviour deemed appropriate for each. Their 
circumstances and motivations aie certainly dissimilai*; the lady pleads on behalf 
of ‘Servants’ and ‘the Poor’, whereas Hortensia, on the other hand, pleads for 
those (herself included) who will be much poorer if  her entreaty fails. In 
paiticulai's their scenaiios aie different, but where praise is lavished it is for
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qualities they shaie. Characterised by its modesty and decency, a woman’s 
petition will be undertaken in a spirit of cheerfulness and, most crucially of all, 
perhaps, will be Sic Vos Non Vobis —  not for ourselves. Though Shirley does 
not mention her, the example to be avoided in this model is suiely that of Fulvia, 
who not only ‘turned’ from a group of women threatened with relative poverty, 
but slammed her door in their faces. Considering the notorious ungraciousness 
of this unwilling suppliant, it is surely no accident that Shakespeare’s Antony is 
mocked by Cleopatra for his propensity to jump when ‘shrill tongu’d Fulvia 
scolds’. While the Egyptian’s famed ‘blackness’ may remind us of pots and 
kettles here, this may be one occasion when the Queen’s derision tells us more 
about early modem conceptions of Fulvia’s failings than it does about the spealcer 
herself.
But to argue that Shirley’s incitement to modesty was an imperative 
applicable to female petitioners only is to distort the evidence. Theorists and 
practitioners from antiquity through the Renaissance privileged a pleader’s ability 
to deliver a ‘decent’ oration. It is curious, in fact, that Shhiey chose to emphasise 
the maternal branch of Hortensia’s genealogy, when the very qualities he is most 
keen to promote were commonly reckoned to reside in her father. As Shirley’s 
reading of Valerius Maximus would have taught him, Quintus Hortensius 
himself, ‘thinking there was very much to be ascribed to a decent and com[e]ly 
motion of the Body, spent more time in practising that than in studying for 
Eloquence’ Similarly, the sub-title of John Bulwer’s Chironomia (1644) 
tellingly designates the ‘Naturall Gestur es of the HAND’ the ^Regulated 
Accessories or faire-spoken Adjuncts of Rhetoricall Utterance’. Chironomia^s 
‘Praeludium’ (which puns throughout with a T te-like relentlessness on the 
theme of hands) introduces the text by asserting that "Decencie is properly 
spoken of Gesture':
and is so looked for at the Hand of an Orator, that the 
defects of extemporarie and jejune Orations, have been 
covered by the Elegancies of this Artifice; and tliose that 
have come off unhandsomly with their expressions, for
Cited in Glenn, Rhetoric Retold, p. 191n.50.
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want of these comely and palliating graces of Elocution, 
were ever laughed at, and justly derided.^^
What is new here is Bulwer’s introduction of the threat of humiliation 
into the context of an oration— the means of avoiding it, by judicious use of 
‘regulated’, decent and comely gestures, is standard/^ Even Shalcespeare’s 
Hemy V, formerly the outrageously indecorous Prince Hal, is aware of the 
propriety of using such gestur es in certain circumstances. Unless one counts his 
advances to Katherine, of course, there is no point in this play at which Hal 
assumes the role of the suppliant petitioner. Still, on the eve of the battle of 
Agincourt he is responsible, nonetheless, for persuading a reluctant body of men 
to undertake a cour se of action unlikely to be particularly advantageous to 
themselves. Treating his soldiers to a little touch of Hariy in the night does not 
involve him subjecting them to a fiery or impassioned oration. On the contrary, 
as he works the crowd, the King’s solicitations bear more resemblance to the 
‘winning Rhetorick’ served up by Brathwait’s gentle speaker. Indeed, the Chorus 
speaks fondly of how Hal bids the soldiers
... good morrow with a modest smile.
And calls them brothers, friends and countrymen.
... Nor doth he dedicate one jot of colour*
Unto the weary and all-watched night.
But freshly looks and overbears attaint 
With cheerful semblance and sweet majesty.
Shalcespeare’s description of a male sovereign who, whatever else his 
failings, is seldom accused of effeminacy or sexual emasculation is replete with 
the same language of modesty and cheerfulness as pervades prescriptive conduct
John Bulwer, Chironomia (London, 1644), ‘The Praeludium’.
The point made by William Miller about the possible Ihik between ‘decent’ behaviom’ and the 
ability to ward off humiliation is interesting in this context. ‘As long as then humility doesn’t 
descend to the morbidity o f obsessively and perversely undervaluing their virtues’, he claims, 
humble people ‘have a near airtight defence against being humiliated and, for the most part, 
against feeling humiliated too’. John Bulwer is not necessarily stressing the ‘humility’ irrherent in 
‘comely and palliating graces’, but Miller’s comment does dr'aw together the advice given to 
orators by Bulwer and that given to the Shirley’s ‘humble spirited’ yoimg lady in quite a revealing 
way. See William Ian Miller, Humiliation: And Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort and 
Violence (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 148.
William Shakespeare, King Hemy V, ed. T.W. Craik (London and New York: Routledge,
1995), 4.0.33-40.
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manuals like Shirley’ In similar terms did James I instruct his own son, 
another Henry, to exercise the virtue of moderation in all his dealings. Tn your 
language be plaine, honest, natmall, comely, cleane, short, and sententious’, the 
King advised, ‘eschew... both the extremities’, and ‘let the greatest part of your 
eloquence consist in a naturall, cleane, and sensible foime of the deliverie of your 
minde’, ‘temper[ed]... with gravitie, quicknesse, or merrinesse, according to the 
subject, and occasion of the time’.^  ^ Reading both Shalcespeare’s and James’s 
descriptions of masculine exemplaiity against that of Brathwait’s ideal woman 
should therefore alert us to something important. One of the effects of this 
comparison is to help release women from at least one element of the double­
standard with which we automatically assume they lived. In short, when writers 
such as Brathwait praise Tomyris’s skill in ‘composing or moderating... her 
owne affections’ (171), when they commend the ‘moderation and discretion’ 
with which Penthesilea bore her losses (174), or the ‘wonderfull discretion and 
moderation’ displayed by Queen Amalasunta,^  ^they are not necessarily 
gendering this behaviour female.
In the light of such evidence it would be rash to claim that male pleaders 
were exempt from observing the rules governing an orator’s ‘comely’ deliveiy of 
his case. What I do believe is that the principles of ‘modesty’ and ‘moderation’ 
were more than a set of characteristics necessaiily possessed by the woman who
For an account that figui'es Hemy’s sexuality as more ambiguous see Richard Corum, ‘Hemy’s 
Deshes’, in Louise Fradenberg and Carla Freccero, eds.. Premodem Sexualities (New York: 
Routledge, 1996). Mobilising ‘Queer’ reading strategies, Corum reads this scene as 
demonstrative of Hal’s ‘longing for illicit male companionship’ (87), and implies that the King is 
what todcy’s reader would call a homosexual. A more complex treatment of the same subject is 
offered by Jonathan Goldberg in Sodometries: Renaissance Texts, Modern Sexualities (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1992), Unlike Corum, Goldberg does not forget that premodem 
sexualities cannot be classified in tenus equivalent to our own. He abandons the search for the 
‘sodomite’ per se, suggesting it would be a mistake to find that Hal is ‘offered up to homosexual 
deshe’ (161).
In this section of Basilicon Doron, James advises Hemy to look to his ‘speaking and language’, 
to which he joins his ‘gesture, since action is one of the cMefest qualities that is required in an 
oratour’. Having told him to eschew ‘both the exti emities’ in his speech, James proceeds to 
describe the benefits of ‘us[ing] also the like forme in your gestme; neither looking sillily, lilce a 
stupide pedant; nor unsetledly, with an uncouth morgue, like a new-comeover Cavalier’. See 
Basilicon Doron, or His Majesties Instructions to His Dearest Sonne, Henry the Prince, in The 
Workes (Hildesheim and New York: Georg 01ms Verlag, 1971), pp. 183-4. A facsimile of the 
1616 edition.
Tuvil, Asylum, p. 101.
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would set foot in this male-dominated profession. In the special case of female 
pleading, I would argue, they constitute nothing less than an entire subject 
position. A brief examination of the shared etymology of these words may help 
explain what I mean by this. The adjective ‘modest’ is derived directly from the 
Latin modestus —  modest, moderate, in due measure, from a pre-Latin stem 
medes-i the adjective ‘moderate’, borrowed from Latin moderatus, past participle 
of moderari— to regulate, from the same pre-Latin stem. Implicit in both 
words, then, is the idea of ‘measure’ (described by Johann Sturmius as ‘when in 
such things as doe agree, there is neyther to much nor to little’), the avoidance of 
extremes, more particularly of ‘regulation’.
The early modem reader curious to know the exact definition of 
‘moderate’ was informed by John Bullokar that it meant ‘Measurable, temperate, 
also to goveme or temper with discretion’ Published in 1616, Bullokar’s 
dictionary includes both the noun and the verb forms of the word ‘moderate’, the 
latter of which was first used in 1577 to refer to the action of ‘regulating’ or 
‘presiding’ over a debate.^  ^ What is described here seems to correspond with oui* 
own perception of what a chairperson does— that Bullokar gives the job to ‘a 
governor’ seems not to malce much difference. Yet to leave the definition here 
neglects the precision of his characterisation. Bullokar’s ‘Moderator’ (as his next 
entry confirms) is no ordinary regulator; he is, quite specifically, a '‘discreet 
governor’, who ‘keeps both par*ties’, as Thomas Blount also put it, ‘from i*unning 
into extreams’.^  ^ Both accounts suggest that early modei*n subjects found it hard 
to separate the idea of presiding over two parties (the action of moderation) from 
the quality of being moderate. Clearly, the prerequisite for any ‘moderator’ in 
this period was that he himself embody the quality of ‘moderation’.
Sturmius, A Riche Storehouse, p. 50v (mispaginated as p. 44v).
John Bullokar, An English Expositor (Menston: Scolar Press, 1967). A facsimile of the 1616 
edition.
See the Chambers Dictionary o f Etymology, ed. Robert K. Barnhart (Edinburgh and New York; 
Chambers, 2000), p. 670.
See Blount’s definition o f ‘Moderator’, in Glossographia (Menston: Scolar Press, 1969). A 
facsimile of the 1656 edition. Blount’s definition is obviously boiTOwed with slight vai iation 
from Bullokar’s description o f ‘he that keepeth both parties from beeing too exfreame’.
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Introducing into the equation one fuither meaning of ‘moderate’ — the 
sense that the OED describes as ‘Of medium or middling quantity’ — may help 
to hirther explain my comparison of a woman’s predilection for modesty and 
moderation to her ‘subject position’. It is this definition, with its connotations of 
centrality or ‘in-between’-ness, rather than the sense of ‘presiding over’, that will 
be emphasised in my own reading of Shakespeare’s suppliant women.
To illustrate this we must return, one final time, to a male-authored 
naiTative that itself seems to compare two species of female petition. The 
examples are drawn fi*om Thomas Heywood’s Curtaine Lecture, Both concern 
women who plead on their own behalf and both of these women are ‘Virgins’. 
Both stories supply the circumstances leading up to each woman’s defence of her 
actions; only one is heaid to defend them. Borrowed fi*om Seneca, Heywood’s 
first example centres around a ‘Vestall Virgin’, who was ‘summoned into open 
Court, and pleaded against’ for writing a verse —  'Felices nuptae, moriar nisi 
nubere dulce esf —  in praise of marriage.^  ^ The verse alone assures the 
magistrates of the Virgin’s flagrant pollution of her vocational integrity. For 
them her attempt at poetic composition can mean one of only two things: that 
‘she is either raptur’d with the thought of what she hath already proved, or 
exstasi’d with the conceit of that she hath not yet tried’ (42). Reasoning further 
that any innocent woman who wished to write on marriage would have made 
‘chaste Lucrece her theme’, they pronounce the Virgin guilty - condemning her 
as one who ‘undoubtedly ha[s] done the act’ (45).
These attacks on the Virgin’s character (founded on nothing more than 
the existence of her poem) aie never refuted, either by the Virgin herself or by 
Heywood. There is nothing remarkable, perhaps, in the Virgin’s failure to defend 
herself by recour se to the /rro-maniage arguments which any schoolboy of the 
period would have known. It is more significant that, although Heywood could 
undoubtedly have helped her, he self-consciously declines to play ‘the Advocate’ 
by ‘shewing what answer she might malce for herself (45). With the Virgin 
disabled firom offering any excuse for her conduct, Heywood talces the
Thomas Heywood, A Curtaine Lecture (London, 1637), p. 41.
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opportunity to salvage from it a moral lesson. Tf one facetious line ... might be 
so traduc’d and fane stietcht... how charie ought all Virgins to be? how carefull 
and cautelous in all their deportments?’ (46). In the context of this cautionary 
tale, there is little wonder that Heywood’s rudely versifying Virgin seems 
curiously absent from the proceedings against her.
Heywood’s very next example, by contrast, gives ample air-time to a 
woman in the process of defending herself against a male aggressor. Against the 
story of the ‘rude’ ‘Recluse’, Heywood approvingly places a more exemplary 
narrative, designed to ‘encourage all maidens how to behave themselves that they 
may be the better marrted’ (48). The story itself concerns a chance encounter 
between Galbrata Bertha, a girl of ‘extraordinarie beautie and vertue’ and 
daughter to a private Florentine, and one Emperour* Otho, visiting the city at that 
time on urgent business.
Participating one day in an early modern walk-about, Otho notices the 
beautifril Galbrata, whom he smgles out from a crowd of well-wishers. Upon 
returning to the Duke’s palace to dine, he proceeds to describe her to the 
assembled company, one of whom, it so happens, is the girl’s father, 
Bellincionus. Heywood does not mention (much less dwell upon) the motives 
behind Bellincionus’s next move, which is to summon his daughter with all 
speed to the palace. Galbrata obeys his command anyway, being an innocent, 
unsuspicious girl, and little expecting to be prostituted by her own father. 
Suggesting that he might like to find a more remote chamber, Bellincionus 
presents to the Prince ‘the Virgin by him so much praised ready to prostrate 
herself to your Majesty’ (54). Otho is evidently not repulsed by this prospect; 
Galbrata, on the other hand, is honified, and proceeds to defend her own right to 
preserve her chastity.
So persuasive is Galbrata’s petition that the amorous Otho withdraws his 
advances and, with a dramatic renewal of purpose, resolves to find her a worthy 
husband instead. Unlike the defence mounted by a certain Shakespearean virgin 
in similarly awkward circumstances, Galbrata’s plea is an object lesson in female 
deference and subservience. Her first action, indeed, is to deny ‘the Emperour 
her right hand, and with her left modestly put him back’ (55). Then, apologising
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to the Prince’s ‘high and sacred Majesty’, she informs him of the vow made 
between her and her Saviour never to lend her hand to any but her husband. 
Having established that this spouse does not yet exist, Otho asks her leave to 
supply one. Galbrata, fully aware that to refuse would signify a ‘great rudeness 
& indiscretion’, accepts his offer (58).
Brief as they are, these synopses show why Heywood’s second virgin is 
allowed to malce answer for herself while the first virgin is not. The first girl is 
being rewar ded for prizing her chastity above all else, the second, for holding 
hers too light. When measured against one ordered to defend her own ‘penning’ 
of ‘trifles’, Galbrata Bertha’s is by far the less ‘idle cause’. In addition to this, 
her answer is itself couched in the most pleasingly decorous of terms. Some of it 
is delivered from the floor, to which she has tearfully fallen ‘low upon her knees’ 
(56). And the whole petition is characterised by its ‘bashfull shame, and well- 
becoming modesty’ (56), its ‘low and well-beseeming obedience’ (57), and its 
‘discretion and modesty’ (59).
A plea delivered with ‘modesty’; a ‘well-beseeming’ carrtage: the 
similarities between Galbrata’s plea and those of the female worthies hardly 
needs pointing out. Distinguished by her ‘meane condition and quality’ from 
Amasia and Hortensia, Galbrata occupies exactly the same position in 
Heywood’s discourse as these women do in Shirley’s. As this writer kindly 
acknowledges, the ‘many examples’ of worthy women mean that space in which 
to praise them is at a premium, so that while the ability to deliver a ‘modest’ 
petition does not guarantee her admission to the ranks of successful female 
pleaders, its opposite certainly precludes it. However, the submissive and 
unthreatening nature of Galbrata’s petition is not the only reason we are allowed 
to hear* it. Another reason has less to do with the petition itself than with its 
eventual outcome.
Stripped of its local colour, Heywood’s story is simple: a man prostitutes 
his daughter, who makes an eloquent plea which succeeds in persuading a 
second, more powerful, man to alter his intended couise of action. The girl is 
then offered in marriage to a third man, himself under the patronage of the 
second. The story ends happily enough but several of its features aie curious.
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Although Heywood initially makes much of Bellincionus’s ‘base Pandarisme’, all 
censuie for his conduct in the affair is, as the narrative progiesses, effectively 
overshadowed by Otho’s magnanimity in bestowing Galbrata on a gentleman 
‘whom hee much favoiued’ (59). Immediately the Prince assumes control, in 
fact, the Florentine pimp drops out of the nairative altogether. Accompanied by a 
change in the story’s structure of authority, this shift may be read in almost 
graphic terms. The story begins with a tableau in which Bellincionus played the 
bawd, going-between Galbrata and Otho; it ends with Otho decisively rejecting 
the role of beneficiary and literally assuming that of benefactor. The lucky 
recipient of Otho’s generosity is told how the Prince has at length ‘found out a 
gift to reward him, and to remunerate his long and and faithfull service; such a 
one as might become the giver, and (withall) prove worthy his acceptance: and in 
the closur e of these words presented unto him the Virgin Galbrata Bertha’ (59- 
60).
The ideological implications of Heywood’s story will be only too familiar 
to anthropologists and cultural historians interested in the ties that bind. Theories 
originally posited by Marcel Mauss, in his seminal Essay on the Gift, have 
subsequently been developed by Claude Lévi-Strauss, Gayle Rubin, and Luce 
Irigar ay.^  ^ It was Mauss who first noticed the ‘significance of one of the most 
striking features of primitive societies: the extent to which giving, receiving, and 
reciprocating gifts dominates social intercourse’.^ "^ The significance of gift 
giving (whether the gift be a dance, a shell, a pig, or a spell) is that it expresses, 
affirms, or creates a link between the partners in an exchange. In this primitive 
context, Mauss claimed, gifts were the threads of social intercourse by which 
societies were held together in the absence of specialised governmental 
institutions. Lévi-Strauss’s contribution to this theory of social organisation took
^ See Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions o f Exchange in Archaic Societies, trans. Tan 
Gunnison (London: Cohen & West, 1969); Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures o f  
Kinship, trans. James Harle Bell and John Richard von Stuimer, ed. Rodney Needham, rev. ed. 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1969); Luce Irigaray, ‘The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of 
the Feminine’, in Margaret Whitfbrd, ed.. The Irigaray Reader (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 
pp. 118-32.
Gayle Rubin, ‘The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy of Sex’, in Rayna R. 
Reiter, ed.. Towards an Anthropology o f Women (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), p. 
171.
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the form of a radical gloss on Mauss’s idea of primitive reciprocity. He argued 
that marriages are the most basic form of gift exchange, in which it is women 
who are the most precious of gifts.^  ^ Precious, perhaps, but, as Gayle Rubin has 
adroitly observed:
if it is women who ar e being transacted, then it is the men 
who give and take them who ar e linked, the woman being a 
conduit of a relationship rather than a partner to i t ... And it 
is the partners, not the presents, upon whom reciprocal 
exchange confers its quasi-mystical power of social linkage 
(174).
Rubin describes this process quite simply as ‘the traffic in women’.
The centrality of this schema to kinship systems is indisputable. A 
twenty-fh'st century bride who walks up an aisle in a white dress is still fairly 
likely to be ‘given away’ by her father (or some equivalent male relative). This 
tradition malces Otho’s attitude to his ‘gift’ and himself as ‘giver’ seem rather 
less draconian, and only mar ginally more embarrassingly compliant with Lévi- 
Strauss’s model. This much is obvious; less clear is the precise significance of 
Galbrata’s petition in this context. Can the matter of female pleading be 
legitimately read in the light of such theories of social organisation? I thinlc it 
can. In one of the most recent appropriations of Lévi-Str auss, Eve Sedgwick 
shifts his parameters in order to explain the importance to patriar chal cultur es of 
what she terms male ‘homosociality’: social bonds between persons of the same 
sex.^  ^ The ingenuity of Sedgwick’s reading lies in its conflation of Lévi- 
Strauss’s theories with those espoused by another French critic, René Girard, in 
his Deceit, Desire and the Novel. In this text, Sedgwick explains, ‘Girard traced 
a calculus of power that was structur ed by the relation of rivalry between the two 
active members of an erotic triangle’ (21).
The affinity between Girard’s insistence on the bond connecting two 
‘active’ rivals, and Lévi-Strauss’s on that binding the (male) partners in a
‘What, will you not suffer me?’, the furious Kate asks her father, Baptista Minola, ‘Nay, now I 
see / She is your tr easure, she must have a husband’ (2.1.31-2).
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 1.
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maiiiage exchange, is not far* to seek. But what Sedgwick does is detach this 
graphic schema from the specific field of conjugal relations —  a move that 
enables her to talk more generally about ‘the special relationship between male 
homosocial... desire and the structures for maintaining and transmitting 
patriai'chal power’ (25). Put simply, Sedgwick’s thesis is encapsulated in the title 
of her text: in patriarchal societies the lines of power run between men. And they 
are fostered and kept open by the presence of a less powerful third party (usually 
a woman) who occupies a position between men. Sedgwick’s more permissive 
talce on the ubiquity of this paradigm for all power transactions thus provides the 
basis for my own reading of Shakespeare’s suppliant women.
Made manifest in Shakespeare’s work as a graphic schema that is 
reproduced time and again in his representation of women petitioners, there are 
several reasons why Sedgwick’s ‘between men’ paradigm is peculiarly relevant 
to the context of female pleading. One of the most obvious has its roots in 
classical proscriptions against female participation in civic affairs. In an analysis 
which inscribes another black mark against the name of Fulvia, Sarah Pomeroy 
compares the political manoeuvrings of this woman, Marc Antony’s ambitious 
first wife, with those practised by Octavia, his second:
While Fulvia’s policy had been to steer Antony against 
Octavian, Octavia’s was to mediate between the two men, 
and for her efforts she won the approbation of her brother 
and later historians. Her precedents for female intercession 
between factions of men were, of course, the legendary 
women of the early Republic, including the Sabine women 
and the delegation of women that dissuaded Coriolanus 
from attacking Rome.^^
Assuming the task of ‘going-between’ men in this way, Pomeroy insists, 
‘was the only traditionally commendable, active political role for women in 
Rome’ (186). Nevertheless, admitting that there was a classical provenance for 
female intercession still does not fully explain why the ‘between men’ paradigm 
seems so essential and recurr ent a feature of female pleading scenes. Providing a
Sarah B. Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity 
(London: Pimlico, 1994), p. 186.
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plausible explanation for it is harder than showing that it invariably was the case. 
Consider the evidence provided by the male-authored texts examined in this 
chapter. Spealdng broadly, early modem attitudes to female pleaders may be 
summarised thus: ‘feminine disputants’ were viewed with suspicion, but the 
‘worthiness’ of the case and, more cr*ucially,yôr and to whom that case was being 
pleaded, were decisive factors governing the degr ee of censure a female pleader 
could expect to receive for her tr ouble. Women who fought their own corners 
inevitably fared worst, as is shown by the gleeful alacrity with which Thomas 
Heywood talces up Juvenal’s example of Manilla: ‘a bold-fac’t Roman Matr on, 
who being frill of controversie, and through her wrangling having many suits in 
agitation, blusht not in open Court to bee her owne Advocate, and plead her owne 
causes in publike assemblies’.^ ^
Less typical (and perhaps more significant because less overtly 
misogynist) are male attitudes to women who plead on behalf of other women —  
not because they ar e tr eated especially harshly but because they ar e scarcely 
mentioned at all. Hortensia’s petition on behalf of the Roman matrons is 
anomalous in this respect; more commonly, nanatives of women promoting the 
interests of women tend to be removed from the category of ‘slcill in oratory’, 
say, and appropriated as evidence of quite different feminine traits.
The table of contents in Brathwait’s Ar ’t Asleepe Husband?, for example, 
promises to relay the tale of ‘a Finitive Girle desirous to excuse her lady’. We as 
readers, the legatees of stories in which loyal women like Shakespeare’s Emilia 
or his Paulina would defend their mistresses even unto death, may reasonably 
expect much from this ‘Girle’. In the event, all she is called upon to excuse is 
her employer’s lateness in receiving a gentleman caller, and, in what seems to be 
Heywood’s only discernible motive for telling the tale, to show how she is unable 
(without making an ignorant malapropism) to do even that. Before too long, as 
we have seen already, Brathwait will praise the ‘worthy’ Sophonisba for her 
efforts with the recalcitrant grave fathers. More interesting in this context is what
In /4 Curtaine Lecture, Heywood quotes Juvenal’s contention that ‘There is no cause in Court, 
nor act in State, / From which a woman cannot gr ound debate’ by way o f inti'oducing a section of 
text demonstrative ‘Of [women’s] wrangling and litigiousnesse’ (10-11).
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comes after his plaudits of this kind of rhetorical aptitude. His next section 
commends women active in the promotion of ‘JUSTICE’, included amongst 
whom is a woman Heywood is pleased to recognise for her unening refusal to 
defend her own daughter. When it comes to mounting a petition, the woman who 
would ‘usually interpose herself between men is accepted, the woman who 
speaks on her own behalf is not, and the third alternative— the woman who 
talces another woman’s part —  is so little countenanced that she seems, 
ironically, to wriggle out from under the net of male judgment and evaporate, 
harmlessly, away.
So why exactly should examples of this kind of female pleader prove so 
hard to come by? The answer must surely lie in what is at stalce in these 
scenarios. A woman who malces a successful petition to a man, either for herself 
or on another woman’s behalf, effectively alters the balance of power between 
them. For while the power to grant that request may remain a male prerogative, 
the successful female pleader has indisputably proved her own capacity for 
changing a male mind. This is a frightening prospect, and one to be avoided at 
all costs. As Sedgwick remarks in relation to the homosocial triangles that are 
the subject of her book:
for a man to undergo even a humiliating change in the 
course of a relationship with a man still feels like 
preserving or participating in a sum of male power, while 
for a man to undergo any change in the course of a 
relationship with a woman feels like a radical degeneration 
of substance (45).
Whilst I am reluctant to envisage Shalcespeare warding off ‘a radical 
degeneration of [male] substance’, I do believe that his insistent insertion of 
women between men in female pleading scenes might be read as an effort to 
contain the ambiguity generated by female excuse-making strategies, made 
manifest, in this case, in the figure of the female petitioner.
To claim that the case of Galbrata is illustrative of early modenr attitudes 
to female pleaders may therefore seem like a contradiction in terms. Galbrata 
pleads for herself and is still praised for her conduct: according to the model
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outlined above she ought not to have got off so lightly. The key to this example, 
however, lies in its male protagonist’s successful management of the outcome of 
this female petition. Whilst Galbrata obeys on every point the proscriptions 
against immodesty so harped on by male commentators, her successful petition is 
sufficiently anxiety-making to ensure that, by the close of Heywood’s narrative, 
she has been safely reinstalled in a subject position ‘between men’.
Heywood’s representation of this persuasive woman differs fiom the vast 
majority of Shakespeare’s only in its degree of subtlety. Not all Shakespeai'e’s 
suppliant women are so overtly jostled into a maniage contract that serves to 
reinforce their status as objects (rather than agents) in an exchange. This said, 
the analysis of the plays to follow will show how urgently this pattern is recreated 
in Shakespearean drama. Examining the playwright’s handling of Volumnia and 
Valeria in Coriolanus', Heimione and Paulina in The Winter's Tale', and Isabella 
and Mariana in Measure for Measure, reveals just how often Shakespeare 
resorted to this paradigm. Even those women who threaten to disrupt it, by 
pleading on behalf of other women, invariably get coaxed back into a position of 
reduced agency. A position, most frequently, between men.
Shalcespear e had access to two complete accounts of the classical story of 
Volumnia and Coriolanus, the older written by Livy, who began writing On the 
Foundation o f the City around 27-25 B.C., the other in Plutarch’s Parallel Lives 
(A.D. 104-115). It was this later source that provided Shalcespeare with most of 
the material for his play.^^  A comparison of this text with its sour ce suggests that 
one of the elements Shakespeare was most keen to preserve from the Parallel 
Lives was the centr ality it accords to the relationship between Coriolanus and his 
widowed mother. Shalcespeare took more, in fact, fiom Plutarch’s version of the
See Catlierine La Courreye Blecki, ‘An Intertextual Study of Volumnia: From Legend to 
Character in Shakespeare’s Coriolanus\ in Jean R. Brink, ed.. Privileging Gender in Early 
Modern England (Kirksville, Missouri: Sixteenth Centmy Journal Publishers, 1993), p. 82 and 
passim.
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climactic scene between mother and son than he did from any other episode in 
the source/^
One of the most important borr owings Shakespear e made fr om Plutarch, 
for our pmposes at least, was the manner in which Volumnia equips herself to go 
and plead. Shalcespeare’s Volumnia does not approach her son alone —  
accompanying her are Valeria, Coriolanus’s wife Virgilia, and his son, yormg 
Marcius. Coriolanus provides a Icind of running commentary as they draw closer:
My wife comes foremost; then the honour’d mould 
Wherein this trunk was fram’d, and in her hand 
The grandchild to her blood.^^
Although the soldier’s repeated references to this entourage prove he has 
not missed its significance, Volumnia persists in drawing her son’s attention back 
to her fellow suppliants. Even as he looks in torture upon the young boy whose 
‘aspect of intercession... / Great nature cries, “Deny not’”(5.3.32-3), Volumnia 
continues to underline their presence, reminding Coriolanus, lest he forget, that 
‘Even he, your* wife, this lady and myself / Are suitors to you’ (11.77-8). 
Unnecessary as these reiterations seem, there is no madness in Volumnia’s 
method. Well documented by classical orators, her str ategy of presenting the 
‘mother, wife and child’ (1.101) as an inescapable physical reality was reckoned 
to be an extremely effective incitement to pity. ‘Actions as well as words may be 
employed to move the cour*t to tears’, wrote Quintilian in the Institutio Oratoria:
Hence the custom of bringing accused persons into court 
wear ing squalid and unkempt attire, and of introducing 
their* children and par ents, and it is with this in view that we 
see blood-stained swords, fr agments of bone taken fr om the 
wound, and garments spotted with blood, displayed by the 
accusers, wounds stripped of tlieir* dressings, and scourged 
bodies bared to view.^^
Ibid., p. 85.
William Shakespeare, Coriolanus, ed. Philip Brockbanlc, rpt. (Walton-on-Thames: Thomas 
Nelson and Sons, 1998), 5.3.22-4. All subsequent references will be to this edition, and will 
appear in the text.
Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, trans. H.E. Butler, 4 volumes (London: Heinemann, 1920-21), 
IV, 6.1,30. On Aristotle’s account o f the enormous psychagogic power o f objects exliibited
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Shalcespeare’s dramatisation of the part played by Coriolanus’s family in 
Volumnia’s petition has its provenance in Plutarch. In his version of the story, 
Volumnia ‘took her daughter-in-law and Martins’ children with her, and, being 
accompanied with all the other Roman Ladies, they went in troop together unto 
the Volsces’ camp’ P  During the course of its journey from Plutarch (via Amyot 
and his tr anslator North) to Shalcespeare something has clearly gone missing 
fr om this episode. The final Act of Coriolanus sees ‘Vfrgilia, Volumnia, Valeria 
and young Martins Enter, sN'Vôa Attendants', but these ‘Attendants’ are clearly not 
the women of whom Plutarch speaks. So who ar e all Plutarch’s ‘Roman Ladies’ 
and where have they gone? One of their number, Valeria, is retained by 
Shakespeare; what is omitted (aside fr om any explanation for her presence) is the 
significance of her role. Hardly figur ing as one of Shakespeare’s famed ‘roimd’ 
char acters, Valeria had received a much fuller treatment at the hands of 
Plutarch.^ "^  ‘Now the Roman ladies and gentlewomen did visit all the temples 
and gods of the same, to malce their prayers imto them’, wrote the author of the 
Lives:
But the greatest ladies, and more part of them, were 
continually about the altar of Jupiter Capitoline; among 
which troop by name was Valeria, Publicola’s own sister ...
His sister Valeria was greatly honour ed and reverenced 
among all the Romans; and did so modestly and wisely 
behave herself that she did not shame nor dishonour the 
house she came of. So she suddenly fell into such a fancy 
... Whereupon she rose and the other ladies with her, and 
they all together went straight to the house of Volumnia,
Martins’ mother... Now all the train of these ladies sitting 
in a ring round about her, Valeria first began to speak in 
this sort to her:
‘We ladies are come to visit you ladies, my lady 
Volumnia and Virgilia, by no direction from the Senate nor 
commandment of other magistrate, but through the 
inspiration, as I take it, of some god above; who, having
dii ectly before the eyes of a juiy, see Cathy Eden, Poetic and Legal Fiction in the Aristotelian 
Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 15-16.
T.J.B. Spencer, ed., Shakespeare’sPhttarch (Hamiondswoilh: Penguin, 1964), p. 352.
On Valeria and the soui ces for this figure, see Judith Hallett, Fathers and Daughters in Roman 
Society: Women and the Elite Family (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 47-8.
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taken compassion and pity on our prayers, hath moved us to 
come unto you, to entreat you in a matter, as well beneficial 
for us, as also for the whole citizans in general; but to your 
selves in especial... Come on, good ladies, and let us go all 
together unto Martins to entreat him to take pity upon us, 
and also to report the tioth unto him’ (350-51).
Conspicuous by its absence from Coriolanus, its author’s exclusion of 
this episode prompts us to ask, as Catherine La CouiTeye Blecki has, why 
Shakespeare chose to ‘omit such a useful and powerful scene?’ (85). The effect 
of this departure from source is, in her opinion, to give ‘Volumnia a more 
profound role in the play because she becomes the spokesperson for all those 
who would save Rome, men and women, patrician and plebeian’ (85). But 
Blecki’s suggestion— that Volumnia’s role is enhanced through Shakespeare’s 
sacrifice of Valeria’s speech— fails to notice the significance o f what, precisely, 
he put in its place, hr effect he replaced it with nothing, for (as Blecki admits) it 
is left to Cominius to report on the likelihood of Volumnia and Virgilia turning 
suppliant. Extremely unhopeful that Menenius will succeed in persuading 
Coriolanus where he himself has failed, Cominius tells how he ‘kneel’d before’ 
Martins:
‘Twas very faintly he said “Rise”, dismiss’d me 
Thus, with his speechless hand ...
So that all hope is vain.
Unless his noble mother and his wife.
Who, as I hear, mean to solicit him
For mercy to his cormtry. Therefore let’s hence.
And with our fair entreaties haste them on (5.1.65-74).
This short scene talces the place of an episode to which Plutar ch gave 
considerable space. The Lives had shown a group of women who make a pro­
active decision to plead to another group of women, who plead successfully, and 
who join forces and travel to the Volsces’s camp, again to plead, hr 
Shalcespeare’s version of the story, by contrast, we are given hints about the 
women’s decision which echo with the vagaries of rumour*, and seem only to 
describe ill-defined projects: Volumnia and Virgilia, Cominius 'hears', 'mean 
to' solicit Coriolanus. Shakespeare’s departure from Plutarch also means that his
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account is missing the effect of Valeria’s careful emphasis on the Roman ladies’ 
independence of decision. They aie sent to plead, she assures Coriolanus’s 
female relatives, ‘by no direction from the Senate nor commandment of other 
magistrate’. Upon entering the camp, Plutarch’s Volumnia is met by men who 
‘did both pity and reverence her; and there was not a man among them that once 
durst say a word unto her’ (352). In Shakespeare, we are prepared for the same 
entrance of the suppliant women by a man who seems scarcely able to recount 
the news, so eager is he to be away to ‘haste them on’. The fact that Valeria (a 
woman) has persuaded Volumnia (another woman) to plead with Coriolanus is 
thus underplayed, at the same time as the role of Cominius and Menenius as 
instigators of the petition is emphasised.
As inconsequential as the phrase may sound, Cominius’s intention to 
speak with the putative suppliants and ‘haste them on’ is echoed elsewhere in 
Shakespeai’e, Indeed, the frequency with which this idea resurfaces, especially in 
the context of female pleading scenes, suggests that Cominius’s words aie far 
more significant than their throwaway quality would at first imply.
They occur again in Act II of The Winter's Tale, by which point Leontes 
seems finally to have relinquished his struggle against absolute paranoia. As his 
perfunctory disregard of the Oracle’s verdict later proves, Leontes is determined 
from the first to act as judge, jury, and witnesses all in the case of Heimione’s 
alleged adultery. Brought forward to speak on her own behalf in her husband’s 
kangaroo couit, Hermione puts to test Quintilian’s assurance that ‘Invocation of 
the gods ... usually gives the impression that the speaker is conscious of the 
justice of his cause’ P  ‘Your honours all, / I  do refer me to the Oracle: / Apollo 
be my judge’,c r ie s  Hermione in closing— a device rendered superfluous by 
Leontes’s power to overthrow any decision favourable to his wife. An 
implacable judge, hardened by hallucinatory suspicion, Leontes is invulnerable to 
the emotional appeals used to such effect by Shakespeare’s Volumnia. As we
Institutio Oratoria, (6.1.34). Aristotle discusses the Oracle as evidence in the Rhetoric, 
1.15.14.
William Shakespeare, The Winter’s Tale, ed. J.H.P. Pafford (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1996), 3.2.113-15. All subsequent references will be to this edition.
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have seen, Quintilian’s contention that the ‘practice ... of appealing to the 
judges by all that is near and dear to them will be of gieat service to the accused, 
especially if he, too, has children, a wife and parents’ (6.1.33), is exploited to the 
full by Volumnia. The visual impact of a bowing mother, a wife, and a son who 
wears an aspect of intercession, malces ‘melt’ (5.3.28) the man who functions 
simultaneously as accused and judge.
Working from the same principle, The Winter’s Tale's Paulina has rather 
less success. She has not reckoned, perhaps, on the strength of Leontes’s 
loathing for the cuckoo object he considers neither near nor dear to him. Hence, 
the baby girl whom Hermione’s woman lays before him prompts the King to 
issue a precipitous death sentence rather than to undergo a change of heait. 
Paulina’s plea on behalf of ‘his queen / ... His hopefril son, his babe’ (2.3.84-5) 
meet only with threats and insults. She is attacked as a ‘mankind witch’ (1.67), a 
‘crone’ (1.76), a ‘callat / Of boundless tongue’ (11.90-91), a ‘gross hag’ (1.108), a 
‘most intelligencing bawd’ (1.68).
Leontes’s anger at this point is clearly no catalyst for linguistic 
innovation. Enraged by Paulina’s impertinence, he clutters his speech with 
defamatory epithets, thus seeking refuge in the commonplace which linlced 
female loquacity to witchcraft, and sexual incontinence to both.^  ^ More 
noteworthy, perhaps, is what Leontes chooses to dwell on in this chain of 
associations; especially significant is his perception of Paulina as an 
‘intelligencing bawd’. Even when told of her cleaiiy stated intention to go 
between Hermione and himself, Leontes prefers to imagine Paulina as a pander 
for her mistress and Polixenes. That she has come in the capacity of intercessor 
between husband and wife is a possibility he refuses to countenance. Instead, the 
King’s wrath bui'geons out to embrace the male witnesses to this scene of female 
pleading; his hysteria fixing now on Paulina, now on her husband and the other 
lords. The defamation of Paulina’s character is thus punctuated with accusations 
of conspiratorial treacheiy among his male followers, targeted specifically at the
William Shakespeare, The Winter’s Tale, ed. J.H.P. Pafford (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1996), 3.2.113-15. All subsequent references will be to this edition.
”  On the conflation of verbal and sexual incontinence see Laura Gowing, Domestic Dangers: 
Women, Words, and Sex in Early Modern London {Oxfoxà:. Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 10 Iff.
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husband who ‘art worthy to be bang’d, / That wilt not stay her tongue’ (2.3.108- 
9).
In the space created by Paulina’s departure, Leontes’s ire comes to rest 
finally on Antigonus, whom the King is convinced ‘hath set on thy wife to this’ 
(1.130). Gesturing to the abandoned child, Antigonus is ordered to ‘Go, talce it to 
the fire; / For thou set’st on thy wife’ (11.140-41). This Antigonus emphatically 
denies; that ‘he is not guilty of her coming hither’ (1.144) the other lords willingly 
confirm. So why cannot Leontes be shaken in his belief that Antigonus is behind 
Paulina’s petition? That it is actually he who has ‘been so tenderly officious / 
With Lady Margery, your midwife there, / To save this bastard’s life’ (11.158-60)? 
Leontes’s irrationality has reached fever pitch, of course, which may be the only 
explanation necessary for his assiduous scapegoating of Antigonus. This said, 
Leontes’s reluctance to envisage Paulina as an intercessor between a woman 
(Hermione) and a man (himself) may be significant in more than its expression of 
the efforts of a distracted mind to fix blame upon any convenient object. The 
King’s propensity to recast Paulina’s own plea (on behalf of mother and 
daughter) as one that has actually been prompted by a man is not peculiar to 
suspicious rulers half-crazed with jealousy. Or perhaps it is. It occurs, at any 
rate, in another notorious Shalcespearean pleading scene, whose location this time 
is ‘A public place near the city gates’. The city is Vienna, the suppliants Mariana 
and Isabella, the play Measure for Measure.
Before looking at what happens in these female petitions, however, it is 
worth noting that they have only been made possible by the success of an earlier 
act of female persuasion to which we as audience have not been party. This plea 
has, in turn, been necessitated by another petition— that of Isabella to Angelo on 
behalf of her brother, Claudio. Despite her brother’s confidence in Isabella’s 
rhetorical prowess, the deputy remains invulnerable to her ‘prosperous aif.^^
Her attempt to ‘play with reason and discourse’ (1.184) appeals only to his baser 
instincts; when he relents, it is on condition that Isabella ‘yield[s] up [her] body 
to [his] will’ (2.4.163). And this, as far as Angelo knows, is exactly what she
William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, ed. J.W. Lever (Walton-on-Thames: Thomas 
Nelson & Sons, 1997), 1.2.183,
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does. But in order that Isabella’s eventual public accusation of Angelo might, in 
tmth, be false, the disguised Duke Vincentio batches a plan. Commonly known 
as the bed-trick, it involves the substitution in Angelo’s bed of Maiiana, Angelo’s 
abandoned bebotbed, for the votress whom be really desires. With this one 
simple switch, the Duke simultaneously preseiwes Isabella’s chastity intact and 
helps Mariana lose hers in a good cause. But having devised this plan single- 
handed, the Duke seems rather squeamish about recommending it to Mariana. 
Paialysed with coyness, perhaps, he leaves it to Isabella, whom Mariana has 
never met, to supply all the details.
One cannot help but feel for Isabella here. Her unenviable task is 
twofold: first, she must acquaint Maiiana, a stranger, with the unwanted advances 
made to her by the man Mariana still loves; second, she must persuade this 
woman to risk the consequences of sacrificing her own honour by attending 
Angelo’s assignation in her place. So by what means does Isabella secuie 
Maiiana’s complicity in this project? We never loiow. No willing audience to 
this conference, Vincentio tells Mariana to talce her ‘companion by the hand’.
The pair withdraw, leaving Vincentio to shift metaphorically ft om foot to foot, 
filling dead air with a monologue on ‘greatness’ which, as many critics have 
noted, is singulaily inappropriate to the occasion.
If this was all he had to replace it with, why did Shakespeare relegate an 
exchange with so much dramatic potential to the wings? Must we imagine a man 
so overcome with fastidiousness that he balked at giving voice to Isabella’s 
appeal to Maiiana for help?^  ^ Again we are in the realms of speculation, which 
dangerous tenitoiy can be avoided by means of the deft substitution of 
playwright for character so commonly practiced in criticism of Measure for 
Measure. Critics as diverse as Northrop Fiye and Jean Howard have commented 
on the role of Vincentio as Shakespeare’s stand-in ‘comic dramatist’; in Jean-
Other critics have offered alternative explanations. While accepting the theoiy (originally 
propounded by Warburton) that the unsuitability o f the soliloquy suggests it was taken from an 
earlier speech of the Duke’s, the editor of the Arden edition finds that, in other respects, 4.1. is 
‘dramatically consistent and structurally sound’. The point here is to introduce Mariana, he 
claims, and ‘the audience must also be made to know that she accepts the Duke’s plan, without 
having to hear yet again the stoiy o f Angelo’s requirements’, (xxi). Revealingly, Lever’s
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Pierre Maquerlot’s opinion, this play especially lays baie the dramatist’s reliance 
on the conventions of comedy —  conventions which, in this case, oblige him to 
entrust ‘some of his demiurgic powers to suiTogate characters like... Duke 
Vincentio’.W o rk in g  from similar assumptions allows Kenneth Gross to 
replace the question of why Shakespeare made Isabella’s explanation inaudible 
with a consideration of Vincentians reasons for putting the women out of earshot. 
Gross himself is puzzled by the Duke’s reluctance to give voice to his own 
scheme, but not unduly so:
Perhaps it should not smprise us that he is ready to 
insti*umentalize these women - as he instmmentalizes other 
deputies in the play, always displacing authority for his 
actions, disimplicating himself even as he implicates others 
... Even if we don’t suppose that the Duke has doubts about 
the bed tiick itself... we can see a whole realm of shame, 
embaiTassment, and umeadiness that the conversation might 
conjure up. It conjures up a set of spaces —  Angelo’s 
chambers and his double-gated garden— full of tr eachery.
Having Isabella talk to Mariana alone thus allows the Duke 
to keep his distance from his own contrivance, from having 
to hear- it talked about, as well as ftom any hesitancy or doubt 
we can imagine in the women themselves.^^
Gross’s explanation is plausible, certainly, but it forgets the fact that 
Shalcespeai'e not Vincentio wrote Measure for Measure  ^and that Shalcespeare, 
not Vincentio, decided whose speeches his audience would hear. Seeing the 
Duke’s dismissal of the women as a way of assuaging his own anxiety would be 
easier, were it not for the fact that his creator would, some four year s later, 
choose not to dramatise Valeria’s petition to Volumnia either. When considered 
in the light of this later omission of a female pleading scene ft om Coriolanus, the
conviction that Isabella’s petition would be tedious rather than dramatically powerful seems to be 
undeiwitten by a definite distaste for its subject matter.
Jean-Pierre Maqueiiot, Shakespeare and the Mannerist Tradition: A Reading o f Five Problem 
Plays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 168. See also Northrop Frye, The Myth 
o f Deliverance: Reflections on Shakespeare's Problem Comedies (Brighton: Harvester Press, 
1983), p. 23; Jean E. Howard, ‘The Difficulties o f Closure: An Approach to the Problematic in 
Shakespearian Comedy’, in A.R. Braunmuller and J.C. Bulman, eds., Comedy from Shakespeare 
to Sheridan: Change and Continuity in the English and European Dramatic Tradition (Newark: 
University of Delaware Press, 1986), p. 120.
Kenneth Gross, Shakespeare's Noise (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
2001), pp. 71-2.
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playwright’s decision to have Isabella spealc inaudibly ftom ‘aside’ may be more 
significant than either Gross or Lever are willing to admit.
These criticisms aside, there is one point on which my own and Gross’s 
analyses agiee entirely. His emphasis on Duke Vincentio’s propensity to 
‘insti'umentalize’ other characters is, I believe, one of the keys to understanding 
what is happening in the scenes of female supplication dramatised in this play.
When Isabella first approaches Angelo to plead on behalf of Claudio she 
is accompanied by Lucio, who accuses her of being too cold in her persuasion. 
Prompting her to a more rousing performance, his language explicitly linlcs her 
ability to ‘move’ Angelo to her ability to tempt him sexually: ‘Ay, touch him; 
there’s the vein’ (2.2.71); ‘O to him, to him wench; he will relent. / He’s coming, 
I perceive’t’ (2.2.124-5). From being too ‘cold’, Isabella begins to generate the 
kind of warmth encouraged by Brutus in Julius Caesar, who would be suie the 
conspirators ‘bear fire enough / To kindle cowards’. T h e  deputy’s subsequent 
immovability as an enforcer of the law might therefore be seen as his reaction to 
Isabella’s power to ‘move’ him. But ultimately, the Duke’s resolution of the 
dilemma created by those who have moved and been moved, suggests that he 
finds such inconstancy wholly undesirable in his subjects. Only he is permitted 
to move others, and move them he does, like players aiound a board, 
euphemistically describing his contiol as ‘direction’. ‘If you can’, he tells 
Isabella, ‘pace your wisdom / In that good path that I would wish it go’ (4.3.131- 
2). In doing so, he gives advice uncommonly similar to that offered by the 
writers of conduct manuals, who advised that ‘for your Caiiiage, in the general, 
let it be a Medium’. And suie enough, it is not long before Isabella is discovered 
in médias res. Although the women are given the opportunity to prove that they 
are not dishonest, in other words, it is on the condition that they are moved by 
him. And although they escape defamation, the Dulce engineers their restoration 
to grace on the open street, overtly denouncing their capacity to devise such a 
plot alone. The Duke’s vindication of the women thus involves a very public 
removal of their agency:
William Shakespeare, Jiilim Caesar, ed. David Daniell (Walton-on-Thames: Thomas Nelson & 
Sons, 1998), 2.1.120.
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Someone hath set you on.
Confess the tmth, and say by whose advice 
Thou cam’St here to complain (5.1.112-14).
This is a good ftiar, belike.
And to set on this wietched woman here 
Against om* substitute! (5.1.131-3).
While the Duke ostensibly acts to lessen the buiden of their blame, the 
effect is to pave the way for a triumphant demonstiation that it is he who has set 
Isabella and Maiiana on, in order that the quaiiy that is Angelo might be caught. 
The Dulce’s ‘instmmentalisation’ of his subjects is made necessary by Isabella’s 
ability to ‘kindle’ the inner fires of Angelo, and when he steps in to take 
possession of the erstwhile votress in Act V, the Dulce suggests that he is not a 
moment too soon: ‘for yoiir lovely sake, / Give me your hand and say you will be 
mine’ (5.1.488-9). Apparently, Isabella represents a danger to herself as well as 
to others; if she goes free, he might not be around the next time she accidentally 
tempts a man with half ftozen veins to ‘raze’ a sanctuaiy to the ground (2.2.171).
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Conclusion
Reflecting on Nahum Tate’s infelicitous addition of ‘a love betwixt Edgar 
and Cordelia’ in his infamous version of Shalcespeai'e’s Lear, George Colman 
goes on to note, in the ‘Advertisement’ to his own 1768 adaptation, that Tate ‘has 
not only given Edmund a passion for Cordelia, but has injudiciously amplified on 
his criminal commerce with Goneril and Regan, which is the most disgusting part 
of the original’:
The Rev. Dr Wai'ton has doubted, ‘whether the cruelty of the 
daughters is not painted with circumstances too savage and 
unnatural,’ even by Shakespeare. Still, however, in 
Shalcespeare, some motives for their conduct is assigned; but 
as Tate has conducted that part of the fable, they ai e equally 
cruel and unnatural, without the poet’s assigning any motive at 
all.'
Revealing as is this writer’s attitude to the ‘disgusting’ relationship 
between Shakespeare’s characters, I am more interested in the Waifon-Colman- 
Tate tiiangle here. Where Warton suggests that Shalcespeare has made his 
wicked sisters too wicked (though of this he seems unsure), Tate obviously 
considered them not wicked enough, and goes about fixing this deficiency in his 
own adaptation. Positioning himself in the middle, Colman implies that both are 
misguided, and, in doing so, points to Shakespeaie’s effort to excuse a pair who 
ai e suiely among the most inexcusable of his creations.
The comment is interesting for its overt reference to Shakespeare’s 
apparent inability to deal in ‘black and white’. At the same time, it also 
highlights the phenomenon with which I attempted to deal in Chapter I thr ough a 
comparison of the reactions of Ben Jonson and Samuel Johnson to Shalcespeare’s 
propensity to talce human ffaility in ‘the better part’. The inability of Warton, 
Colman and Tate to agr ee on the implications and consequences of Shalcespear e’s 
tendency to assign motives, or to ‘paint’ with ‘circumstances’, gives a good sense
 ^George Colman, The History o f King Lear (London, 1768), pp. ii-iii.
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of the ambiguity inherent in the playwright’s own ability to create moral 
ambiguity.
By suggesting that Shalcespear e is willing to explore the motives driving a 
pair of women who, as their sister Cordelia claims, ‘spealc and purpose not’, 
Colman also touches on the subject I went on to investigate in Chapters III and 
IV. Having examined the gendering of rhetorical colour, a concept so well- 
documented as to be hackeyed, I attempted to convey a sense of the radical 
ambiguity inherent in female excuse-makers, ostensibly far* less blameworthy 
than Goneril and Regan, and to suggest that early modern audiences might well 
have attached to such women a negative moral charge which it is difficult for us 
to understand today.
At the start of this thesis I suggested that there were reasons other than the 
obvious one for beginning with prefaces. At its close, I hope I have shown that 
there ar e equally good reasons for not ending with an account of epilogues —  the 
context in which strategies of extenuation are most obviously brought to bear. 
Shakespear e, as I aim to have demonstrated, rar ely resor*ted to such ostentatious 
ways of making excuses.
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